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CHAPTER
ONE
INTRODUCTION
How voters and parties are linked and interact is one of the fundamental questions
of democracy. After all, voters delegate power to political actors who take decisions
on their behalf. At the core of a functioning relationship of representation, therefore,
is some congruence in preferences between voters and parties. Many factors affect
this relationship, ranging e.g. from electoral institutions to organisational structures.
An influence that is frequently discussed is the economy in general. It affects voters
as it does affect political parties. Changes in the economy affect citizens’ economic
prospects, standard of living, willingness to contribute to public goods and many more
aspects. Parties are affected in their access to resources, discretion for policy-making
when in government and, of course, on a policy level where voters expect parties to
present policies to promote their and others’ well-being. It follows that the economy
has very strong implications for political processes of representation and preference
aggregation.
In this dissertation, I study to what extent structural characteristics on the indi-
vidual level affect political behaviour and how these characteristics, on the aggregate
level, create incentives for political parties in their programmatic positioning. A com-
mon theme throughout this work is an interest in the political implications of economic
processes. More precisely, I am mostly interested in the role of homeownership and
variation in house prices on political processes on the individual and the party level.
As such, the structure of this thesis follows a stylised political process where structural
factors affect political behaviour on the micro level which then, on the aggregate, has
implications for political parties. Put differently, the chapters of this dissertation are
bound together by a politico-economic model that emphasises the relevance of the econ-
omy, and of housing and volatile housing markets in particular, on vote choice and party
competition. At the respective levels of analysis, I combine this more structural per-
spective on housing as an individual trait with political repercussions with well-known
approaches on political behaviour, party competition and political representation to
derive expectations. In combination, this dissertation focuses on voter-party linkages
and how these are affected by economic processes more generally.
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At the heart of this dissertation is the insight that economic processes have costs
and benefits which are unequally distributed across the electorate. The fact that some
individuals are affected while others are not, forms a basic precondition for the political
relevance of these processes. The ensuing idea is rather simple and not entirely new:
On the individual level, an economic process has different implications for political
preferences and political behaviour of exposed individuals. Given these differences,
political parties have incentives to respond to these developments if core voter groups
are affected.
One very interesting economic phenomenon of this kind that has received little at-
tention so far in comparative politics is housing. The most relevant difference on the
micro level is whether individuals rent or own the home they live in. Homeowners
and tenants differ on a variety of characteristics such as age, education or income.
Therefore, ownership status is linked to other criteria that are known to affect polit-
ical behaviour and thus, as an individual characteristic, should have indirect effects.
However, thinking in more detail about the implications of homeownership, there are
several additional channels through which it can take effects on politics. Most impor-
tantly, changes in house prices strongly affect the economic and financial well-being of
homeowners. While they benefit disproportionately from house price inflation, housing
market corrections with decreasing prices have far-reaching negative consequences on
household portfolios. Overall, homeownership as a trait of character and house price
developments should have effects on individuals which drive political processes on the
individual and the party level.
The papers that constitute this dissertation follow the idea of a micro-founded the-
ory of individual and party behaviour. As stated before, the characteristic I am mostly
looking at is asset ownership and the development of asset prices, in particular of hous-
ing assets, and how they affect political behaviour. Therefore, the dissertation and
my findings have implications for broader debates about the political consequences of
homeownership and housing markets which have attracted growing scholarly attention
in recent years. On the party level, I am then mostly interested to what extent the
political implications of housing affect political parties. To do so, I develop a theo-
retical argument about party responsiveness to core voter groups. In the third paper,
I further develop this argument and generalise it beyond housing markets to other
economic processes. The latter two papers, therefore, speak to debates about party
competition, partisanship theory as well as political representation and political econ-
omy in a broader sense. This introductory chapter has five purposes. Firstly, as all
papers, to some extent, refer to homeownership and housing as a so far understudied
economic phenomenon in political science, the next section will review the existing
literature on the political economy of housing. Subsequently, I move to the litera-
ture on party competition and partisan theory and review the most relevant literature.
Thirdly, I discuss the theoretical contributions of this dissertation in more detail and
clarify the implications of the work. Fourthly, I summarise the articles which consti-
tute this doctoral thesis before I ultimately discuss the implications of the dissertation’s
results.
2
1.1 The politics of housing and homeownership
Housing has become a salient issue over the past decade. Much attention has been
given to housing finance and its role during the global financial crisis. Besides, housing-
related problems remain major issues in many countries. In most places, affordable
housing becomes increasingly scarce calling for action from policymakers. Given the
specificity of the domestic housing system, the major issue concerns e.g. either high
rental costs (e.g. in Germany) or high purchasing costs (e.g. in the UK) which lim-
its access to homeownership with far-reaching consequences for individuals’ financial
planning over the long run. From these debates, it is apparent that housing remains
an important and heavily discussed issue across the globe. In this dissertation, I focus
particularly on the ownership dimension of housing and how homeownership affects
politics on the micro level.
To start off the discussion about the political implications of housing, it is worth-
while to give an initial overview of the two main indicators of interest, homeownership
rates and house prices fluctuations. Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of homeownership
rates across OECD countries for the period from 1975 to 2010. The thick line on the
left-hand side represents the per-year-average across countries. Several things are worth
discussing on this graph. It is easy to see that homeownership levels vary quite largely
between countries. Some countries remain below 50 per cent of homeowners through-
out the entire period (Germany and Switzerland, see right panel) while others (e.g.
Great Britain) are substantively higher at values of up to 80 per cent (Norway). This
points to different systems of housing provision across countries (Barlow and Duncan,
1994; Hoekstra, 2005). Looking at the evolution of homeownership, there is a posi-
tive trend across countries implying that homeownership has grown, sometimes quite
dramatically. In countries such as the Netherlands, typically characterised through a
large public housing stock until the 1990s, homeownership massively expanded after
the 1990s. In Norway, homeownership grew by 20 percentage points between 1975 and
1990. The average evolution shows a positive trend which washes out around the early
2000s and then remains at an average value of roughly 60 per cent homeowners. There
is substantial cross-country and over-time variation in homeownership which highlight
at interesting dynamics on housing markets.
Moving to the dynamics of house prices, Figure 1.2 plots house price indexes for a
sample of about 20 OECD countries. The left-hand side displays level values while the
right-hand side shows annual differences. Starting with the levels, there is substantial
variation across countries and over time in house price developments. Across coun-
tries, house prices on average grew steadily over the past 40 years. Only during the
global financial crisis of 2007/2008, housing markets collapsed across sufficiently many
countries to push down the overall average, as well. It is also evident that house prices
grew to a varying extent across countries. In some countries, the index rose to more
than four times the level of 1995 (e.g. Ireland or Norway) while in others they never
surpassed twice the 1995-level. The panel on the right-hand side is equally interesting.
Two things stand out from the visualisation. Firstly, there are a substantial number
of cases where house prices decreased to the level of the previous year. Although more
variation is located above the zero intercept as the average line shows, there is a non-
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Figure 1.1: Evolution of homeownership in OECD countries.
Left panel shows all countries with overall mean per year shown as thick line. Right panel shows evolution of home-
ownership rates in selected countries for illustration.
negligible number of instances where house prices dropped. Secondly, housing markets
have become more volatile over time. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, price changes
were relatively modest. Looking at the period after the 1990s, however, we see that
fluctuations on housing markets started to grow massively, pointing to an evolution of
relatively stable asset markets into more volatile processes with profound effects for
financial stability, but also household wealth (Ansell, 2014).
It has become clear that there is interesting variation in homeownership and housing
markets over time and across countries. What are the political consequences of these
developments? To answer this question, I move on to discuss to what extent housing
on the micro level is linked to politics. As a starting point, it stands out that individ-
uals who select into homeownership differ in several characteristics from tenants. For
instance, homeowners are typically older, more likely to be married, better educated,
members of ethnic majorities and also recipients of higher incomes (Barton, 2017; Gar-
riga et al., 2006; Segal and Sullivan, 1998). In addition, homeowners are on average
wealthier (Di, Belsky and Liu, 2007; Turner and Luea, 2009; Wind and Dewilde, 2017).
Homeownership rates also vary largely by region with fewer owners in urban areas
(Andrews and Sa´nchez, 2011b; Barton, 2017). As such, homeownership appears to be
an umbrella characteristic that represents social class which is typically linked to more
right-wing political beliefs and preferences (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2009; Manza,
Hout and Brooks, 1995). So, if we study whether homeowners behave differently than
tenants, this might first of all be the result of a selection into homeownership.
Beyond these selection effects, the literature has identified several channels through
which homeownership affects politics. Broadly speaking, there are three different ar-
guments. The first argument focuses on the interaction of the insurance function of
homeownership with welfare provision by the state. The second argument is related to
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Figure 1.2: Evolution of house prices in OECD countries.
Left panel shows nominal house prices with overall mean per year shown as thick line. Right panel shows annual
differences in house price indexes.
Note: Some time series on house prices were added manually with different base level values. This applies to the curves
which do not intersect the value of 100 in the year 1995. For these, only a comparison over time within the country is
valid.
the vested interests that owners are considered to have in their homes’ values and thus
evaluates an economic mechanism. Thirdly, homeownership has a strong ideological
connotation which affects political beliefs.
Moving to the first argument, homeownership is often considered as an integral part
of an individual’s welfare provisions. It closely interacts with social security systems
which often actively promote homeownership via tax incentives and other policies (An-
drews and Sa´nchez, 2011a). Homeownership usually represents the largest investment
that individuals carry out over their life-cycle (Ronald, 2008). It is a long-term finan-
cial commitment which is mostly financed by going into debt as households take up a
mortgage (Mau, 2015). Financing a house with a mortgage over a long period shifts
housing costs from old to young age which has important effects on economic secu-
rity after individuals have retired (Kemeny, 1981; Mau, 2015; Turner and Yang, 2006).
Many studies argue that homeownership acts as a savings vehicle that incentivises the
creation of equity and thus serves as a buffer stock against future economic shocks (Car-
roll and Samwick, 1997; Conley and Gifford, 2006). The decision to build up housing
wealth as a self-insurance instrument against old-age poverty and deprivation risk is
closely connected to general ideas about the welfare state and social security provision
(Conley and Gifford, 2006; Kemeny, 1981). A straightforward conclusion from these
aspects of homeownership is that it should affect individual preferences on redistribu-
tion and welfare provision by the state. Indeed, empirical research has shown that on
average, homeowners prefer lower degrees of redistribution (Andre´ and Dewilde, 2014;
Saunders, 1990). More recently, Ansell (2014) studies the connection between redis-
tribution preferences and house price changes. He argues that housing wealth which
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increases in value has an improved insurance function and therefore lowers the demand
for social insurance provision by the state. His findings support this argument that
particularly right-wing voters decrease their preferences for redistribution under house
price booms. On the aggregate level, there is a vast body of research that explores the
role of housing within the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hoekstra, 2003; Torg-
ersen, 1987) and the negative correlation between homeownership rates and the size
of the welfare state (Castles, 2005, 1998; Kemeny, 1981). Although causality in this
relationship is still unclear, the general view is that there are important interactions
between the promotion of homeownership by governments and the simultaneous pri-
vatisation of welfare provision through some forms of asset-based welfare (Delfani, De
Deken and Dewilde, 2014; Doling and Horsewood, 2011; Malpass, 2008). When house
prices increase, Ansell (2014) argues and shows that right-wing governments decrease
social spending under house price booms. In conclusion, there is ample evidence which
demonstrates that housing as a pillar of welfare provision has far-reaching implications
on politics on the individual as well as the aggregate level.
The second argument relates to homeowners’ vested interests in their property’s
value. In this argumentation, the political relevance of property values follows a pock-
etbook logic in the sense that owners have a stake in the stability or appreciation of
their property value and accordingly prefer policies or vote for parties that promote
these interests. This is strongly related to housing being a good with a dual nature.
On the one hand, homeownership represents a basic necessity as a shelter and a home
to live in. On the other hand, it also represents an investment good which is critically
linked to the development of its value.
How do these vested interests of homeownership affect political preferences? To
answer this question, it is important to take a closer look at the implications of an
investment into housing as this comes with several risks. A home is a non-diversifiable,
immobile investment that involves high transaction costs (Dietz and Haurin, 2003).
House values, however, can be affected by a variety of reasons, some more local such
as e.g. the influx of new social groups into a neighbourhood or infrastructure projects,
some more national or even global such as a bursting housing bubble or worsening
finance conditions on global markets (Mau, 2015). For aspects of both scenarios, there
is a rationale that links the protection of house values to political behaviour. In his
“homevoter hypothesis”, Fischel (2004) discusses how homeowners attempt to con-
serve their neighbourhood by opposing specific projects on the local level as well as an
increased political participation in general (Dietz and Haurin, 2003; DiPasquale and
Glaeser, 1999; McCabe, 2013). As property values are sensitive to these consequences
of government activity, voting for parties that promote stable property values acts a
sort of insurance against property loss. A similar argument applies to government de-
cisions taken on the national level. Mortgage-holding homeowners should prefer low
interest rates that minimise their refinancing costs as well as liquid housing markets
which guarantee rising prices (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008). Homeowners are ex-
posed to additional forms of taxation such as land transfer or property tax but also
disproportionately benefit from tax incentives and tax breaks (Schwartz and Seabrooke,
2008). Overall, support for parties which promote a smaller government, lower taxes,
less redistribution but also stable housing markets and lower refinancing costs through
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deregulated housing finance represents a viable strategy for homeowners who want
to protect their investment. A more recent strand in the economic voting literature
called patrimonial economic voting provides empirical support for the relationship be-
tween, among other asset types, homeownership and right-wing vote choice (Foucault,
Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2013; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2011; Nadeau, Foucault and
Lewis-Beck, 2010).
The third argument discussed above is less tangible in the sense that homeownership
has an ideological dimension which is linked to support for conservatism. This argument
has its historical roots in Marx’ and Engels’ work who have argued that workers who
acquire property develop ties with the capitalist system and become small capitalists
themselves (Engels, 1872). Others have argued similarly that homeownership gives
individuals a stake in the capitalist system and thus fundamentally alters political
beliefs (Castells, 1977). The most visible example of this strong ideological dimension
of homeownership is that it was at the heart of calls for a property-owning democracy in
the UK in the early 1980s. The Conservative party advanced an agenda of privatisation
of state assets in any form, from state enterprises to public housing, which expanded
homeownership massively. Behind this ideology was the very idea that ownership
gives individuals a stake in society which renders them, over time, more conservative
because individuals have something to lose and indeed, something to conserve (Jones
and Murie, 2006). Homeownership within this agenda was elevated to be a value as
such. It has often been argued that this ideological connection of homeownership with
the Conservative party, of course together with wealth transfer from public to private,
has created long-lasting support for the Tories in the UK (see chapter 2 for a more
detailed discussion of this case).
Overall, it becomes clear that there are on the one hand demographic as well as more
structural and ideological reasons that link homeownership to politics. The combina-
tion of economic incentives, insurance considerations and ideological connotations have
effects on individual political preferences, policy demand as well as political behaviour.
In this dissertation, I contribute to this literature in two ways. Firstly, in the
second chapter, I discuss and empirically assess how far homeownership and house
price changes affect vote choice on the individual level. Secondly, I build on these
findings and develop a theory of how parties should respond to house price fluctuations
as an increasingly volatile economic process. By doing so, I link the literature on the
political economy of homeownership with a research field where housing has so far been
neglected, party politics and political representation, and discuss and test for possible
interactions. To better illustrate this connection, the next section reviews the literature
on party competition and party politics.
1.2 Theories of party competition and party poli-
tics
The main focus of this dissertation is the link between voters and parties and how it
is driven by structural factors such as the economy. The previous chapter has intro-
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duced in how far economic processes, in this case homeownership and housing market
fluctuations, affect or describe voters’ policy demand and thus connect them to parties
with specific policy offers. In this section, I want to turn the perspective away from
voters and move to the party level. Here, the question of main interest is an issue of
political representation. If voters are affected by the economy, what does that imply
for political parties and how should we expect them to respond to the preferences of
the electorate?
Parties take up a crucial intermediate role in the link between voters and policy out-
put (Dalton, Farrell and McAllister, 2011). Although they are active in various arenas
as they e.g. create policy output when in government or engage in legislative debates,
I focus on the positions that parties communicate during electoral campaigns. Party
positions represent the first stage of how voters’ preferences are taken up by political
actors. Parties compete in elections with programmatic proposals which are, as I ar-
gue, less affected by institutional constraints in comparison to e.g. government policy
output. As a result, pre-electoral statements represent a relatively “raw” measure of
parties’ policy preferences and therefore a more direct connection to voters’ positions.
Empirically, party positions are fairly well measurable and comparable across countries
and over time as most parties, in some form or another, decide on their positions before
an election and write down and communicate their choices to the electorate (Budge
et al., 2001).
How parties take which positions during electoral campaigns is essentially a question
of political representation. Representation has many dimensions (Pitkin, 1967), yet
the most relevant one in this context is substantive representation (Miller and Stokes,
1963). After all, congruence between voters’ and policy-makers’ ideological preferences
is an integral part of democratic representation and described as “major claim and goal
of liberal democracy” (Huber and Powell, 1994, p.292). This is not only a claim which
has to hold in a static perspective. From a normative point of view, congruence also
has a dynamic dimension in the sense that parties should be responsive to changes in
e.g. voters’ preferences. This relatively straightforward idea of dynamic representation
(Stimson et al., 1995), therefore, serves as a starting point for reviewing the literature
on party positions and party competition.
Before moving to the literature, it is important to qualify that the perspective on
voter-party linkages applied throughout this dissertation is obviously incomplete from
a causal perspective. Focusing on the link from voters to parties, in this sequence, does
not imply that causality only runs one way. There is ample research that shows that
not only parties respond to voters but also the other way around (Zaller, 1992). For
instance, elites shape discourse and structure policy solutions which also affect voter
preferences. Zooming into one direction of the causal connection between voters and
parties therefore mainly serves the purpose of simplifying a very complex relationship.
It has become clear that I am mostly interested in the dynamic connection between
voters’ preferences and party positions. How can we theoretically grasp these links? I
identify two main models of representation from the literature that produce different
expectations on party responsiveness to voter preferences . Essentially, both models
boil down to the question of who parties are mainly representing, the general electorate
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or core voter groups. In combination with how economic processes affect the electorate,
understanding the dynamics behind representing either group is a cornerstone of the
theoretical perspective in this work.
Let us start with the general electorate model which follows the well-known spatial
approach as pioneered by Downs (1957). In this model, parties are seen as purely
vote-seeking (Strom, 1990). Party competition occurs between two parties in a uni-
dimensional policy space along which voters’ ideal points are distributed. This frame-
work produces the well-known median voter result which holds that parties maximise
their vote share by taking up the policy preference of the median voter. In a dynamic
setting, when preferences of the electorate shift parties should follow in the same di-
rection of these shifts until they, again, hold positions which are close to or at the
peak of the distribution. Empirical research has evaluated this model with respect
to party positions. Adams et al. (2004) investigate how parties shift their positions
in response to changes in public opinion. They find that parties indeed follow public
opinion, but only if it moves further away from their position. Put differently, parties
try to close the gap that emerges from a change in public opinion. Ezrow et al. (2010)
confirm this finding and qualify that it only applies to mainstream parties, that is
Social Democratic, Conservative, Christian Democratic and Liberal parties.
An important omission in this model is that parties do not carry any policy pref-
erences. Another model of representation builds on the observation that parties have
core voter groups to which they are closely connected (Dalton, 1985; Pontusson and
Rueda, 2010). Parties in this model are not pure vote maximizers and focus on the
median voter but represent the preferences of the mean party supporter. This model
is inspired by classical partisanship theory (Hibbs, 1977) which predicts that parties
pursue policies that benefit their core constituencies. A focus on core voters has impli-
cations for responsiveness. Parties should only be responsive to preference changes of
their core voters instead of the overall electorate. Reasons for this responsiveness by
political parties emphasise the relevance of core voter mobilisation for their electoral
success (Pontusson and Rueda, 2010) or access to resources from voter groups biased
towards the party (Miller and Schofield, 2003). Empirically, there is support for re-
sponsiveness to core voters for niche parties such as Communists, Nationalist or Green
parties (Ezrow et al., 2010). Similarly, other studies have emphasised the importance
of party activists for parties’ positions (Schumacher, De Vries and Vis, 2013).
As mentioned before, both models of representation differ mostly in an assumption
about the most important motivation for parties, that is whether they attempt to ap-
peal to the general electorate or to their core constituencies . The predictions of both
models, either a pure focus on the median or on the core voter, are fairly extreme and
empirically implausible. Therefore, I follow advances in the literature that acknowl-
edge that both of these models describe important underlying motivations for political
parties (Strom, 1990). Parties are vote- and policy-seeking, both at the same time. As
Pontusson and Rueda (2010) note, pure policy-seeking parties which never win elec-
tions have little value for their core voters while a pure vote-seeking strategy might
demobilise core voters. Integrating both models means that as both motives push par-
ties into different directions, they are under constant pressure to find strategies that
reconcile core and median voter interests (Aldrich, 1995).
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So far, I have only discussed models that theorise about how parties are linked to
voters and how different underlying models of representation produce different expec-
tations of party behaviour. There are, however, additional factors that influence to
what extent parties change their positions . Such factors include e.g. party organisa-
tion (Schumacher, De Vries and Vis, 2013), the behaviour of rival parties (Adams and
Somer-Topcu, 2009), party type (Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow et al., 2010) and economic
conditions (Adams, Haupt and Stoll, 2008; Ezrow and Hellwig, 2014; Pontusson and
Rueda, 2010). These contributions all showcase the value of spatial theory to under-
stand party competition under the consideration of other contextual factors (Ezrow
et al., 2010). Given these theoretical perspectives, what does that imply for the main
question of interest in this dissertation, that is to what extent economic processes
have an effect on voter-party links? The following section summarises the overarching
theoretical argument of this dissertation.
1.3 Theoretical framework
As stated throughout this introductory chapter, I am mostly interested in voter-party
linkages and how these are affected by economic processes. The most important eco-
nomic dynamic I investigate is, in how far homeownership and house prices affect these
links. However, the theoretical underpinning of the chapters in this dissertation also
applies to economic dynamics in a broader sense. In this section, I want to briefly
highlight these contributions of this dissertation.
The theoretical perspective of this dissertation can be summarised as a micro-
founded model of party behaviour. Building on a description of how the economy
affects voters to different extents, I theorise how this creates differential incentives for
political parties to respond. To do so, I integrate different theoretical approaches from
political representation, party competition and partisanship theory into a strategic
model of party behaviour.
Starting on the individual level, the main argument is that voters’ political pref-
erences and behaviour are affected by economic processes. This idea is not novel as
such as there is a large body of research looking at how the economy affects voters.
For instance, classical studies of economic voting focused on the role of the economy
on voters’ support for incumbent governments (Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck
and Stegmaier, 2009). I depart from this incumbency support focus and rather argue
that developments in the economy are positional issues with implications for voters
(Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck, 2013). According to this policy-oriented perspective,
voters who are affected by the economy, positively or negatively, will support parties
who are closest to their policy preferences. This represents the general framework on
the individual level. In chapter 2, I build on this insight and theorise and investigate
how far homeownership and changing house prices have such effects on individual vote
choice. Inherent in this theoretical framework is the possibility for asymmetric effects
of economic developments. Given that individuals differ in risk exposure as well as
possibilities to benefit from the economy, these dynamics do not unfold effects for all
political parties. For instance, voters of leftist parties are typically characterised to be
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more affected by income inequality (Pontusson and Rueda, 2010). If inequality rises,
this should matter more to these voters than to voters of the right who attach less
importance to the issue. In the other direction, asset-owning voters are typically more
supportive of right-wing political parties (Foucault, Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2013).
Developments on housing markets, therefore, have a more direct structural effect on
these voters. In summary, the economy can unfold asymmetric effects on voters which
in turn affect their political preferences and behaviour.
Building on this framework on the individual level, I continue that these unequally
distributed effects on the voter level have implications for political parties. As intro-
duced in the previous section, I theorise that parties have vote-seeking incentives which
push them towards the centre of the policy space as well as more policy-oriented or
ideological preferences which link them to their core voters and push them towards the
fringes. If the economy is perceived as a positional issue that affects voter preferences,
parties should respond to these dynamics. How they respond, however, depends cru-
cially on the surrounding economic environment as it alters the incentive structure for
parties. The argument makes two key predictions, on the likelihood and the direction
of the party response to an economic process. Starting with the latter, I argue that
parties prioritise the median over the core voter motive and moderate their position
when their core voters benefit from socio-economic change. If core constituencies, in
the opposite case, suffer from a socio-economic development, parties have strong in-
centives to polarise and move in their direction as a signal to core voters. Key to this
reasoning is that the economic situation of core voters is assumed to be informative
about the credibility of core voters’ threats to withdraw their support. If they fare
well economically, it is less likely that they are alienated and abstain or vote for some-
one else, so parties can moderate. If they suffer, however, this threat becomes more
credible and parties have strong incentives to signal support to core constituencies to
make sure they turn out. Overall, the economic environment, therefore, helps parties
to prioritise either of these motivations depending on the effect on core voters. Moving
to the likelihood of a response to the economy, the asymmetric logic introduced above
comes into play. If a socio-economic change affects one group disproportionately, e.g.
core voters of the right, the theory only predicts a responsiveness for parties of the
right while it remains more unclear for parties of the left. The result of the unequal
distribution of costs among voters is, therefore, an asymmetric partisan response to
the economy.
An important role in this discussion is taken up by ideology as a characterising
feature of parties and voters. Within the described framework, I have referred to left
and right parties as an overarching description of parties with distinctive policy profiles
who represents voters with similar preferences. Speaking to the larger literature about
party responsiveness, the theoretical argument has a second implication which results
in a second form asymmetry. The previous examples focused on economic change which
disproportionately affected one group of voters. It is possible, however, that voters of
the right are similarly affected, e.g. from unemployment, but in different directions.
The political economy literature argues that voters of the left are more exposed to un-
employment as such and therefore seek protection in the form of social benefits which
represents a position further to the left on an economic policy dimension. Voters of
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the right, who are less exposed to unemployment, might at the same time fear the
costs of addressing unemployment through benefits and therefore resist calls for more
redistribution or more taxes to refinance such policies. Therefore, if a socio-economic
development has functional complements in the sense that it affects multiple voter
groups similarly but pushes them into different directions, parties representing both
voter groups should respond, but in different directions. In such a context, the frame-
work, therefore, suggests that parties respond asymmetrically as well, but asymmetry
here describes that parties of different ideologies respond by moving in opposite direc-
tions. Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation further expand on these arguments and
test the theory with respect to a variety of socio-economic indicators.
This theory offers, as I argue in the subsequent chapters, a more flexible framework
to derive expectations about party behaviour. Depending on the effects of voter groups,
it can explain why parties shift their positions between elections and often change be-
tween more moderate and more polarising positions. There is a broad range of studies
that have dealt with similar questions, in particular regarding the connection between
the economy and party behaviour(Adams, Haupt and Stoll, 2008; Ezrow and Hellwig,
2014; Haupt, 2010). Most of these studies, however, theorise about this relationship by
focusing on how global economic relations and globalisation limit the capacity of nation
states to manage the economy. Only a few other studies focus on the influence of do-
mestic economic processes on party behaviour (Hellwig, 2012). Other contributions on
party position shifts have usually measured public opinion shifts more directly (Adams
et al., 2004; Ezrow and Hellwig, 2014). These approaches highlight how important it is
to develop micro-founded theories to understand party behaviour. In combination, the
focus on domestic economic processes and its effect on voters applied here represents
an innovative approach to the study of party behaviour.
1.4 Overview of included studies
1.4.1 Chapter 2
Three articles constitute this dissertation. Chapter 2 presents the first article entitled
”Patrimonial Economic Voting in the UK: Homeownership and House Price Appreci-
ation”. This chapter looks at the connection between asset ownership, asset market
developments and vote choice on the individual level. Theoretically, the article builds
on a recent strand of the economic voting literature which is mainly interested in the
effect of asset ownership on vote choice. Contributions to this literature hypothesise
that owning property alters an individual’s position within the economy and creates
vested interests that shape policy demand and ultimately voting behaviour. Sub-
stantively, this leads owners to vote for right-wing parties with a higher likelihood.
Evidence from several countries consistently supports the theoretical expectation that
on average, there are substantial differences in voting behaviour between owners and
non-owners (Be´langer et al., 2014; Foucault, Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2011; Lewis-Beck
and Nadeau, 2011; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Foucault, 2013; Persson and Martinsson,
2016; Stubager et al., 2014). Building on this observation, the main contribution of
12
the article is to focus on the underlying causality behind the observed voting differ-
ential. To do so, I further develop the theory behind patrimonial economic voting by
embedding it into a dynamic framework and present empirical results that give a better
handle on the co-development of property ownership and vote choice.
In the article, I focus on the most widespread form of property – homeownership – in
the UK. Following the literature on patrimonial economic voting, ownership of different
forms of assets should have a different impact on voting behaviour. For instance, assets
whose values have exposure to government interventions should have more influence
on vote choice as voting for pro-ownership candidates or parties can directly work as
an insurance against decreasing asset values. House values have substantial exposure
to government regulations of many forms, e.g. through zoning or housing finance
regulations, and therefore represent a very interesting case to look at. Furthermore, I
build on the more recent insight that levels of asset values should affect voting behaviour
(Persson and Martinsson, 2016). I further develop this argument and theorise about
how changes in asset values should affect vote choice deriving the expectation from the
literature that rising prices should increase the likelihood to vote for the Conservatives
in the UK.
To be able to empirically test these theoretical claims, I use data from a longitudinal
survey. The analysis consists of two steps. Firstly, I focus on the emergence of the
observed difference in voting behaviour. I firstly replicate the result of different voting
behaviour between owners and non-owners. Then, I ask how vote choice is affected if
we compare individuals who recently acquired their house to individuals who remained
non-owners. The results show that already shortly after the acquisition, owners are
substantively more likely to vote for the Conservatives. However, when analysing
whether this difference can be attributed to the purchase of a home, my results suggest
that it is rather likely that the voting difference already existed before the purchase and
some sort of selection into homeownership takes place which also affects vote choice.
UK voters who buy a house have a – on average – higher likelihood to vote for the
Tories already before the acquisition which is evidence for sorting into forms of housing
tenure based on political behaviour. Secondly, I am interested in how changes in asset
values affect vote choice. To test this, I focus on the sub-sample of homeowners and
investigate how far differences in reported house values affect their vote choice for the
Conservatives. In a first step, I find that levels of house values positively affect Tory
vote choice. Individuals with more expensive homes are more likely supporters of the
Conservative party. Secondly, I find that, in contrast to the literature and the proposed
theory, increases in asset values decrease the likelihood to support the Conservatives.
The results of both parts of the analysis are robust to a variety of different empirical
specifications.
Overall, the results of this paper challenge some of the conventional wisdom in the
literature. Firstly, selection effects are the most likely reason for a voting difference
between owners and non-owners rather than a change in policy demand due to asset
ownership. Secondly, house price increases, and therefore wealth increases, do not
directly translate into more support for right-wing parties, even in a setting as the UK
which represents a most-likely case.
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1.4.2 Chapter 3
In the second article in chapter 3 with the title ”An Asymmetric Partisanship Effect:
House Price Fluctuations and Party Positions”, the focus remains on the politics of
homeownership but moves to the level of political parties. In this study, I am inter-
ested in the implications of housing market developments on the positioning of political
parties. Building on the insight that homeowners are an important core voter group
for right-wing parties, I develop a more general theoretical argument on how parties
respond to socio-economic developments and test it by looking at housing markets.
Theoretically, I combine approaches from the literature on party competition, electoral
targeting and political economy. A critical question when theorising about party re-
sponsiveness is who parties are most responsive to. The classical Downsian response
to this question is that parties should target the median voter as this maximises elec-
toral returns. Other scholars have argued that parties have close ties to certain core
voter groups and therefore try to promote and implement policies preferred by these
voters. The literature on electoral targeting produces similar competing expectations.
From this literature, it becomes clear that parties are in a strategic dilemma in that
they have to strike a balance between attracting the median and the core voter. I
attempt to reconcile this contrasting results by arguing that parties always do both,
but contextual developments prioritise one goal over the other. If core voters are under
pressure, parties have an incentive to send signals of reassurance to their core voters.
If they are well off, parties have some strategic leeway to attract more moderate vot-
ers in the centre of the policy space. Which parties respond in the described fashion
then depends on the links between voters and parties and how certain voter groups
are affected by external shocks. I apply this theoretical perspective to fluctuations in
housing markets because they represent a so far understudied and interesting test case
for the argument.
With respect to housing market dynamics, two main questions emerge. Which
parties should be responsive to fluctuations in housing markets and how should they
respond? Theoretically, I answer the first question by arguing that right-wing parties
disproportionately represent homeowners. As a result, they should be particularly
responsive to their well-being while there is less reason to believe that left-wing parties
should do so, as well. The result should be an asymmetric partisanship effect in that
not all parties across the policy space respond to housing market dynamics. Building
on a growing literature about the impact of housing wealth on an individual’s economic
situation, homeowners’ well-being, I continue, is substantively affected by increasing or
decreasing house prices. If house prices grow, homeowners are well off and right-wing
parties have some discretion to move leftwards to the centre to expand their voter
base. If house prices decline, however, homeowners face severe economic threats, so
they move to the right to send signals of reassurance to their core voters.
Empirically, I test this argument for 18 OECD countries between 1970 and 2013
using a novel modelling strategy. I locate political parties on an economic policy di-
mension using several positional measurements and test how house price changes affect
the change in party positions. In contrast to existing studies on party responsiveness,
I identify parties of the right using a party’s position at the previous election and in-
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teract this measurement with house price changes. This modelling strategy directly
models the decision space that parties face when taking positions and avoids critical
assumptions about the homogeneity of parties within party families or across countries
and over time. My findings confirm the theoretical expectation that parties with party
positions further to the right move to the left when house prices increase. By symme-
try of the statistical model, this implies that when house prices drop, parties of the
right move to the right. Left-wing parties, in contrast, display no systematic positional
responses to house price changes. Substantively, liberal, conservative and Christian
democratic parties (on average) fall under the scope of the argument.
1.4.3 Chapter 4
While the presented results confirm the theoretical argument in this very first test,
there are some expectations and implications which cannot be tested and theorised
about when looking at house prices. Therefore, chapter 4 with the title ”Asymmetric
responsiveness: The effects of socio-economic developments on party position shifts”
widens the perspective and puts the general theoretical argument to a broader test.
Applying the developed theory about party responsiveness to house price changes gen-
erates the expectation of an asymmetric partisanship effect as not the entire electorate
is affected by housing market dynamics. Once we generalise this argument to other
developments, however, the expectations change slightly. Therefore, in this chapter,
Leonce Ro¨th and I discuss in more detail which incentives emerge from different exter-
nal shocks within the suggested framework and which parties should ultimately respond
to these shocks and how. At the core of the paper is, like in the previous article, the
insight that socio-economic developments affect the electorate to different extents. As
a result, parties of different ideologies who mostly represent different voter groups have
varying incentives to respond to these socio-economic developments. The result is a
second form of asymmetry where party ideology moderates the direction of the parti-
san response. This generalisation challenges the state of the art in empirical research
on party positions which assumes that parties of the entire political spectrum respond
uniformly to external changes. We argue that this is rather implausible when we look
at processes that affect voter groups differently. The expectations we derive from our
framework are similar to the previous chapter. When parties’ core voters suffer from a
certain development, parties move away from the centre and towards these voters. In
the opposite situations, parties can moderate their positions and move to the centre to
expand their voter base. In addition, we contest other findings in the existing literature
that mainstream parties are responsive to the median voter while niche parties focus
on their core voters. Within our framework, whether parties target core or median
voters is not a function of their “nicheness” but rather of external developments and
their effect on core voters. We, therefore, expect similar responses by both types of
parties.
We theorise about the impact that four carefully selected socio-economic develop-
ments (GDP growth, house price changes, changes in public debt and changes in income
inequality) should have on voters and derive expectations for the related responsiveness
by political parties. We are particularly interested in the overall result on the party
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system level where party moves can either lead to overall moderation or polarisation.
The selected processes should, theoretically, lead to party system moderation (GDP,
house prices) and polarisation (public debt, income inequality). Whether these ten-
dencies are driven by parties of the left and the right then depends on the relative
indicator.
Empirically, we test our claims using data on 18 to 36 countries from 1980 until 2017.
We specify regression models where we interact the socio-economic dynamic with the
lagged party position on an economic left-right dimension to evaluate our expectations.
We do so for all four indicators on the full sample of all parties before running separate
analyses for niche and mainstream parties. Our findings clearly refute the idea that
parties of all ideologies respond uniformly to socio-economic developments but that
responsiveness is moderated by ideology. With respect to the difference between niche
and mainstream parties, we do not find strong evidence for a systematic difference
between the two types of parties. Quite to the contrary, the results support our idea
that parties of all kinds respond to core voter pressure as well as attempt to move to
the centre to attract new voters. Our results, therefore, display a strong consistency
between voter and party responses. Overall, this chapter presents a more flexible
theoretical model on party responsiveness that allows deriving expectations on party
responses to a variety of socio-economic developments.
1.5 Relevance and broader implications
This dissertation is guided by an interest in the links between voters and parties and
how these are shaped by the economy. The theoretical and empirical contributions of
this dissertation speak to various literatures. In the following, I briefly highlight the
most important implications arising from this doctoral thesis.
One of the major interests of this work concerns the politics of housing, its forms
of provision and the development of housing markets. The results of this dissertation
challenge some of the existing findings in the field. The findings from chapter 2 provide
evidence that homeownership does not have direct political effects but rather indirect
results from selection into homeownership. At the same time, rising house prices do not
translate into increased support for the Conservative party in the UK but rather the
opposite. These findings have implications for further studies of patrimonial economic
voting which should be interested in similar causal perspectives and corroborate these
findings with data from additional countries. With respect to the house price effects,
these results also challenge findings by Ansell (2014) who finds that increasing house
prices push right-wing voters’ preferences and right-wing governments further to the
right. In contrast, the results of my study on the micro level as well as the result
of chapter 3 point in the other direction. There are some measurement differences
between the relative levels of analysis, however, the conflicting results are nevertheless
puzzling. Within the framework of this dissertation, however, the results of chapter 2
support the theoretical claims and empirical results of chapter 3 and present a coherent
picture that rising house prices decrease likelihood to vote for the Tories and right-wing
parties move towards the centre of the policy space. More research on the politics of
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housing, and in particular on the political implications of housing markets, is required
to understand this puzzle.
When we think about the broader relevance of the findings, it is easy to link the
studies to recent debates about wealth inequality. Housing wealth represents the most
widespread form of property ownership and access to housing wealth is often decisive
for future capital gains or losses. Due to recent booms on housing markets, there are
many countries where access to homeownership has become increasingly difficult. In
the UK, for instance, the homeownership rate is continuously dropping over the past
years, particularly among younger age cohorts (Barton, 2017). If some groups are
continuously excluded from wealth gains on housing markets, this has the potential to
cause severe political backlash. In particular, right-wing parties might face problems in
the future when fewer and fewer individuals are socialised into a homeownership culture
and thus potential electoral returns from privatisation of public housing wash out. At
the same time, asset markets have become increasingly volatile. If this trend is to
continue, this implies that their political effects might become larger and more salient
over time. Simultaneously, parties have growing incentives to respond if asset markets
remain volatile. Housing markets, in addition, will continue to play an important
role in the reproduction of wealth inequality. Overall, this thesis shows that housing
and homeownership represents an important political cleavage which will, albeit to a
varying extent in different countries, continue to have political repercussions in the
coming years.
With respect to the literature on party competition, political representation and
party behaviour, the findings of this dissertation have several implications. The expec-
tations derived from the core voter focus in this dissertation have received substantial
empirical support with respect to party positions. It is less clear, however, what the
electoral implications of the presented arguments look like. Two outcome variables
would be particularly interesting from this dissertation’s point of view, mobilisation
and vote share. Future research should extend this argument and investigate to what
extent both variables are affected by the revealed party position shifts. Simultaneously,
it would be very interesting to provide further micro-foundation of the link between
economic change and vote choice or voter preferences on the individual level to further
clarify the link between voters and parties under a changing economy.
Another issue that this dissertation touched upon was the moderating role of ideol-
ogy in determining party responses. Related studies have found that incumbent parties
of different ideologies are rewarded or punished to a different extent for issues they own
(Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck, 2013; Hellwig, 2012). It is, therefore, reasonable to as-
sume that there are interactions between particular issues (e.g. economic phenomena),
incumbency and the strategic leeway that political parties can use. As strategic leeway
in the presented framework always has to do with the mobilisation of core voters, a
very interesting avenue for further research is to study in how far differential turnout by
voters of the left or the right creates different strategic room for the respective parties.
As typical voters of the left often turn out in lower rates (Mahler, 2008; Pontusson and
Rueda, 2010), there might be a competitive advantage for these parties.
Furthermore, this study has mostly focused on an economic policy dimension. Over
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the past years, however, there is a growing consensus that party competition is in-
creasingly multidimensional. In particular, socio-cultural issues such as immigration
have become more important and increasingly dominate political debates. It would
be useful to better understand how parties respond to these dynamics by extending it
to and empirically testing this framework on a second dimension. After all, cultural
issues can have strong mobilising effects, in particular on core voters. The results from
Tavits and Potter (2015) indicate that there are important interactions between issue
positions on different dimensions. Therefore, to improve the framework developed in
this dissertation, it might be necessary to further study how the core voter motivation
plays out when adding a second issue dimension. This theoretical work could prove
highly fruitful for advancing debates on party strategies and party position shifts.
At the same time, party system fragmentation and polarisation are on the rise in
many European and Western countries. The presented theory contributes to this dis-
cussion in that it provides explanations for polarisation which can be driven asymmet-
rically by parties of one ideological camp. How the proposed framework will perform
in the future remains to be seen. It will be particularly interesting to see in how far
trends of fragmentation and more volatile partisan loyalties affects party strategies to
identify and mobilise core voters.
1.6 Publication status of the articles
The first article with the title ”Patrimonial Economic Voting in the UK: Homeown-
ership and House Price Appreciation” (Chapter 2) is a single-authored piece and has
been submitted to the British Journal of Political Science in early September 2018 and
is currently under review.
The second article entitled ”An Asymmetric Partisanship Effect: House Price Fluc-
tuations and Party Positions” (Chapter 3) is a single-authored article and has been
invited for revision and resubmission to the European Journal of Political Research. It
has been resubmitted on October 9th, 2018 and is currently under review.
The third article with the title ”Asymmetric Responsiveness: The Effects of Socio-
economic Developments on Party Position Shifts” (Chapter 4) is co-authored work with
Leonce Ro¨th and is, as of October 18th, 2018, currently prepared for submission to the
American Journal of Political Science. Both authors contributed equally to the study.
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CHAPTER
TWO
PATRIMONIAL ECONOMIC VOTING IN THE UK:
HOMEOWNERSHIP AND HOUSE PRICE APPRECIATION
Abstract
Recent contributions in economic voting show that asset ownership is associated with
support for right-wing parties. Moving towards a causal statement about the effect of
property ownership on the vote, I develop a dynamic perspective on patrimonial eco-
nomic voting and test it with longitudinal data. I focus on the acquisition of assets and
changes in asset values to discuss and test their implications on vote choice by looking
at the most widespread form of asset ownership, homeownership, in the UK. My results
show that recent homeowners are considerably more likely to vote for the Conservative
party. I present tentative evidence that this effect is mainly driven by selection effects.
Similarly, people owning more valuable houses also show a higher probability to vote
for the Tories. Surprisingly, when house values increase, the likelihood to support the
Conservatives decreases.
2.1 Introduction
Does asset ownership affect vote choice? While traditional studies of economic voting
emphasise the influence of the economy on vote choice (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Elias,
2008; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000), the recent literature suggests that property
ownership also plays an important role in determining the economic vote (Lewis-Beck,
Nadeau and Foucault, 2013; Nadeau, Foucault and Lewis-Beck, 2010; Persson and
Martinsson, 2016). Conceptually, those studies move beyond the perception of the
economy as a valence issue and argue that an individual’s position within the economy
is different when owning assets (Persson and Martinsson, 2016; Nadeau, Foucault and
Lewis-Beck, 2010). In general, there is ample evidence that asset ownership increases
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support for parties of the right, This highlights the importance to move beyond income
or occupational status when looking at the economic vote (Nadeau, Foucault and Lewis-
Beck, 2011).
So far however, the literature is not overly specific in terms of the causality behind
the patrimonial economic vote. The causal processes explaining the voting differential
are underspecified and the empirical analyses have so far only used cross-sectional data.
For instance, it is unclear how exactly an owner’s different position in the economy looks
like and how it influences political behaviour. Therefore, the main objective of this
paper is to move closer to a causal statement about the effect of ownership on the vote in
theoretical and empirical terms. To do so, I introduce a dynamic perspective1 into the
theory of patrimonial economic voting which helps to derive more concise expectations
on the causal processes behind the patrimonial economic vote. For instance, it allows
us to theorise more explicitly about what happens once individuals acquire assets or
when the value of their asset holdings change. As such, a dynamic framework informs
us about the emergence and development of patrimonial economic voting over time.
From an empirical point of view, a dynamic approach allows to distinguish between
different causal pathways such as a changing policy demand or selection effects.
The link from ownership to political behaviour should work differently for different
types of assets (Foucault, Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2013). I therefore focus on the most
widespread form of asset ownership in many countries: homeownership. Looking at
one asset type allows to be more precise about the impact of property ownership on in-
dividuals. Homeownership is a well-suited laboratory as it is the most widespread form
of property and often represents the largest financial investment of a lifetime (Ronald,
2008; Dietz and Haurin, 2003; Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008). I study the relation-
ship between homeownership and vote choice in the United Kingdom. It represents a
most-likely case for the patrimonial economic vote in a dynamic setting as its existence
there has already been confirmed (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Foucault, 2013). Moreover,
Britain is also the context where most anecdotal evidence about a conservatising effect
of property ownership, more specifically homeownership, has its roots (Dunleavy, 1979;
Williams, 1989). Typical descriptions focus on housing policy measures taken by the
Thatcher government that systematically created long-lasting electoral support for the
Conservative party. Overall, investigating homeownership in the UK is a promising
testing ground for a dynamic theory of patrimonial economic voting.
This paper firstly reviews the literature on economic voting before developing the
theoretical argument about the effect of homeownership on vote choice. The next
section presents the case selection, data and methods before turning to the results of
the empirical analysis.
1I use the term dynamic to represent a longitudinal view.
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2.2 Patrimonial economic voting
Patrimonial economic voting moves past the traditional economic voting model of in-
cumbency reward/punishment2 and argues that asset ownership motivates voters to
vote for the right (Nadeau, Foucault and Lewis-Beck, 2010; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and
Foucault, 2013; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2011). This effect has been shown for several
countries such as France (Nadeau, Foucault and Lewis-Beck, 2010; Be´langer et al.,
2014), the UK (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Foucault, 2013), the US (Lewis-Beck and
Nadeau, 2011), Denmark (Stubager et al., 2014) and Sweden (Persson and Martinsson,
2016).
Some authors leverage variation in asset types to further characterise the effect. For
instance, ownership of high-risk assets is found to influence the vote decision (Nadeau,
Foucault and Lewis-Beck, 2010, 2011). Subsequent studies argue that it is important
to refine the measurement of wealth and take into account the asset values(Foucault,
Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2013; Persson and Martinsson, 2016). In general, those find-
ings corroborate the relevance of property ownership in explaining vote choice for right-
wing parties. Owning high-risk and high value assets seem to systematically affect the
vote. In another qualification, Persson and Martinsson’s analysis of the Swedish case
with high-quality data on wealth holdings shows that assets most affected by govern-
ment policies matter most for voting behaviour (2016).
Most often, the literature argues that owning assets alters an individual’s position
in the economy and thus creates different economic interests (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau,
2011). Typically, reference is made to a classic Marxian or Weberian argument about
the position of an individual within the production process of the economy or how social
class is determined by economic interests3. Owning property creates vested interests
as owners seek to protect their wealth. Put differently, voters’ material self-interest is
assumed to be more important or at least different when owning property.
This implies that asset-owning voters have a different policy demand and evaluate
parties’ programmatic offers through the lens of their effect on asset values. Ultimately,
this should also affect who they vote for (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Foucault, 2013). It
is assumed that these different economic interests are best catered to by right-wing
parties (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2011)4. Persson and Martinsson (2016) move beyond
the binary owner/non-owner distinction and suggest that asset values are of crucial
importance to the vote. In their view, the material self-interest logic only starts to be
sufficiently relevant when assets held exceed a certain value and additionally increase
with the value of assets. In essence, this is a positional argument: Property owners’
ideal points should differ from non-owners’ preferences and thus lead to different vote
decisions. The relative importance attached to asset-relevant issues should also be
2See Duch & Stevenson (2008) for an overview.
3In essence, this is similar to a class voting argument, only that class is not determined by education
or occupation but by control over private property (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Foucault, 2013)
4However, this critically depends on the political context which is structured by political parties.
Depending on the programmatic positions of political parties, this link can be weaker or stronger.
See Hellwig and McAllister (2017) for an overview and similar argument in the Australian context.
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higher, thus amplifying the relevance of asset ownership for the vote (Persson and
Martinsson, 2016).
The link from property to the vote should look differently for various types of assets
as they differ e.g. in terms of risk or insurability (Nadeau, Foucault and Lewis-Beck,
2011, 2010). However, not only asset type should matter but also how the investment
into property develops. For this reason, I suggest to introduce a dynamic perspective
into patrimonial economic voting to better describe how property ownership specifically
is linked to political behaviour. A dynamic perspective forces us to think more in
detail about how differences in voting behaviour emerge and develop when asset values
change. Such an approach follows traditional economic voting arguments, which are
inherently dynamic, more closely. The classic incumbency reward/punishment logic
implicitly involves comparing the current state of the economy to another (experienced
or expected) state. For instance, Duch and Stevenson characterise economic voting as
”as any change in a voter’s support for parties that is caused by a change in economic
perceptions” (2008, p.41). Following this, I suggest to theorise about the impact of
changes in property owned on vote choice. The actual effect of causal interest for
patrimonial economic voting is therefore characterised as a change in a voter’s support
for right-wing parties caused by a change in their patrimony or portfolio of assets held.
This perspective allows to isolate two settings with testable implications from the
material self-interest logic which are interesting from a causal perspective: the acqui-
sition of assets and a change in their value. The theoretical expectations in these two
settings are clear: Individuals who have recently acquired assets or experience appreci-
ating asset values should more likely support right-wing parties following their interest
of shielding their wealth. In the following, I turn to homeownership, the asset class of
interest in this paper, and spell out how it should affect voting behaviour.
2.3 Patrimonial economic voting and homeowner-
ship
Homeownership has been included in previous analyses of patrimonial economic voting
(Nadeau, Foucault and Lewis-Beck, 2010; Persson and Martinsson, 2016). How it
specifically affects the vote according to the material self-interest logic depends on
whether we look at the acquisition or appreciation case.
Starting with the former, acquiring a house comes with several costs and risks
mainly associated with taxation, housing finance and other regulations which affect
housing wealth and ultimately voting behaviour (2008). Firstly, homeownership ex-
poses homeowners to several forms of taxation such as land transfer or property taxes
(e.g. council taxes). Consequently, recent owners experience a higher and more visible
tax burden (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008, p.6). Secondly, financing a house rep-
resents a considerable financial challenge and usually involves taking up a mortgage.
Thus, homeowners are liquidity constrained as they repay and service their mortgage
while simultaneously connected to global capital markets via the interest rate on their
mortgages (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008). This connection can prove critical as the
22
financial crisis has taught us how homeowners can go underwater when house prices
drop while interest rates and credit size remains stable (Aalbers, 2009). Thus, holding
a mortgage should affect preferences for interest rates. Additionally, mortgages are
usually subject to specific rules on e.g. the length of the repayment or the loan-to-
value ratio. At the same time, holding a mortgage often qualifies for tax breaks e.g.
in the form of interest payments being deductible from the income tax (Schwartz and
Seabrooke, 2008). In summary, housing finance affects voters’ pocketbooks directly
while the terms of repayment of the mortgage also exposes them to government regu-
lations. Thirdly, owning a house also creates a stake in other areas where governments
or authorities take decisions with effects on house values. Compared to other forms of
investments such as stocks, an investment into housing is notoriously difficult to insure
against. On the local level, research has repeatedly shown that homeowners engage
in ”not-in-my-backyard” behaviour and oppose the construction of e.g. power plants
in close proximity (Fischel, 2004). As governments and authorities also have a handle
on property values through zoning and land use regulation or control over building
permits, homeowners should have an interest in some form of insurance against these
risks. One possibility to do so is by supporting parties which promote the protection of
housing wealth also on the local and national level (Dietz and Haurin, 2003). Parties
which promote lower taxes, more liberal markets in general as well as more deregulation
of housing finance are usually right-wing parties such as the Conservative party in the
UK. Therefore theoretically, individuals who recently acquired property should have,
at least on the margin, a higher propensity to support right-wing parties in national
elections5.
Moving to the development of house prices, a slightly different causal mechanism is
at play. Some previously presented arguments about costs and risks continue to apply
such as e.g. the exposure to property taxes or mortgage regulations. However, varying
prices have additional consequences with political repercussions. Again, taxation is one
main channel through which rising prices affect individuals. Property taxes are often
bound to property values and might rise if property prices increase. Similarly, when
individuals want to sell or bequest their houses after price increases, capital gains or
inheritance taxes apply on the gains incurred in comparison to the purchasing price.
Increasing house prices can therefore directly affect owners’ pocketbooks. Simultane-
ously, rising values can also reduce income. For instance, households might disqual-
ify for means-tested welfare programs after an increase in the value of their property
(Ansell, 2014). Ansell (2014) shows that house price increases reduce demand for social
insurance and redistribution. He argues that homeownership serves as a buffer stock
through which households can self-insure against economic shocks by either selling or
5A critical assumption behind the electoral implication of ownership is that right-wing parties make
programmatic offers that protect property values best. This does not fully reflect party competition
and dynamics in position-taking. Left-wing parties such as the UK Labour party in the 1990s can take
up policy positions that offer similar protection to owners and thus weaken the electoral advantage for
right-wing parties (see e.g. Hellwig and McAllister, 2017). In addition, policies affecting homeowners
and their property’s value the most are often taken on the local level. Therefore, the most direct
electoral connection from property on the vote should be on this level. Nevertheless, I argue that
there is still a sufficiently important role for national governments in housing policy so that political
behaviour on the national level also represents a form of insurance against negative shocks on property
values.
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borrowing against their house. When house prices increase, this dynamic is amplified
and owners become less dependent and thus less supportive of the welfare state. This
preference shift to the right should also materialise in the voting booth. As households
incur capital gains on their house, they become more independent from and thus less
supportive of public schemes against adverse events. Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008)
argue similarly that house price dynamics affect the preferred level of public spending.
As with the acquisition of housing property, these arguments point to an increased
likelihood to support right-wing parties when house prices increase. Positions on re-
distribution are an important element of the overall economic policy programme by
political parties and right-wing parties usually advocate a smaller welfare state than
their left-wing competitors. The same argument applies with respect to the taxation
of capital gains or inheritance taxes. Following this, we should expect homeowners to
have a higher likelihood to support right-wing parties as house prices increase.
To summarise, the existing literature explains the voting differential between owners
and non-owners through a different policy demand resulting from different economic
interests. In a dynamic setting, this implies that voters who acquire assets or experience
changes asset values re-evaluate their policy demand and update their preferences which
ultimately translates into support for right-wing parties.
2.4 Empirical approach
2.4.1 The case: Homeownership in the UK
I study the effect of homeownership on vote choice in the United Kingdom. Homeown-
ership and housing generally have been contested and highly politicised issues in the
UK for decades (Pattie, Dorling and Johnston, 1995). The high saliency of the issue is
an important precondition for studying the patrimonial economic vote as voters must
be capable to evaluate in how far parties’ programs affect their interests. House values
and their development play an important role in the life of many UK citizens who wish
to ”move up the housing ladder” to build up property. This familiar saying mirrors that
many households rely on capital gains on their current residence to trade up to larger
and more expensive homes over time. On a more conceptual level, Dunleavy (1979)
has argued that housing, and in particular the difference between individualised private
property and collective public housing, represents a politically relevant cleavage in the
electorate. Still, one of the main reasons for the heated debates about homeownership
in Britain is that much of the previously large public housing stock has been privatised
by Conservative governments under Thatcher (Jones and Murie, 2006). Many com-
mentators, academics and journalists, have interpreted the privatisation of the public
housing stock in the UK as a classic example of pork barrel that created long-lasting
support for the Conservative party (Pattie, Dorling and Johnston, 1995).
Besides the substantial reasons to study homeownership in the UK, there is an
additional factor that justifies the case selection. Although a pro-Conservative tendency
among British homeowners is generally accepted, some point out that an approach
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striving for a more causal interpretation of the effect is necessary (Dunleavy, 1979;
Williams, 1989; McAllister, 1984). The dynamic perspective applied in this paper thus
aims to fill another gap inherent in the old debate about housing and politics in Britain.
2.4.2 The data and empirical strategy
Assessing the effect of patrimony on the vote in a dynamic setting requires data on
an individual’s housing situation and detailed information on political behaviour. The
dataset that comes closest to the requirements of this paper’s research goal is the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and its successor Understanding Society (UKUS).
BHPS and UKUS are two of the few large surveys that include information on re-
spondents’ housing status as well as political variables, in particular to measure party
support. The BHPS was run for 18 years (1991-2008) by the Institute for Social and
Economic Research (ISER) at the University of Essex. In 2009, the ISER launched
the UKUS which continued to collect data from a sub-sample of BHPS households,
thereby allowing to link respondents across waves from the two surveys. Every year,
around 5,000 households and 10,000 respondents were questioned thus offering a very
rich and powerful dataset6.
My empirical approach follows several steps. I firstly reproduce the cross-sectional
relationship between property and the vote by pooling observations from all survey
waves. Subsequently, I use the longitudinal nature of the dataset and analyse the two
test cases introduced above. To analyse the transition into homeownership, I use the
sample of all respondents who were non-owners at the first time they completed a
survey wave and then split it into a control group of individuals who remain tenants
throughout the survey and the ones who acquire a home over the course of the survey.
This represents an important improvement over cross-sectional approaches because it
creates better comparisons and zooms into the the early phase of asset ownership.
It allows to disentangle between early stage electoral implications and development
over time. From a research design perspective, this analysis follows the suggested
causal mechanism behind the material self-interest logic more closely. Subsequently,
I investigate the subs-ample of homeowners and examine in how far changes in house
values drive vote choice. To do so, I construct a measurement of house value change
by taking the yearly differences of self-estimated house values which are reported in
the dataset.
Homeownership, however, is not randomly distributed over the entire population so
that estimation results might be biased. For this reason, I take two additional steps to
evaluate the transition into homeownership. Firstly, treatment and control group can
still differ substantially in terms of other characteristics that might affect the outcome
variable. Although we can control for level differences, results from simple regressions
can be biased due to a lack of covariate balance. I expect the treatments ’homeowner-
ship’ and ’transition into homeownership’ to be strongly influenced by socio-economic
6For further information on the BHPS and UKUS see www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps and
www.understandingsociety.ac.uk
25
factors. A linear regression approach minimising squared residuals and strongly relying
on extrapolation is likely to make unrealistic comparisons (Imbens and Rubin, 2015).
There are different approaches to ensure covariate balance between treatment and
control group. These preprocessing techniques generally re-weight the data to ensure
that the control group serves as a good proxy for the unobserved counterfactual of the
treatment group. While matching approaches such as nearest neighbour or propensity
score matching have been popular, their application requires researchers to manually
work through a variety of algorithms to find an appropriate technique that maximises
covariate balance. Success and validity of these different matching approaches and their
application are strongly contested as they are prone to model dependence and often
fail to ensure covariate balance across all covariates (Hainmueller and Xu, 2013). As a
result, I follow Hainmueller’s approach (2012) and preprocess my data using entropy
balancing. This technique balances the distribution of variables between treatment
and control groups over a number of constraints such as first and second moments and
thus optimises covariate balance. Using the resulting weights to re-weight the data
ensures that treatment and control groups are best comparable given their observed
characteristics and should reduce model dependence and increase the reliability of the
results.
Secondly, I use the longitudinal nature of the dataset to run several difference-in-
difference models which can be interpreted as a series of quasi experiments. To do so,
I pool the annual data into inter-election periods and assign individuals a treatment
variable of zero if they were tenants in the election year t0 and all following election
years or one if they were tenants in t0 and owners in all following election years. This
approach helps in two ways: First, it controls for pre-treatment level differences between
treatment and control group in t0 and thus for selection effects. Second, it controls for
major changes in public support for the Conservatives between two elections that affect
both treatment and control group. From a causal perspective, this approach allows to
identify an effect from the treatment on the outcome variable under certain assumptions
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008, pp.185). The most critical identifying assumption is that
treatment and control groups are subject to parallel trends between t0 and t1. While
there might be concerns that in some of the inter-election periods this assumption is
violated, it is unlikely that the same non-parallel trends persist over all periods and
thus bias the results of all quasi-experiments.
2.4.3 Estimation and sample
The main dependent variable for all estimations measures support for the Conservative
party. I follow Tilley, Neundorf and Hobolt (2018) who also use the BHPS dataset
and develop a measurement of vote choice for non-election years which maximises the
number of observations. The variable is a composite measure of three survey questions
which report answers on whether respondents are closer to one political party than to
others, which party they would vote for tomorrow and which party they feel closest to.
The resulting variable is strongly correlated to the cleaner measurement of reported
vote choice. From this measurement, I construct a binary variable which is coded 1 if
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the respondent supported the Conservative party and 0 otherwise7.
The main independent variables of interest are the binary variable reporting transi-
tion into homeownership between and the variables on self-reported house prices and
their annual deltas. With respect to the house price estimations, I take the logs of
reported self-estimated house values and their annual difference to analyse the effect
of a change in the value on vote choice8. Using logs of house prices compresses the
distribution and helps to deal with outliers in the dataset.
The control variables for the different models are selected based on the existing
literature9. I include variables reflecting major social cleavages such as age, gender,
occupation, income, living in an urban or rural community or education10. In partic-
ular the inclusion of income, education and occupation matters as these are typical
measurements of social class. Any remaining effect after controlling for these factors
points to an independent and additional pathway from property ownership on Tory
support (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Foucault, 2013).
In order to control for the other common pathways of the economic vote, I also
include a variable that measures respondents’ ideological position on a left-right scale
ranging from 1 to 511. To capture some of the dynamics inherent in the British majori-
tarian electoral system, I borrow data from Gallego et al. (2014) to classify constituen-
cies depending on their propensity to vote for Labour or the Tories. This should take
into account that not all constituencies are battleground districts where single votes
might be pivotal and decisive12. Additionally, I include a constituency average council
tax rate into the analysis to control for the influence of different tax levels13.
I firstly present results from pooled logit models as baseline results. I start by look-
ing at homeownership in general and then move on to gauge the influence of transition
into homeownership on vote choice. All models are estimated with individual clus-
tered standard errors. Moreover, I include entropy weights to ensure covariate balance.
Subsequently, I present results from the difference-in-difference models which are es-
timated with linear probability models including entropy weights. Finally, I present
pooled logit models investigating whether rising house prices affect vote choice.
7As robustness check, I include results from models with alternative DVs in the appendix.
8Not all respondents can objectively estimate the value of their house as e.g. house price indexes
can. Nevertheless, if house values had an effect on political preferences or behaviour, it should be
driven by the subjective perception of increased wealth rather than objective measurements. As a
robustness check, I match official data on median house values on the constituency level to the survey
data and report these results in the appendix.
9I exclude a measurement for partisanship from the estimations. There are conceptual (see Price &
Sanders (1995)) and empirical reasons to do so as it limits the number of observations and absorbs
much of the variation.
10See e.g. Persson & Martinsson (2016) or Duch & Stevenson (2008) for similar specifications.
11As a proxy for ideology, I follow Ansell (2014) and construct an index from answers to six questions.
The questions used for the index ask for the respondents’ consent with several statements such
as ”The government has the obligation to provide jobs” or ”Private enterprise solves economic
problems” and increases in right-wing preferences.
12Constituencies are classified into six categories: Mixed, Safe Labour, Marginal Labor, Safe Tory,
Marginal Tory, Safe or Marginal Liberal Democrats.
13Due to frequent redistricting in many constituencies in the period under investigation not all re-
spondents can unambiguously be matched to a single parliamentary constituency for every election.
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I restrict the sample to respondents from England as the party systems in the other
regions, in particular in Northern Ireland, are characterised by very different dynamics
which might affect the analysis. The time period I am investigating (1991-2015) covers
three general elections which were won by the Labour party. Labour moved program-
matically quite far to the right in the 1990s, thus reducing the incentives for asset
owners to fear for their property under a leftist governments. I argue that this context
biases - if at all - against the hypothesised effect. To disentangle potential incumbency
effects, I also estimate the models for Labour and Tory governments separately and
present the results in the appendix.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Homeownership and transition into homeownership
Let us first look at the difference in support for the Conservatives between homeowners
and tenants. Models (1) to (4) in Table 2.1 present results from different configurations
Table 2.1: Homeownership: Logit Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Homeownership status 0.502 (0.000) 0.504 (0.000) 0.511 (0.000) 0.544 (0.000)
Age 0.001 (0.509) 0.001 (0.786) 0.001 (0.636) 0.003 (0.351)
Female -0.248 (0.000) -0.256 (0.000) -0.274 (0.000) -0.188 (0.009)
Education 0.057 (0.000) 0.070 (0.000) 0.069 (0.000) 0.090 (0.000)
Occupation -0.092 (0.000) -0.076 (0.000) -0.094 (0.000) -0.107 (0.000)
Log total income (last month) 0.130 (0.000) 0.119 (0.000) 0.109 (0.000) 0.019 (0.570)
Living in urban area -0.558 (0.000) -0.479 (0.000) -0.400 (0.000) -0.425 (0.000)
Has children -0.136 (0.000) -0.118 (0.004) -0.150 (0.000) -0.034 (0.588)
Marital status (ref: single)
Married/living together/civil union 0.233 (0.000) 0.231 (0.000) 0.230 (0.000) 0.041 (0.613)
Widowed 0.234 (0.152) 0.063 (0.727) 0.266 (0.137) 0.356 (0.265)
Divorced/separated 0.190 (0.005) 0.262 (0.003) 0.188 (0.009) 0.085 (0.485)
Average council tax rate 0.001 (0.000)
Parl. constituency (ref: Safe Tory)
Parl. Const: Safe Labour -0.733 (0.000)
Parl. Const: Safe/marginal LibDem -0.190 (0.014)
Parl. Const: Marginal Tory -0.044 (0.702)
Parl. Const: Marginal Labour -0.339 (0.000)
Parl. Const: Mixed -0.191 (0.005)
Ideology (ref: very leftist)
Ideology: Leftist 0.134 (0.234)
Ideology: Center 0.409 (0.000)
Ideology: Rightist 0.819 (0.000)
Ideology: Very rightist 1.427 (0.000)
Observations 156447 67340 142093 31343
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.064 0.073 0.113
Entropy balancing weights Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-values in parentheses
Respondent clustered standard errors, wave & region dummies included.
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of control variables all using entropy weights to ensure covariate balance. The samples
vary due to missing data, in particular on the geographical identifiers. Independent
from control variables or samples, homeownership systematically increases the likeli-
hood to support the Tories by a large magnitude. After ideology, it represents the
second largest predictor for Tory support. Translated to probabilities, homeowners are
roughly 10 percentage points more likely to support the Conservatives. This differen-
tial is quite large and possibly decisive in actual vote decisions at the margin. This
finding is in line with the results of previous studies arguing that real estate holdings
play an important role in the patrimonial economic voting framework (Persson and
Martinsson, 2016; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Foucault, 2013) and previous research on
homeownership and voting in Britain (Dunleavy, 1979). The novelty here is that the
results hold after re-weighting with entropy balancing.
Table 2.2: Transition to homeownership: Logit Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transition to homeownership 0.438 (0.000) 0.453 (0.000) 0.414 (0.000) 0.469 (0.006)
Age 0.011 (0.001) 0.009 (0.069) 0.011 (0.003) 0.009 (0.262)
Female -0.246 (0.000) -0.193 (0.063) -0.277 (0.000) -0.198 (0.226)
Education 0.049 (0.000) 0.051 (0.009) 0.060 (0.000) 0.094 (0.005)
Occupation -0.095 (0.000) -0.092 (0.000) -0.097 (0.000) -0.053 (0.153)
Log total income (last month) 0.173 (0.005) 0.133 (0.189) 0.174 (0.007) 0.086 (0.543)
Living in Urban/rural area -0.610 (0.000) -0.491 (0.000) -0.470 (0.000) -0.714 (0.000)
Has children -0.067 (0.371) -0.102 (0.335) -0.103 (0.195) 0.005 (0.980)
Marital status (ref: single)
Married/living together/civil union 0.036 (0.672) 0.069 (0.591) 0.026 (0.771) -0.267 (0.185)
Widowed 0.198 (0.613) 0.039 (0.949) 0.138 (0.747) 0.281 (0.700)
Divorced/separated 0.041 (0.780) 0.252 (0.231) 0.037 (0.807) -0.394 (0.269)
Average council tax rate 0.001 (0.001)
Parl. constituency (ref: Safe Tory)
Parl. Const: Safe Labour -0.657 (0.000)
Parl. Const: Safe/marginal LibDem -0.194 (0.167)
Parl. Const: Marginal Tory -0.496 (0.111)
Parl. Const: Marginal Labour -0.548 (0.000)
Parl. Const: Mixed -0.174 (0.193)
Ideology (ref: very leftist)
Ideology: Leftist 1.028 (0.031)
Ideology: Center 1.000 (0.032)
Ideology: Rightist 1.427 (0.002)
Ideology: Very rightist 1.784 (0.000)
Observations 19990 8690 18160 2759
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.080 0.086 0.140
Entropy balancing weights Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-values in parentheses
Respondent clustered standard errors, wave & region dummies included.
Let us look at the transition into homeownership. Table 2.2 follows the same struc-
ture as above, displaying the results of four models with different control variables. In
these estimations, I compare tenants who have acquired a home while participating in
the survey to the ones who remained tenants in all waves. In all models, transition
into homeownership is a strong positive predictor for the likelihood to support the
Conservatives. It increases the probability to support the Conservatives by roughly 8
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percentage points. The coefficients on the transition variable are stable across all spec-
ifications, pointing at a robust estimation result. Introducing further control variables
such as constituency type, average council tax rate or ideology into the models does
not change the results14. These results represent an important step forward: Individu-
als who recently acquired their home already have a substantively and systematically
higher likelihood to support the Tories. The voting differential thus does not largely
build up over time but is present from an early stage of ownership onwards.
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Figure 2.1: Homeownership and transition to homeownership and probability to vote Con-
servative
Figure 2.1 visualises the results from the first homeownership and transition mod-
els15. The estimations suggest that on average, owning or purchasing a house has a
strong positive influence on the probability to support the Conservatives. Individuals
having just purchased their house display a smaller propensity to support the Tories.
If we link this finding to the causal mechanism presented in the theory section, already
the acquisition of assets indeed affects voters on the aggregate to an extent that they
are more likely to vote for right-wing parties when compared to individuals with similar
traits who did not acquire assets.
It is worthwhile to highlight that the first contribution of the chosen dynamic re-
search design is that we gain a better idea on when ownership starts to exert influence
14Controlling for ideology, however, does not come without problems. Firstly, it limits sample size
as the questions from which the ideology index is constructed are only part of the BHPS. Empiri-
cally, including ideology may indirectly control for some unobservables which simultaneously drive
individuals into homeownership and supporting the Conservative party. However, the hypothesised
effect from asset ownership on party support or vote choice runs through a change in preferences or
policy demand which is also reflected in a measurement of ideology. Controlling for the latter holds
parts of the hypothesised causal pathway constant and thus suppresses the relationship of interest.
15Models (1) in Table 2.1 and 2.2
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on voting behaviour. Nevertheless, the presented results from the pooled logit models
have no causal interpretation in a narrower sense. What they show is that on average,
recent owners and tenants as groups differ considerably in terms of supporting the
Conservatives. However, this difference must not necessarily be driven by the home
acquisition. In an ideal world, it would be preferable to estimate a model with individ-
ual fixed effects which controls for time-invariant unobservable characteristics which
might bias the effect and could explain a change in party support with a change in
asset ownership. Unfortunately, there is insufficient within-variation in the dataset to
estimate such a model. A feasible alternative is to focus on the within-group variation
with a difference-in-difference design. In such a setting, the important difference to
the pooled estimations is that pre-treatment group differences are taken into account.
Consequently, it helps to evaluate whether the observed behavioural difference emerges
from selection effects or through the treatment. As the treatment in the data is received
at different points in time, I split the data into five sub-samples of inter-election periods
and investigate to what extent the difference in Tory support between treatment and
control group differs between elections.
Table 2.3 presents the results of these models. The main coefficients of interest are
the ones on the treatment and the interaction term. Firstly, in four of the five models,
there are substantial pre-treatment differences between treatment and control group
after controlling for all covariates. The similarity of the results is striking given the
varying sample sizes. Individuals who plan to purchase a home differ from the ones who
remain in a rental arrangement already before acquiring their home. Secondly, there is
no evidence in the data that recent homeowners have a higher likelihood to vote for the
Conservatives that is directly attributable to the purchase of a home. The coefficient
on the interaction term is relatively unstable and not significant at conventional levels
in all models. Treatment and timing of the treatment do not drive the two groups
further apart so that there is no direct causal effect from purchasing a home on Tory
support.
Table 2.3: Transition to homeownership: Difference-in-difference models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1992-1997 1997-2005 2001-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015
Treated 0.113 (0.222) 0.122 (0.017) -0.017 (0.822) 0.200 (0.004) 0.078 (0.009)
Post treatment -0.179 (0.016) 0.016 (0.744) -0.031 (0.572) -0.056 (0.684) 0.003 (0.905)
Treated × Post treatment -0.012 (0.895) -0.068 (0.223) -0.056 (0.684) 0.164 (0.544) 0.021 (0.529)
Age -0.001 (0.730) 0.000 (0.980) -0.004 (0.188) 0.010 (0.089) 0.001 (0.339)
Female -0.070 (0.233) -0.022 (0.581) 0.000 (0.995) -0.031 (0.693) -0.093 (0.000)
Education 0.016 (0.118) 0.004 (0.567) 0.002 (0.834) -0.002 (0.911) 0.013 (0.005)
Occupation -0.015 (0.196) -0.017 (0.046) -0.002 (0.864) 0.001 (0.952) -0.007 (0.215)
Log total income (last month) -0.010 (0.767) 0.025 (0.480) -0.031 (0.600) -0.088 (0.326) 0.059 (0.000)
Living in Urban/rural area -0.066 (0.357) -0.048 (0.374) -0.087 (0.367) 0.005 (0.966) -0.139 (0.000)
Has children -0.082 (0.135) -0.070 (0.143) -0.039 (0.523) 0.012 (0.905) 0.038 (0.128)
Marital status (ref: single)
Married/living together/civil union -0.045 (0.528) 0.065 (0.268) 0.008 (0.908) -0.157 (0.135) 0.061 (0.021)
Widowed 0.543 (0.000) 0.200 (0.189) 0.570 (0.043) -0.731 (0.034) -0.057 (0.518)
Divorced/separated -0.048 (0.587) 0.033 (0.690) 0.064 (0.592) -0.208 (0.365) 0.064 (0.233)
Observations 704 968 441 186 3325
p-values in parentheses
Linear probability model. Respondent clustered standard errors, year & region dummies included
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The parallel trends assumption is crucial for difference-in-difference analyses. There-
fore, Figure 2.2 plots the predicted probabilities of Tory support before and after
the treatment to illustrate how these groups behave before and after the treatment.
Here, I use yearly data and divide the dataset into 23 smaller quasi-experiments. The
thick lines represent the average of 23 quasi-experiments which cover all survey waves.
Treated observations have acquired their home throughout the survey while control
observations are defined as individuals who were tenants in the same waves. Both
groups differ considerably already three years before the purchase of the house and
remain distinctive throughout the plot. They do not display strongly non-parallel de-
velopments on average. There is a slight tendency of owners becoming more supportive
of the Tories one or two years before the purchase. Most importantly, however, from a
causal perspective is that the probability to support the Conservative party does not
increase after receiving the treatment. It is rather the case that individuals who intend
to buy differ from individuals who do not already before having acquired the asset.
Comparing these results to the pooled models, there are possibly unobservable fac-
tors that simultaneously drive treatment and outcome and which are captured by the
difference-in-difference models. For instance, if ones’ parents owned a home and sup-
ported the Conservatives, this might have a long-term influence on which party to
support. While my analyses corroborate the strong difference in the voting behaviour
between homeowners and tenants, they cast some doubt on the hypothesised mecha-
nism through which homeowners are considered to become Tory supporters. The UK
as a most-likely case for the patrimonial economic vote adds to these concerns. One
limitation of the evidence presented is, however, that individuals who purchase a house
might start to save up for the mortgage some years in advance and thus anticipate the
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Figure 2.2: Mean pre- and post-treatment probabilities to support the Tories by ownership
Red line represents tenants, blue lines represents owners. Thin lines in the background represent probabilities for single
quasi-experiments with a yearly timing. Thick lines represent averaged pre- and post-treatment probabilities of Tory
support by group. Results from logit models are available on request.
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treatment effect. Due to relatively small sample sizes in the single quasi-experiments
which form the basis of Figure 2.2, the results presented here should therefore be taken
as tentative evidence for selection effects behind the patrimonial economic vote. The
results are useful, however, to guide future research which should focus on designs
which help to understand anticipation effects and the associated effects on material
self-interest as well as the selection into property ownership and its link to political
behaviour.
2.5.2 House price volatility
Let us turn to the the development of asset values. Theoretically, the material self-
interest argument points to a positive influence of house values and appreciations on
the likelihood to vote Conservative. Table 2.4 shows the results of models following the
same logic in terms of control variables as the transition-into-homeownership models
before. It is important to note that the sample underlying these models differs from
the previous ones as it only encompasses all homeowners for whom repeated measures
of their house values are reported.
I start the analysis by firstly looking at house value levels. In all four specifications
house value levels exert a systematic positive effect on the propensity to vote for the
Conservatives. This confirms expectations of a general wealth effect which pushes
voters towards right-wing parties. The size of the effect is quite considerable. Figure
2.3 displays the substantive impact of the level of house values on the propensity to vote
Conservative following model (1). As expected, higher house values lead to a higher
probability to report a vote choice for the Tories. The model predicts a probability to
support the Tories of 36 per cent for a median house value of ∼ 170,000 GBP. This
likelihood rises to 55 per cent for a house value of ∼ 500,000 GBP (95th percentile of
the distribution).
It appears house value levels capture a more general and very powerful wealth effect
that drives voters to vote Conservative. This effect holds throughout all models, even
when controlling for local council tax levels, constituency type or ideology. So far, this
supports the findings of the previous literature which argues that patrimonial economic
voting only starts to work at certain levels of ownership (Persson and Martinsson, 2016).
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Table 2.4: Self-reported house values: Logit Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log of house value 0.659 (0.000) 0.626 (0.000) 0.560 (0.000) 0.562 (0.000) 0.704 (0.000) 0.675 (0.000) 0.605 (0.000) 0.609 (0.000)
Log change of house value -0.326 (0.000) -0.315 (0.000) -0.294 (0.000) -0.315 (0.000)
Age 0.001 (0.674) 0.000 (0.795) 0.001 (0.546) 0.006 (0.043) 0.000 (0.966) -0.000 (0.956) 0.000 (0.796) 0.006 (0.069)
Female -0.188 (0.000) -0.177 (0.000) -0.198 (0.000) -0.216 (0.001) -0.189 (0.000) -0.179 (0.000) -0.199 (0.000) -0.216 (0.001)
Education 0.085 (0.000) 0.094 (0.000) 0.092 (0.000) 0.096 (0.000) 0.086 (0.000) 0.095 (0.000) 0.093 (0.000) 0.098 (0.000)
Occupation -0.047 (0.000) -0.042 (0.000) -0.048 (0.000) -0.034 (0.010) -0.046 (0.000) -0.041 (0.000) -0.046 (0.000) -0.032 (0.015)
Log total income (last month) 0.079 (0.000) 0.098 (0.000) 0.080 (0.000) 0.013 (0.661) 0.079 (0.000) 0.098 (0.000) 0.079 (0.000) 0.014 (0.650)
Living in Urban/rural area -0.311 (0.000) -0.269 (0.000) -0.240 (0.000) -0.236 (0.002) -0.302 (0.000) -0.261 (0.000) -0.234 (0.000) -0.227 (0.003)
Has children -0.185 (0.000) -0.160 (0.000) -0.170 (0.000) -0.204 (0.001) -0.188 (0.000) -0.162 (0.000) -0.173 (0.000) -0.206 (0.001)
Marital status (ref: single)
Married/living together/civil union 0.218 (0.000) 0.165 (0.011) 0.216 (0.000) 0.092 (0.365) 0.228 (0.000) 0.172 (0.008) 0.225 (0.000) 0.103 (0.309)
Widowed 0.409 (0.006) 0.303 (0.112) 0.368 (0.021) 0.168 (0.587) 0.420 (0.005) 0.313 (0.101) 0.378 (0.018) 0.189 (0.541)
Divorced/separated 0.280 (0.000) 0.240 (0.013) 0.224 (0.006) 0.214 (0.163) 0.294 (0.000) 0.251 (0.009) 0.237 (0.004) 0.227 (0.138)
Average council tax rate 0.000 (0.007) 0.000 (0.018)
Parl. constituency (ref: Safe Tory)
Parl. Const: Safe Labour -0.534 (0.000) -0.521 (0.000)
Parl. Const: Safe/marginal LibDem -0.167 (0.028) -0.166 (0.029)
Parl. Const: Marginal Tory 0.036 (0.778) 0.032 (0.804)
Parl. Const: Marginal Labour -0.238 (0.000) -0.231 (0.000)
Parl. Const: Mixed -0.132 (0.054) -0.128 (0.061)
Ideology (ref: very leftist)
Ideology: Leftist 0.091 (0.464) 0.091 (0.466)
Ideology: Center 0.419 (0.000) 0.415 (0.000)
Ideology: Rightist 0.853 (0.000) 0.850 (0.000)
Ideology: Very rightist 1.278 (0.000) 1.272 (0.000)
Observations 87994 41000 80286 15552 87994 41000 80286 15552
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.061 0.070 0.095 0.073 0.063 0.071 0.097
p-values in parentheses
Respondent clustered standard errors, year & region dummies included
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Figure 2.3: Effect of house value levels on probability to support Conservatives
Spikes represent 95% confidence intervals around simulated point estimates using clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg and King,
2003). Simulations use results from model(1) in Table 2.4.
Let us move on to the analysis of changes in property values on Tory support.
Theoretically, we expected increases in house value to amplify the positive influence of
asset ownership on the probability to vote Conservative. In contrast to this theoretical
argument, house price changes in models (5) to (8) of Table 2.4 surprisingly have a
consistently negative effect. In all specifications, the coefficients are strongly significant
and robust. The magnitude of the effect is smaller than for house price levels. For
illustration, I simulate the effect using the results from model (1) over the distribution
of reported changes in house prices in Figure 2.4 at the median house value and mean
covariates.
A mean house value appreciation of ∼ 8,000 GBP lowers the probability to vote for
the Tories from 36.1 per cent to 35.7 per cent. The average observed annual change
in house values therefore does not systematically alter support for the Conservatives.
With more extreme observed house value changes, there is, however, a fairly sizeable
effect. A house price appreciation of ∼ 72,000 GBP (95th percentile of the distribution)
over a year reduces the likelihood to support the Tories from 36.1 to 33.5 per cent. For
sharper appreciations, we can uncover a substantial impact of house price changes
on Tory support, although not in the hypothesised direction. Although the observed
yearly changes are quite small, the compound effect over an entire inter-election period
leads to substantively important effects. By implication, the model predicts a positive
effect on the probability when house prices decrease. A decrease in log house value of ∼
30,000 GBP (fifth percentile) would increase the probability to vote for the Tories from
36.1 to 37.4 per cent. In the sample, however, most of the data points on house price
change are appreciations so that the results of the estimations are mostly driven by
35
.3
.3
25
.3
5
.3
75
.4
S
up
po
rt 
fo
r C
on
se
rv
at
iv
e 
P
ar
ty
-30k -13k 0 17k +50k +80k
House value change
Figure 2.4: Effect of changes in house values on probability to vote Conservative
Spikes represent 95% confidence intervals around simulated point estimates. Simulations use results from model (5) in
table 2.4.
variation in value increases. It is, however, surprising that the estimations contradict
the expectations on the influence of asset value development. Although levels of asset
ownership positively affect homeownership, an increase in the value of those assets
reduces the probability to support the Conservatives and mitigate the relatively strong
level effect.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I contribute to the discussion about an effect of property ownership
on vote choice. The literature on patrimonial economic voting argues that the asset
ownership plays an important role for the economic vote as it changes the position of
individuals within the economy. I make additional efforts to come closer to a causal
interpretation of the suggested link between property ownership and the vote. Using
longitudinal data from the UK, I am able to move beyond the existing cross-sectional
analyses in the literature and analyse in how far changes in homeownership status (i.e.
the transition into homeownership) and changes in house values affect the propensity
to vote for the Conservatives. I find that homeowners and individuals who recently
acquired their home in the UK have a much stronger likelihood to support the Conser-
vative party. Results from a difference-in-difference analysis suggest that this difference
is not caused by ownership as such. Individuals selecting into homeownership have a
higher propensity to support the Tories already before the acquisition. These results
highlight that further research on patrimonial economic voting with an interest in
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causality should focus more directly on the selection into ownership and its link to
political behaviour.
The evidence presented for selection effects casts some doubt on the causal mecha-
nism which emphasises how material self-interest immediately drives and even changes
voting behaviour. However, these findings do not entirely rule out the relevance of
material self-interest. Firstly, the suggested causal mechanism always runs through a
change in preferences first. Voting behaviour and party support is rather stable and
does not change often. Preferences on certain issues, however, may change more easily
and quickly. A changing importance of material self-interest might not have a suffi-
ciently large effect to change vote choice but might be decisive for positions on certain
issues. Consequently, future work on the patrimonial economic vote should look at
how preferences, potentially on issues related to property and its value, are affected
by ownership. This could be particularly interesting on the local level. Secondly, it is
important to further think about the timing of an ownership effect on the vote. Possi-
bly, individuals and households start saving up for their owned home long before the
ownership and already adapt their policy demand. Similarly, the difference between
homeowners and tenants is larger than between recent owners and tenants so that it
seems that recent homeowners catch up to the preferences of long-standing homeowners
over time. It follows that the timing of the treatment effect requires further attention
in future work. In addition, non-economic dynamics might also affect the link between
property and the vote in the acquisition phase. For instance, when people move into
new neighbourhoods or new contexts, they are exposed to alternative views on the
world which in turn affects themselves over time. Empirical support for this finding
remains ambiguous. Some authors argue that neighbourhoods do not really matter
(Williams, 1989; Dunleavy, 1979) while others find modest support (Gallego et al.,
2014). Further research on this particular mechanism might add to our understand-
ing of how asset acquisition drives vote choice. Overall, while casting doubt on the
proposed mechanism, the results from the difference-in-difference models have some
limitations with respect to data quality and should therefore be seen as a first step in
the dynamic analysis of the patrimonial economic vote which deserves attention from
further research.
Moving to the house price changes, I find that house value levels strongly predict
Tory support. This wealth effect corroborates previous findings (Persson and Martins-
son, 2016). Surprisingly, I find a negative effect of house price increases on the vote
choice for Conservatives. This contradicts previous research on preference changes in
response to house price increases (Ansell, 2014). The transmission of these preference
changes on party support does not work in the expected way. It appears that the entire
story of patrimonial economic voting is not as straightforward and linear as previously
described and the proposed causal mechanism of an increased importance of material
self-interest seems not to hold in this context. Instead, individuals do not move further
to the right trying to secure their recent wealth gains but rather moderate their vote
choice on average. As house prices are often closely linked to (regional) economic dy-
namics, this argument speaks to Kayser and Grafstrom’s model of luxury goods voting
(2016). They argue that support for the left increases during economic upswings while
in times of economic hardship, securing material interests becomes more important.
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As a result, voters cease to prefer spending on ’luxurious’ policies during recessions
which leads them to support more right-wing or conservative parties. Volatile asset
prices might trigger these electoral responses in an amplified way as asset price inflation
substantially bolsters household income while decreases in asset values can have devas-
tating economic consequences for individuals and families. Future work should examine
increases in asset values in more detail and take into account in how far they are related
to new or additional financial challenges e.g. through debt-financed investments.
Overall, I find that homeownership and house prices are strong and stable predictors
of voting behaviour in the UK. Political science research should make more efforts
to further explore in how far property influences political preferences and political
behaviour and should be particularly interested in a causal perspective that explores
the whys and hows of any of the empirically found effects. Future work should focus on
new data sources and explore other quasi-experimental and experimental approaches
to further qualify the link between property and the vote. Building on the results of
this paper, particular attention should be given to selection into homeownership and
the timing of asset acquisition. Concerning price developments, further research should
corroborate the negative effect and develop new theories on the impact of asset price
on political behaviour.
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CHAPTER
THREE
AN ASYMMETRIC PARTISANSHIP EFFECT: HOUSE
PRICE FLUCTUATIONS AND PARTY POSITIONS
Abstract
Political economy arguments on party behaviour usually address parties of the left
and the right. I introduce a novel argument which portrays house price changes as
an economic signal that right-wing parties disproportionately respond to in their pro-
grammatic positioning. This asymmetric partisanship effect is driven by homeowners’
importance for right-wing parties as a core voter group. Increasing house prices im-
prove homeowners’ economic prospects. Right-wing parties thus have some flexibility
to reach out to undecided voters by targeting the centre of the political spectrum.
Falling house prices, however, signal worsening economic outlooks for homeowners.
Right-wing parties thus have a strong incentive to send out signals of reassurance and
prioritise their core voters. For a sample of OECD countries from 1970 to 2014, my
findings support this argument. Right-wing parties move programmatically leftwards
with booming house prices and rightwards when house prices fall while parties of the
left do not respond systematically.
3.1 Introduction
Many studies examine how government partisanship affects policy outcomes (Hicks
and Swank, 1992; Alt, 1985; Hibbs, 1977), although it remains unclear whether such
an effect actually exists (Imbeau, Petry and Lamari, 2001; Schmitt, 2015). On party
positions, similar research investigates how parties respond to economic developments
in their electoral strategies and positioning in the policy space (Adams, Haupt and
Stoll, 2008; Adams et al., 2004; Adams, 2012). While those studies recognise how pub-
lic opinion, party structure and economic conditions interact to shape party positions,
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they do not explicitly consider that economic processes affect voter groups to differ-
ent extents1. I integrate this perspective from the partisanship hypothesis literature
into the study of party positions by analysing in how far economic developments that
differentially affect certain voter groups influence parties’ electoral strategies. One im-
plication of this more structural perspective is an asymmetric partisanship effect where
parties respond to the changing economic environment to different extents.
The theoretical argument has two main implications. Firstly, it characterises an
asymmetric partisan response to economic developments in the sense that parties repre-
senting particularly affected voter groups are disproportionately responsive. Secondly,
it sketches the direction of this partisan response by suggesting that political parties
attempt to strike a balance between two strategic motives that drag them into differ-
ent directions. On the one hand, I assume parties have strong ties to key voter groups
and particularly care about their well-being (Hibbs, 1977; Dalton, 1985; Cox and Mc-
Cubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996). In terms of party positions, this implies
that parties have an incentive to take up positions that mobilise their core voters by
formulating positions that match their preferences. On the other hand, I argue that
parties also have an incentive to expand their voter base by approaching other, ideo-
logically less predisposed voters (Downs, 1957; Stokes, 2005). Whether parties favour
one of these motives over the other depends critically on the surrounding economic and
political environment and how it affects core voter groups.
One of several possible examples of an economic process that should trigger such
an asymmetric partisan response are housing market fluctuations which improve or
worsen homeowners’ financial situation by changing their home values. I follow Ansell
(2014) and present homeowners as an important voter group for right-wing parties.
Housing market dynamics create incentives for the latter to focus either on the core or
swing voter motive. When house prices rise, and homeowners’ investments appear safe,
right-wing parties can turn to more centrist voters to attract new or swing voters. In
the opposite event, when house prices fall, the same parties have an incentive to send
out signals of reassurance to their core voters. We should thus see right-wing parties
carry out contrasting positional shifts in response to house price fluctuations whereas
leftist parties should not display systematic reactions to the same extent.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. Theoretically, I propose an argu-
ment that combines elements from partisanship theory, party competition and political
economy to characterise how parties respond to socio-economic developments in their
campaign manifestos. Empirically, I contribute to the emerging literature about the
political economy and politics of housing, yet at a so far neglected level of analysis: the
party level. I test whether parties systematically alter their positions using data from
the Comparative Manifesto Project on 155 parties from 18 advanced industrialised
countries over the period from 1970 to 2013. The results support the argument: Right-
wing parties disproportionately shift programmatically leftwards in times of house price
increases and rightwards when they decrease.
1Some studies consider a differential response by certain parties (Adams, Haupt and Stoll, 2008),
however they only focus on parties of the left and do not theorise about the direction of party
responses in a similar way. Moreover, the theory proposed here is built on a micro-foundation about
the impact of shocks on voters and thus more flexible in its application to other cases.
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3.2 How parties take positions and target voters
Following spatial models of party behaviour, empirical research on how parties adapt
their programmatic positions has focused on changing voter preferences (Adams et al.,
2004; Adams, Haupt and Stoll, 2008; Ezrow et al., 2010), economic developments
(Adams, Haupt and Stoll, 2008; Pontusson and Rueda, 2010; Ezrow and Hellwig, 2014)
as well as differences in party type and party organisation (Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow
et al., 2010; Schumacher, De Vries and Vis, 2013). Theoretically, the main question
in models of party competition is whether parties follow the median (swing) or the
median party (core) voter when taking programmatic positions. Two literatures pro-
duce the same (diverging) predictions on party behaviour with parties either choosing
a converging or polarising strategy.
Firstly, the literature on party competition or political representation has produced
models which emphasise the importance of the median or median party voter for party
strategies. The median voter approach assumes parties try to maximise their vote share
by focusing on the political centre (Downs, 1957; Ezrow et al., 2010). Policy interests
are less important as parties are ideologically flexible in order to match the median
voter’s preferences (Stimson et al., 1995). Parties choose their position in response to
voter preferences and select the position of the median voter as it yields the highest
probability to win an election. In contrast, the median party voter approach holds that
parties are responsive to their core constituencies to which they are traditionally linked
and have ongoing and close ideological commitments to (Dalton, 1985; Hibbs, 1977).
Here, policy preferences are more important than simple vote maximisation. Propo-
nents of this approach emphasise that parties cannot solely rely on the median voter
as winning elections essentially requires the mobilisation of core voter groups (Pontus-
son and Rueda, 2010). With respect to policy outcomes, the partisanship hypothesis
(Hibbs, 1977) builds on this view and portrays governments to make policy decisions
that particularly benefit their core constituencies. The main distinction between the
two models is their prioritisation of voters’ and parties’ policy preferences.
Secondly, the literature on electoral targeting, extends this framework to a second
factor, the allocation of redistributive benefits. Those studies identify additional factors
leading to either outcome, i.e. either the swing or core voter result. Here, two parties,
one left and one right, compete for votes. Voters have fixed ideological preferences
but also derive utility from benefits distributed by parties. These can increase their
vote share through the allocation of targeted benefits to certain voter groups.Cox and
McCubbins (1986) argue that parties hold informational advantages over the electoral
returns of benefits addressed to their core voters. As a result, politicians have incentives
to allocate benefits to core voters as they can design these benefits more efficiently and
generate electoral returns at lower costs and less uncertainty (Dixit and Londregan,
1996).
In contrast, others argue rational parties should not focus on core voters but target
swing voters instead. Stokes (2005) argues that core voters cannot credibly withdraw
support for their preferred party in lack of a viable alternative. Thus, parties should
not waste their resources on core voters but instead, use them to attract swing voters.
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Dixit and Londregan’s (1996) model can also predict the swing voter result when parties
fail to have special relationships to certain voter groups and the efficiency in delivering
benefits is similar across voter groups. Put differently, the marginal electoral benefit
of targeting swing voters comes at lower costs and thus beats a core voter strategy.
The presented models are not all developed to explain party positions in electoral
campaigns. For instance, the core and swing voter literature originally focuses on
the distribution of benefits across geographically delineated electoral districts which
allows a more tailored allocation of benefits to certain groups (Idema, 2009). I argue,
however, that considering policy positions as the intention to deliver benefits to voters
or to produce policy outcomes allows extending these frameworks to programmatic
party positions. Therefore, the indicated dynamics still provide a framework to derive
predictions on party behaviour.
3.3 The argument
Building on these two literatures, I propose a model that allows deriving expectations
on the direction of a party response as well as conditions for party responsiveness. Doing
so, I try to reconcile the diverging positional logic presented in the previous section
(Pontusson and Rueda, 2010; Idema, 2009). The argument is essentially dynamic
as it develops expectations about positional movements by political parties between
elections.
As a start, I argue that parties have two goals that push them into opposite directions
and which they need to balance (Aldrich, 1995). Several assumptions are necessary
for the argument. Policy competition takes place on one dimension along which the
distribution of voters is single-peaked. Parties have core voters who are to the left or
the right of the centre of the distribution of all voters2. Following the median/swing
voter logic, parties have an incentive to expand their voter base and appeal to swing
voters in the centre. At the same time, however, parties also have incentives to send
signals to their core voters to ensure they turn out at the ballot box. The first motive,
therefore, drags parties to the centre of the policy space while the latter one pushes
them towards the fringes of the policy space. I suggest that parties essentially try to
deliver to both groups but under different contextual circumstances (such as an external
shock), targeting one group becomes more important than targeting the other. When
an external shock hits and core voters benefit disproportionately, parties have some
margin to moderate their positions away from their core voters and move to the centre
2Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) empirically show that left-right voter distributions in 15 European
countries are approximately single-peaked. I assume that core voters have clearer ideological pref-
erences thus appear to the left or right of the centre of the policy space (see e.g. Ura and Ellis
(2012, p.282) for the US case). Swing voters, in contrast, can theoretically be to either side of a
political party in a multiparty context. Adams and Somer-Topcu, however, make the point that
most non-centrist parties can expect electoral gains from moderating their positions (2009, p. 680;
Ezrow, 2005). From this argument and based on the cited literature, it follows that the assumption
that swing or more easily swayed voters are in the centre of the policy space is reasonable, also in a
multiparty context.
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of the policy space. If their core voters suffer disproportionately, parties have a strong
incentive to send signals of reassurance to their core voters by polarising their position
and move away from the centre. Both moves are contingent on parties’ expectation
about their core voters’ turnout and voting behaviour after an external shock. I argue
that core voters in a good economic position are more likely to still turn out while under
distress, they might credibly threaten to not cast their vote or vote for an alternative
party.
On top of these positional dynamics, I propose that this behaviour is not necessarily
symmetric for parties of all ideologies. In principle, this behaviour should only be
observed for parties with clear links to core voter groups. If a relevant core constituency
is hit by an external shock, the representing party should be responsive. If parties
lack this electoral connection to certain voter groups, the model’s prediction is less
clear and competing parties should either be less responsive or not respond to the
external shock at all in their positioning. Given that voter groups often differ by
ideological preferences, the party response should be moderated by party ideology.
Depending on the party ideology, we should then see an asymmetric partisanship effect
where some parties, those with the electoral connection to a core voter group, respond
disproportionately strong to an external shock while others do not or at least show
more ambiguous positional responses. The asymmetry can also result from different
expectations about the turnout of core voter groups. If these expectations are not
equal between parties, a party that always needs to target its core voters to ensure
their mobilisation does not have the margin to moderate its position and should not
display the hypothesised behaviour. As a result, some parties might be able to use
their discretion while others do not3.
The argument applies in principle to a variety of external shocks. The main condi-
tions which need to be met are a clear electoral connection between a relevant voter
group and a party as well as a salient external shock that disproportionately improves
or hurts the voter group’s economic well-being. Researchers are left with the task to
identify contextual factors where we can observe the hypothesised behaviour. As a first
evaluation of the argument, I move on to introduce one of several testable implications
of the outlined theory: housing market fluctuations.
3Most of the cited models are based on two-party systems. In such a setting, a shift by one party always
affects the other party as it opens or decreases space for the competitor and a strictly asymmetric
effect is hardly possible. In a multiparty setting, however, it is possible that only some of the
competing parties respond to an external shock as party competition is more complex. For instance,
the incentives to move to the centre of the policy space are less clear. Swing voters, however, do
not necessarily have to be in the centre of the policy space but parties still face incentives to target
voters outside traditional core constituencies to expand their voter base. In such a case, swing voters
are characterised as ideologically close, but not entirely predisposed voters that parties attempt to
persuade at low costs. Targeting voters outside the core constituency also critically depends on the
existence of competition for similar voters. For instance, a party located to the very right of the
policy space might have more leeway to moderate and move to the left without losing voters than
a party that still faces competition from the right. In the empirical analysis, I take some steps to
control for these different forms of party competition.
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3.4 The case: Housing markets
Fluctuations on housing markets are not the most straightforward choice to test the
argument. So why should we be interested in changes in housing regarding party posi-
tions? The relevance of changing asset prices lies in the profound impact they have on
the economic and financial situation of a relevant subgroup of all households. Home-
ownership is far more than simply a form of housing provision: Financing a home often
acts as a savings vehicle and the accumulation of capital is frequently seen as a buffer
stock against adverse economic shocks (Turner and Luea, 2009; Di, Belsky and Liu,
2007; Dietz and Haurin, 2003). Fluctuations in house values, therefore, have important
implications. While house price increases generate often considerable capital gains for
homeowners, dwindling markets put households under severe financial stress4. This
profound impact on homeowner’s economic situation constitutes the political relevance
of asset price fluctuations as political parties take an interest in homeowners’ economic
fortune. Considerable shares of the population in all countries of the developed world
are homeowners, ranging from roughly 38 per cent in Switzerland and 41 per cent
in Germany to 71 per cent in the UK and 78 per cent in Spain in 2004 (Andrews
and Sa´nchez, 2011a)5. Exposure to housing market fluctuations varies from house-
hold to household. However, homeownership represents a long-term commitment via
e.g. mortgage payments and so house prices remain an important signal concerning
homeowners’ general economic situation and outlook.
The political implications of homeownership have attracted some attention in the
literature. A frequent observation is that high-homeownership countries often feature
rather small welfare states which sparked theories about a trade-off relationship be-
tween homeownership and the welfare state (Kemeny, 1981; Castles, 1998). While there
is still debate about causality in this link, an impact of owner-occupation on the welfare
state is generally accepted (Delfani, De Deken and Dewilde, 2014). Yet homeowner-
ship does not unfold its political implications through the form of housing provision
per se but rather through the financial challenge and opportunity it represents (Doling
and Horsewood, 2011). Hence, changes in housing values tap more directly into this
mechanism.
On the micro level, homeowners often share some characteristics. For instance,
homeownership in the US is higher for White, older, better educated, higher income and
married citizens (Garriga et al., 2006; Segal and Sullivan, 1998). Similarly, homeowners
hold and accumulate more wealth and rather live in rural areas than tenants (Andrews
and Sa´nchez, 2011b; Di, Belsky and Liu, 2007; Turner and Luea, 2009). More recently,
4The relevance of house price volatility on homeowners’ economic situation – and thus on preference
formation - should vary by housing regimes, e.g. by average housing transactions per household
over the life cycle (see Hoekstra (2005) or Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008) for an overview). Due to
shortage in comparable data, I include country fixed effects in my models to capture some of the
underlying country-specific variation.
5Different levels of homeownership should vary the incentives for political parties to consider home-
owners an important voter group. Data quality on homeownership, however, is too low to properly
model these changing incentives empirically. I opt to control for homeownership levels to at least
ensure comparability across countries.
44
decreasing homeownership in the Anglo-Saxon countries among the young increased
the age divide of homeownership (Fisher and Gervais, 2011). Theories of class voting
suggest that those characteristics are more likely associated with voters of the right
rather than the left (Lewis-Beck, 2009; Manza, Hout and Brooks, 1995).
On political preferences, the evidence is more ambiguous although suggesting that
homeownership is linked to more right-wing political preferences6. For the US, Kingston,
Thompson and Eichar (1984) find no evidence for an effect of homeownership on vot-
ers’ views on socio-economic policy. Verberg (2000) finds that Canadian homeowners
are more conservative on economic, moral and labour issues than renters. For the UK,
Saunders (1990) discovers that homeowners are less in favour of redistribution than
tenants. Andre´ and Dewilde (2014) show that homeowners are less supportive of redis-
tribution with mortgage-holding homeowners showing even less support than outright
homeowners.
Differences exist also in political behaviour. Homeowners in the US, Germany
and Canada vote more for conservative parties and participate more often in elec-
tions(Kingston, Thompson and Eichar, 1984; Ha¨ußermann and Ku¨chler, 1993; Verberg,
2000). Looking at property owners in general, similar class voting effects have been
found in the UK, the US and France (Foucault, Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2011; Lewis-
Beck, Nadeau and Foucault, 2013; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2011). In the Netherlands,
homeowners in risk of negative equity from falling house prices vote disproportionately
for pro-ownership parties (Andre´ et al., 2016). Several studies show that homeowners
are more likely to vote than renters emphasising their importance as a voter group
(Hoffmann-Martinot, Rallings and Thrasher, 1996; Andre´, Dewilde and Luijkx, 2015).
On the local level, homeowners are found to participate more often in local politics
(DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Dietz and Haurin, 2003).
One important contribution to the political implications of housing comes from
Ansell (2014). He argues that the financial situation of home-owning households is
largely determined by their house value. Short-term fluctuations from e.g. unemploy-
ment can be hedged against through homeownership which, at rising prices, increases
the household’s permanent income. This then reduces their support for redistribution
and social policy in several ways, e.g. through an increased tax burden or simply the
reduced demand for social insurance. His analysis shows that homeowners have lower
preferences for social policy and decrease their support as house prices rise, particularly
right-wing voting homeowners. The same study suggests that right-wing governments
utilise these preference shifts by cutting back social policy significantly, thus exploit-
ing the changing social policy attitudes of their electorate to carry out welfare state
restructuring without the risk of electoral punishment.
The described patterns suggest that right-wing parties should have an incentive to
consider homeowners as a core voter group, especially as those turn out more often
at elections which increases the potential positive returns of addressing homeowning
voters’ needs.
6Unfortunately, the literature is often inaccurate whether conservatism applies to an economic or a
socio-cultural dimension. I argue that the former is more relevant as differences in socio-cultural
political preferences are rather related to characteristics that affect selection into homeownership.
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3.5 Parties’ responses to house price fluctuations
Applying the theoretical argument to the case of housing market fluctuations, two
questions need to be answered. Firstly, which parties should be responsive and secondly,
which positional response do we expect? With respect to the first question, the previous
section has shown that homeowners are disproportionately represented by right-wing
parties so that we can consider them as a core voter group. Of course, this link
varies by the extent to which homeownership is distributed across the electorate. The
more people are homeowners, the fewer individuals select into homeownership which
weakens its performance as an indicator of membership to a voter group. Linking
this to the argument, parties of the right should be disproportionately responsive to
external shocks affecting homeowners while parties of the left should display a smaller
or no response.
The external shock I am investigating are changes in house prices. Increases and
decreases in housing values tap into households’ expectations about the development
of their economic and financial situation. This is so relevant as households often rely
on housing wealth in their financial planning over the life-cycle7. If house prices rise,
homeowners virtually incur capital gains. When another adverse shock then strikes,
those gains can be materialised, and housing wealth unfolds its insurance function.
Households should derive a feeling of economic security and increasing wealth from
rising house prices. The opposite happens when housing values decrease. Then, for
instance, mortgage-paying households fear the prospect of negative equity and home-
owners suffer from virtual capital losses, thus affecting a household’s economic and
financial situation quite substantively. A decreasing house value should lead to an
increased feeling of insecurity and a worsening economic outlook.
These effects on the economic situation of homeowners are informative to parties
and the direction of house price changes prioritises either the core or the swing voter
logic for right-wing parties in their programmatic positioning. When house prices
rise, homeowners face positive economic prospects. Right-wing parties should thus
not waste their programmatic resources by sending an additional signal to core voters.
Homeowners turn out disproportionately more often as do higher-income voters in
general (Andre´, Dewilde and Luijkx, 2017; Pontusson and Rueda, 2010; Mahler, 2008).
In other words, the marginal electoral benefit of addressing homeowners’ preferences,
e.g. by lower degrees of redistribution, is rather low when house prices are rising (with
possibly lower costs of abstention from this group). This opens some margin for right-
wing parties, who are on average more to the right on an economic policy dimension
so that they can move leftwards to the centre and try to expand their electoral base.
In the opposite situation, when decreasing house prices worsen the economic prospect
of homeowners, right-wing parties have an incentive to send out signals that reassure
7Strictly speaking, current house prices are not necessarily informative about house prices in old age.
Nevertheless, whether the decision to invest into a house to accumulate wealth is perceived to pay off
is affected by the development of the house’s value relative to the buying price. More importantly, in
countries where households typically trade up from property to property, the current housing market
conditions are even more salient as they determine the next investment decision directly.
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their core constituencies as these might now credibly threaten to withdraw their sup-
port. The marginal electoral return of a leftward move decreases substantially, while
reassuring core voters yields a higher return. Thus, these parties should move to the
right when house prices are falling. Such a move to the right is typically associated with
e.g. a reduction in social benefits and lower taxes. By the lower exposure to typical
social risks such as e.g. unemployment, homeowners, in comparison to tenants, should
not demand more social benefits under economic distress8. They should rather seek sig-
nals of reassurance concerning the proper functioning of housing and banking markets
as well as a stable or reduced tax burden. Consequently, it is rational for right-wing
parties to move rightwards when house prices are falling to signal their commitment
to core voters and ensure their mobilisation. Hence, parties should prioritise the core
over the swing voter motive. To prepare the empirical analysis, the following section
introduces the research design and the data used for the empirics.
3.6 Measurement, model specification and data
3.6.1 Measuring party positions
I measure party positions using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)
(Volkens et al., 2015). The unique advantage of the CMP dataset is its coverage
of 55 countries over a period from 1945 to 2015, thus allowing for comparisons of
party positions over time within and across countries. The CMP data offer abundant
information about parties’ positions on a multitude of dimensions. I test my argument
about the movement of parties in the policy space as a response to changes in house
prices by mainly looking at the economic policy dimension . Parties have the highest
leverage to influence the economic situation of the electorate when deciding about
economic and social policy issues such as taxation or the distribution of benefits. Leftist
positions on this dimension include welfare state expansion as well as higher degrees
of redistribution while rightist positions represent the opposite.
The conventional approach to work with the CMP data is to locate parties on a
left-right dimension and evaluate positional shifts along this dimension. I present the
results of one left/right measurements of the numerous proposed in the literature here in
the main text and report the results of two additional measurements which are similar
but differ in the selection of items and the method of aggregation in the supplementary
material. Reporting results from three different indicators should account for some of
the shortcomings inherent in every positional measurement and increase the robustness
of the empirical results. In the main text, I use the index by Franzmann and Kaiser
(2006)9 which measures positions on an economic policy dimension. Lower values on
8In high homeownership countries, this extends particularly to homeowners who are core voters of
the right. As these are on average wealthier and better educated, they should make up the group of
homeowners who are less interested in social benefits but rather seek protection for their assets. For
right-wing parties , these voters are the more important subgroup of homeowners.
9Throughout the paper, I talk about right-wing parties as representing homeowners. The main issue
dimension on which parties are theorised to respond, however, is on economic policy. As a result, I am
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the scale indicate leftist and higher values rightist positions.
3.6.2 Variables of interest and controls
To measure a shift in party positions, I use the first difference between a party’s score
on the respective index in the current and previous election. For ease of interpretation,
this variable is positive if parties moved to the right and negative if the new position is
further left. The main independent variable is the change in real house prices between
two elections. House price data is taken from the Bank of International Settlements’
property price database which covers 18 countries from 1970 to 2010 and deflated to
create real house price changes10. Comparability across countries is given by the focus
on house price changes which also helps to deal with the time trend in the price index
time series11. I use lagged party positions to identify right-wing parties instead of the
party family. Doing so, I follow recent suggestions in the literature which question the
problematic assumption of party-family-homogeneity over time and across countries
(Garritzmann and Seng, 2016). Especially regarding economic liberalism, parties differ
substantively within party families, across countries and over time so that a direct
measurement of previous positions is better suited to test the argument. Assuming
party families are homogeneous across these dimensions is not only implausible, but
it also does not consider spatial dependencies in the data. A right-wing party that
shifted far leftwards in the previous election clearly has a different room for manoeu-
vre than the average rightist party. Using the lagged position relaxes this assumption
and exploits the existing variation in the data. It also matches the party’s decision
before any programmatic move more closely, as different starting points have different
strategic implications. Using the lagged party position to identify parties, therefore,
represents an important innovation which is more closely in line with the theoretical
setting explored in this paper. After all, I am more interested in a difference in degree
between parties rather than a difference in kind12. The main effect of interest is eval-
uated via an interaction between the lagged party position and the changes in house
prices. The coefficient on this interaction effect is the main result of interest for this
paper: When negative, it confirms the hypothesised party behaviour.
identifying parties as right-wing based on their positions on this issue dimension. Strictly speaking,
with this operationalisation it would be more concise to talk about market liberal parties who promote
liberal economic policies such as lower degrees of taxation and well-functioning, deregulated markets.
Due to a strong overlap between the two labels as most right-wing parties also promote market liberal
economic policies, and for ease of understanding and a better link to the existing literature, I stick
to the right-wing label throughout the paper.
10A measurement including sub-national variation in house prices would be superior to the national
average, but there is no comprehensive dataset tracking house prices for several countries over such
a large period. As a result, I use national averages and argue that it biases – if at all – against the
hypothesised effects as the magnitude of some upswings and downturns in metropolitan areas are
downsized due to the averaging.
11Both, the change in party position and the change in house prices are stationary and do not contain
unit roots. Following a Fisher panel unit root test (Choi, 2001), the null hypothesis of a unit root
could be rejected for both time series (p=0.000).
12As a robustness check, however, I also present results from models using party family dummies and
a left-right-dummy based on party families in the appendix (Tables SM2.11,SM2.12, and SM2.13).
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Of course, I acknowledge that my statistical and theoretical model only captures a
part of all factors influencing how parties determine their ideological positions13. Still,
I include several political control variables in my models to partially make up for this
shortcoming. I control for the electoral system (PR/mixed/majoritarian), the lagged
vote share from the previous election and intensity of party competition (effective num-
ber of parties on the votes level) with data from the Comparative Political Data Set
(Armingeon et al., 2015) to ensure comparability across party systems. Moreover, I
calculate the political centre of gravity for each positional index following Kim and
Fording (1998). This allows measuring relative programmatic shifts instead of falsely
identifying overall shifts in public opinion (Pontusson and Rueda, 2010). The theo-
retical expectations concerning the direction of party responses hinge on assumptions
on voter turnout and competition from the fringes of the ideological spectrum. To
capture some of these dynamics, I include a voter turnout variable to hold mobilisation
constant (Armingeon et al., 2015) and add a variable measuring competition from the
right to a second specification of the model. I also include a government dummy (Seki
and Williams, 2014). Moreover, I add a measurement of homeownership levels with in-
terpolated data collected from 18 national statistical offices ranging from 1970 to 2014.
Furthermore, I include several macroeconomic indicators to capture changing economic
circumstances. Those controls include the change in unemployment, the current real
GDP growth rate, the interest rate on government bonds, the inflation rate, the change
in government debt and an indicator of the economy’s openness and the Gini coeffi-
cient (Armingeon et al., 2015). Controlling for the general economic environment is
important since it also affects households’ economic prospects and potentially inter-
feres with the theoretical argument. Furthermore, I control for the log of population,
the difference in the share of people over 65 and the share of the urban population
(Armingeon et al., 2015; World Bank, 2016). The first two variables are widely used
in welfare state research and potentially drive all parties’ positions. The latter should
help to account for the possibility that highly urbanised countries experience different
housing market dynamics.
3.6.3 Data structure and model specification
The time structure in my dataset is given in legislative terms following the CMP.
The time dimension is strongly unbalanced as elections recur irregularly. Therefore,
I construct a variable that ranks legislative terms and introduces a time-series cross-
sectional data structure. In my statistical models, I control for the duration of the
legislative term. This time structure avoids inflating the number of observations as a
yearly linear interpolation of manifesto data would do (Garritzmann and Seng, 2016).
Looking at legislative terms, significant changes e.g. in important economic variables
have sufficient time to unfold their effect so that parties can react to those developments
(Schmitt, 2015).
From an econometric point of view, there are several issues which deserve closer
attention. Firstly, the main theoretical interest of this paper is on how parties respond
13See Adams, Haupt and Stoll (2008, footnote 1) or Adams (2012) for an overview.
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to changes in house prices. Therefore, I specify models using the first difference of
party positions as the dependent variable. This specification choice does not come
without problems. Changes in party positions are contingent on previous changes as
well as previous positions. To capture most of these dependencies, I control for the
latter (in the interaction effect) and present additional results from models controlling
for the lagged dependent variable in the appendix (Adams et al., 2006). Moreover, I
also present findings from the model with level party positions to demonstrate that
the results are not driven by the difference structure of the dependent variable. Sec-
ondly, the simultaneous consideration of country and party level variables introduces
a hierarchical dependence into my dataset where parties are nested within countries.
In addition, the time structure per election produces a strongly unbalanced panel. To
get some empirical leverage on the data structure, I include country and year dummies
and robust standard errors to capture some of the unobserved sample heterogeneity
and within-country correlation14. Standard errors might still be serially correlated, so I
present results from models using an auto-regressive error structure as sensitivity anal-
yses in the appendix. Using these different models, I am confident that dependencies in
the error terms over time and between units are appropriately modelled. Thirdly, as an
additional check on these issues, I also present results from models using party random-
and fixed-effects in the supplementary material15. Using a party-fixed effects approach
is a relatively conservative test as it only exploits within-variation for the analyses and
therefore controls for idiosyncratic time-invariant unobservable characteristics.
Here in the main text, I present findings from pooled OLS models with robust
standard errors, country and year dummies. The models follow equation 3.1 using
the change in party positions as the dependent variable, change in house prices, the
lagged party position and their interaction as main independent variables. In addition,
Z represents a vector of control variables:
∆POSi,t = β0 + β1∆HPi,t + β2POSi,t−1 + β3(∆HPi,t × POSi,t−1)
+
l∑
k=4
βkZkit + αi + γt + eit
(3.1)
3.7 Results
Table 3.1 presents the results of four models with different sets of control variables.
All models use the inter-election change in the Franzmann/Kaiser economic policy
dimension score as the dependent variable. The first column reports the baseline
model without interaction effect. Columns two to four present the estimations using
14Using country dummies is additionally important as party systems are often subject to country-
idiosyncratic traits (such as institutional features or historical pathways) which are hard to measure
and thus impossible to model. Introducing country dummies can – at least partially – account for
these differences (Pontusson and Rueda, 2010).
15A Hausman test suggests that the fixed-effects model is preferable as the null hypothesis of no
correlation between individual error terms and regressors is soundly rejected (p=0.000).
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an interaction of house prices with lagged party positions. In column three, I add a
control variable for the centre of gravity in the party system so that the party position
shift can be interpreted as a shift relative to the median voter (Pontusson and Rueda,
2010). In column four, I add a measurement of competition from the right to better
capture the reality of multiparty competition.
Table 3.1: Determinants of shifts in party positions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Interaction Interaction Interaction
∆ Real house prices -0.002 (0.157) 0.001 (0.750) 0.000 (0.873) 0.001 (0.660)
Party Position (t-1) -0.041 (0.000) -0.034 (0.000) -0.036 (0.000) -0.161 (0.000)
∆ House prices × Party Position (t-1) -0.001 (0.077) -0.001 (0.089) -0.000 (0.075)
Center of gravity 0.072 (0.043) 0.126 (0.000)
Competition from the right -0.155 (0.000)
Observations 903 903 903 903
R2 0.141 0.145 0.149 0.263
Full model results and additional robustness checks can be found in the supplementary material (see Tables SM2.2 -
SM2.15). P-values are reported in the parentheses and are obtained from robust standard errors. Country and year
dummies included.
Overall, the most significant and largest predictor of a change in the party position
is the lagged party position itself. In all models, a prior party position further to the
right is associated with a subsequent move to the left. The positive coefficient of the
centre of gravity variable is intuitive: When the political centre of gravity is further to
the right, parties generally move in this direction. The variable on competition from
the right is also negative. If there are more parties to the right of a single party (which
implies that a party is further to the left), parties shift to the left.
As stated before, the coefficients on the interaction terms should be negative if sup-
porting the argument. For the positional measurement employed here, I find significant
and negative interaction terms at a 10 per cent level. Alternative model specifications
in the supplementary material using different positional measurements and empirical
specifications generally corroborate this effect. This finding suggests that parties that
have been located further to the right in the previous election are systematically shift-
ing leftwards in response to house price increases. In support of the argument, this
also implies that parties move rightwards when house prices are decreasing. Figure 3.1
plots the linear marginal effect of house price increases on the position shift for a range
of lagged party position with a 95 per cent confidence interval using model (3)16. The
negative slope indicates that when house prices rise, a party position further to the
right is associated with a programmatic shift to the left. The effect is only different
from zero for parties located on the right-hand side of the political spectrum while
for parties of the left and centre left, no such effect can be found. I interpret this as
16Alternative specifications of the interaction effect allowing for non-linear marginal effects are re-
ported in the appendix and generally support the argument.
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evidence for an asymmetric partisanship effect. The empirical distributions of all party
positions in the sample (grey histograms) show a considerable number of observations
to fall into the significant area (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). Interpreting the
magnitude of the coefficients requires some elaboration. The actual house price effect
is multiplicative and consists of the coefficient on house price change and the interac-
tion term dependent on the previous party position and the average change in house
prices. For instance, in model (3), the average conservative party in the sample with
a position score of 6.6 together with the sample average house price appreciation of
27 points shifts such a party by -0.1 points to the left compared to a median leftward
movement in the sample of -0.3. Roughly a third of the most common move to the left
can thus be explained by the interaction effect.
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Figure 3.1: Marginal effects of house price change over previous party position
Dotted lines represent 95 per cent confidence intervals around point estimates.
To see which parties are responsive, Figure 3.2 plots the results of a rough test:
Which party families are on average located sufficiently to the right to display a sys-
temic response to house price changes? The black vertical line indicates the threshold
where the marginal effect becomes significant. This encompasses on average only lib-
eral, Christian democratic, conservative, nationalist and agrarian parties, so exactly
the parties which disproportionately represent homeowners.
As an additional illustration, Figure 3.3 plots the results of predicted party responses
over a range of house price changes, holding all other variables constant at their mean.
I plot the shift for three party types, a leftist, a centre and a right-wing party. From
the prediction, we can first learn about the substantive magnitude of the effects which
are quite sizeable. For instance, in the central plot, right-wing parties (with a score of
7.75 on the index) move to the left by more than - 0.2 points when house prices increase
52
0 2 4 6 8
Sample mean of party family positiona
gr
 ag
ra
ria
n
na
t n
ati
on
ali
st
co
n c
on
se
rva
tiv
e
ch
r c
hr
ist
ian
 de
mo
cra
tlib
 lib
er
al
so
c s
oc
ial
 de
mo
cra
tic
co
m 
co
mm
un
ist
ec
o e
co
log
ist
Figure 3.2: Average party position by party family (across all elections); based on CMP
party family coding
by 50 points. Secondly, the plot helps to disentangle whether the effects are mostly
driven by house price changes or the lagged party positions. This matters as the driving
force behind the results could theoretically be a regression-to-the-mean-phenomenon:
A party located far to the right has more room for manoeuvre to move leftwards
than further rightwards. The difference between the curves is given by the different
coefficient sizes for the party position (different intercepts) and different sizes for the
interaction effect between house prices and party positions (different slopes). With
respect to the level differences, the model shows that there is considerable variation
between parties. The order of the curves suggests some regression-to-the-mean as left
parties move right, and right-wing parties move left.
The most relevant result with respect to the asymmetric responsiveness, however,
are the slope differences: The steeper the slope, the more responsive a certain party is
to house price dynamics. The curve for leftist parties is flat throughout the range of
house price changes. The positional response of right-wing parties, and centrist parties
to a smaller extent, however, is conditional on the housing market changes. To see
that right-wing parties indeed change the direction of their response, it is important
to correct for the regression-to-the-mean visible in the plot. As stated above, the
regression-to-the-mean introduces a level shift into the visualisations. In the case of
the right-wing party, this is a downward shift. Therefore, the magnitude of the leftward
shift with booming markets is probably slightly exaggerated while we can expect right-
wing to move rightwards when prices drop. Overall, these simulations corroborate the
previous findings: Right-wing parties interpret housing market developments as an
informative signal which they might respond to while leftist parties do not exhibit such
behaviour. The direction of right-wing parties’ movements changes with house price
53
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
Li
ne
ar
 P
re
di
ct
io
n
-5
0
-4
0
-3
0
-2
0
-1
0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Change in house price
FK(t-1)=1.5 FK(t-1)=4.5  FK(t-1)=7.75
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developments.
3.8 Discussion
In this paper, I present a theory about how parties change their position in response to
a change in the economic environment. The theory offers a more structural, political
economy perspective on party position shifts by focusing on the economic costs and
benefits that external economic developments have on core voters of political parties.
In addition, the argument allows for asymmetric responsiveness by political parties
depending on their links to the electorate. I have tested the argument by looking
at a so far neglected economic development in party research, fluctuations on housing
markets. House price changes disproportionately affect core voters of right-wing parties
who moderate their positions under house price booms while polarising when house
prices drop. This article has broader implications for two research fields, the politics
of homeownership and housing markets as well as party research. Starting with the
former, the shown leftwards shift of right-wing parties is puzzling as previous research
on the micro and macro level has shown that house price increases lead to a decrease in
support for redistribution among homeowners and a reduction of social spending and
other policy outcomes (Ansell, 2014; Andre´ and Dewilde, 2014; Andre´ et al., 2016). As a
result, house price booms appear to push voters and governments further to the right.
Theoretically, if parties simply matched their core voters’ preferences, they should
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similarly move rightwards. This paper’s findings, however, suggest otherwise. As it is
unlikely that parties are unaware of their core voters’ preferences (Cox and McCubbins,
1986), it appears more plausible that they suggest other policies to expand their voter
base while taking the mobilisation of core voters for granted. When a party’s core
voters are doing well, this creates strategic room for manoeuvre that parties seek to
exploit by reaching out to new voters. It needs to be noted, however, that the samples
and research designs studied in this paper and most of the micro evidence differ in
scope and time covered so the divergence of results might originate in sample effects.
On the macro level, Ansell (2014) shows that right-wing governments respond to
house price increases by a rightward move on an economic policy dimension through
e.g. cuts in social policy. This is similarly puzzling, as this paper suggests that right-
wing parties moderate during the campaign. Several arguments might account for
these conflicting results. Firstly, party positions as measured in election manifestos are
not perfectly comparable to policy outcomes so divergent results might be an artefact
of different positional measurements. Also, not all right-wing parties in my sample
entered government, so a selection of certain parties into government might drive the
conflicting result. Additionally, parties which enter government are bound by certain
institutional constraints (e.g. through negotiations with other levels of government,
budget constraints) which affects their potential to keep election promises. Moreover,
Adams (2012) points out that there is weak to no support for systematic electoral
consequences of party position changes. This, again, points to a strategic room for
manoeuvre for parties to attract new voters without fearing to lose support by core
voters.
This argument has a more general relevance. Whether parties can and do behave
strategically is still debated in the literature. Research on promise-keeping by political
parties suggests that governments do so at a rather high rate (Pe´try and Collette, 2009)
while others have argued that governments diverge strongly from manifesto pledges
(see Adams (2012, p.413) for an overview). It seems that there is variation between
countries, parties and over time with respect to promise-keeping. For instance, a
recent study finds that promises on regulatory issues which are easy to change are
most likely kept while promises on redistributive issues are more difficult to deliver
(Brouard et al., 2018). Patterns of non-compliance can be explained with strategic
behaviour by political parties who “measure the constraints and incentives that weigh
upon policy-making” (Brouard et al., 2018, p.13). While a review of the literature on
promise-keeping suggests that strategic party behaviour is possible, the evidence on the
case of homeownership and housing markets presented in this paper cannot conclusively
resolve this puzzle which requires more attention by future work. At the same time, the
presented argument delivers a good framework to characterise the underlying reasoning
behind strategic behaviour.
Within the suggested framework, the strategic calculus for parties implies weighing
the benefits of attracting new voters against the costs of not matching core voters’
preferences. Whether potential gains outweigh the costs depends critically on the
expectation whether core voters can credibly threaten to withdraw electoral support
either by voting for competitors or by abstention. Given that electoral participation
among core voters is not identical for all political parties, a very interesting corollary
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of the argument is that some parties might enjoy more strategic leeway than others.
Parties of the left struggle disproportionately to mobilise core constituencies (Pontusson
and Rueda, 2010), so future work should investigate whether parties of the right enjoy
a comparative electoral advantage over their competitors from the left resulting from
strategic freedoms.
Above all, however, more validation for the presented argument is needed by study-
ing other economic processes that might have similar effects. Similar asymmetric party
responses can theoretically be triggered by a variety of socio-economic processes. A
precondition for an asymmetric effect is that a process has a substantively and dispro-
portionately large effect on a clearly targetable share of the population that is linked to
a certain party. In addition, core voters’ ability to threaten a withdrawal of electoral
support has to be limited. More work with a focus on other socio-economic devel-
opments is required to evaluate these scope and conditions. A promising approach
would be a micro-founded analysis contrasting preference responses on the voter level
to economic developments with subsequent party position movements.
Besides the focus on asymmetry, the proposed theory also offers a less restrictive
account of party position-taking in general. So far, any theoretical prediction on party
behaviour depends critically on whether we believe parties to follow core or swing voters
and whether some party characteristics exist to link them particularly strong to either
group (Schumacher, 2013; Ezrow et al., 2010). In addition, the literature on party
position shifts frequently assumed whether shifts in overall public opinion drive parties
uniformly in one direction (Adams et al., 2004). The theory advanced here allows that
and explains why parties of different ideologies respond differently to the same socio-
economic development in their positioning given that implications of socio-economic
change are unequally distributed across the electorate. Overall, this micro-founded,
more structural, political economy-driven perspective on position-taking, therefore,
offers a new, more flexible way to think about party competition and the interplay
between the economy and politics more generally and can guide and motivate future
analyses.
Ultimately, on a more substantial level, the results of this paper also underline that
house prices and their volatility should receive more attention as a highly relevant
economic phenomenon with far-reaching political consequences. The growing volatility
of asset markets is similarly important as the traditional focus on labour markets and
monetary policy in shaping not only individual economic well-being but also political
responses. In contrast to left-wing parties, whose focus on labour market volatilities
and its vulnerable voter groups is well established, developments on housing markets
are similarly significant for right-wing parties. In times of rising wealth inequality and a
decreasing importance of labour income, understanding how the dynamics of property
markets translate into the policy process is highly relevant.
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CHAPTER
FOUR
ASYMMETRIC RESPONSIVENESS: THE EFFECTS OF
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ON PARTY
POSITION SHIFTS
(co-authored with Leonce Ro¨th)
Abstract
Responding to voters’ opinion is a core task of political parties in democratic represen-
tation. When conditions change, parties should change their signals to the voter too.
Surprisingly, the state of the art assumes that parties shift their position in response to
external changes in uniformity. We argue that this is a highly implausible assumption
and accordingly theorise a partisan response model allowing for asymmetric reactions
across different ideologies. The core of the model highlights the different effects of
external changes on different core voters. We argue that parties predominantly shift
positions in order to signal responsiveness to their core voters when those are under
pressure due to external developments. A Downsian move to the median voter is
only plausible in the constellation of low core voter pressure. Thus, we challenge the
widespread belief that the core or median voter focus has much to do with the “nich-
eness” of a party. We test our theory with a selection of four salient socio-economic
indicators as instances of external change (growth, debt, house prices and income in-
equality). We apply a very conservative test with kernel density interactions in order to
identify partisan shifts across the entire ideological spectrum as a consequence of socio-
economic change. Our results support the claim that parties first, respond substantially
to socio-economic changes and second, asymmetric responses are rather the rule than
the exception. The pivotal role of core voter pressure has consequences for a wide range
of party and party system effects beyond the economic dimension and allows a more
profound understanding of moderating and polarising tendencies in democracies.
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4.1 Introduction
To start the complex electoral machinery in democracies has much to do with our con-
viction that such a machinery is necessary to ensure responsiveness as a core aspect of
political representation (Pitkin, 1967). Political parties and their members are the pri-
mary agents whose responses we are demanding. One of the most visible responses of
parties to their voters is to change the programmatic appeal. Thus, party position shifts
are at the core of meaningful political representation. Unsurprisingly a considerable
number of researchers have dedicated their resources to explain how and why parties
change their position. Several general conclusions can be drawn based on the existing
studies. Parties are responsive to public opinion (Adams et al., 2004; Ezrow et al.,
2010), party organisation (Schumacher, De Vries and Vis, 2013), party type (Adams
et al., 2006) or react to moves by competing parties (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009).
Furthermore, other work shows that parties respond to changes in the surrounding eco-
nomic environment, in particular with respect to globalisation and inequality (Adams,
Haupt and Stoll, 2008; Haupt, 2010; Pontusson and Rueda, 2010; Ezrow and Hellwig,
2014). Overall, the electoral machinery seems to fulfill its pledge of responsiveness.
The existing proof of work for the electoral machinery is still deeply influenced
by a Downsian perspective of representation, equating strategic responsiveness with
a median voter orientation (Downs, 1957). For instance, if average public opinion
changes, parties of different ideologies are typically argued to react in the same way
(Adams et al., 2004). Only a second tenet of the existing approaches has defined an
exception to this perspective. It is argued that niche parties mainly follow core voter
interests while mainstream parties target the preferences of the median voter (Ezrow
et al., 2010). Implicitly, the orientation on either core or median voters is assumed to
be stable for partisan types. The state of the art on party position shifts, thus, makes
us believe that parties react uniformly to changing conditions.
As important as these findings are, they are also irritating once we take a slightly
different perspective. Political parties are carriers of political ideologies and help us to
direct the spotlight on what is important and what is not. The differences of political
ideologies are mainly about the different foci and different guidelines to interpret and
react to the world. Political psychology has profoundly confirmed that carriers of differ-
ent ideologies have very different perceptions in terms of identifying political problems
at first and even more so on their actual solutions (Jost, 2017). For example, rising
economic inequality obviously triggers different reactions for left and right-leaning in-
dividuals (Jost, 2017). From this perspective, it is highly implausible that voters and
parties of different ideological camps react in uniformity to changing conditions.
Some existing research argues similarly and acknowledges that parties of different
ideologies respond differently (e.g. Adams, Haupt and Stoll, 2008). This perspective
has, however, not been developed into a broader theoretical framework on how ideology
moderates party responses. Our goal in this paper is to introduce a broader, micro-
founded perspective on party responsiveness by arguing that changing environments
have typically diverging effects on voters and parties. A uniform reaction is rather the
exception than the rule and, if observable, it often constitutes an instance of equifinality,
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e.g. right as well as left parties move in the same direction but for different reasons.
We think any theory of responsiveness which acknowledges different priorities across
voters and parties should start with an account to asymmetric instead of uniform
responsiveness.
This asymmetry is based on our first premise that every party first and foremost
caters to the demands of their core voters. They protect their core voters predomi-
nantly when they are under strong pressure from salient external developments. Most
importantly, the same socio-economic developments have typically asymmetric conse-
quences for different parties because the costs and benefits of external developments are
unequally distributed across different core constituencies. Only in cases where external
developments clearly benefit core constituencies, parties can turn away from satisfied
core voters and strategically turn to the median in order to broaden their electorate.
Taking the asymmetric meaning of change for different ideologies seriously leads to
fundamentally new expectations concerning the position shifts of parties and the over-
all dynamic of party systems. In a nutshell, our theory of asymmetric responsiveness
states that core voters of different parties are differently affected by external transfor-
mative processes of societies and accordingly, responsive parties react differently to the
same external change. Parties radicalise if their core voters are under pressures and
moderate in instances of core voter satisfaction. The result of this argumentation is a
more general framework to explain how parties respond to external events.
Although we present our theory of asymmetric responsiveness as a general instance
of partisan reactions to change, we limit our empirical analysis to the socio-economic
dimension. We select four indicators of relevant and visible socio-economic change
(growth, public debt, house prices, and income inequality) and empirically assess how
parties respond to their development. The results, based on very conservative esti-
mates using kernel density estimators for the interaction of socio-economic change and
ideology on party position shifts, lend fairly robust and systematic confirmation to our
claim that partisan responses to socio-economic change are typically asymmetric. The
results, although being strongly in line with our core claim of asymmetry, further partly
corroborate and partly falsify established and our own expectation of how parties with
different ideologies react precisely to growth, rising public debt, rising house prices,
and rising inequality.
4.2 How socio-economic developments affect party
position taking
The literature on party behaviour has produced several important findings regarding
party positions. Fagerholm (2016) has summarised the explanations and evidence of
why parties change their position. In a nutshell, changing leadership, changing factions
or previous electoral performance seem not to make a systematic difference (Adams
et al., 2004, 2006; Harmel et al., 1995; Meyer, 2013; Schumacher, De Vries and Vis,
2013) whereas organisational weakness and strong activists increase responsiveness to
external conditions (Schumacher, De Vries and Vis, 2013; Meyer, 2013).
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The most important of these external conditions is public opinion. Following the
model of dynamic representation, parties respond to the shift of voter’s preferences
((Adams et al., 2004; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2002; Stimson et al., 1995).
However, the most widely discussed question is which party responds to whom? Par-
ties are constantly engaged in balancing the preferences of core voters against the
preferences of median or swing voters (Aldrich, 1995). Adams et al. (2006) qualified
the responsiveness of parties by distinguishing between niche and mainstream parties1.
They find only mainstream parties to be responsive to public opinion shifts. Consis-
tently, Ezrow et al. (2010) have shown that niche parties respond rather to their core
constituencies than to the change of the median voter. Additionally, opposition parties
tend to be more responsive to their voters and niche parties to voter position shifts
in the core issue they own (Spoon and Klu¨ver, 2014). In other terms, Lehrer (2012)
distinguishes between inclusive and exclusive parties. Inclusive parties are responsive
to their party voters while exclusive parties react to the median voter (Lehrer, 2012;
Schumacher, De Vries and Vis, 2013).
Others have challenged the assumption that mainstream parties react uniformly to
public opinion shifts. Party voter shifts are more important than mean voter shifts
for parties’ positional responsiveness (Schumacher, De Vries and Vis, 2013). How-
ever, and this is a crucial point for our argument, different economic signals can have
different effects for different parties such that their response is not uniform but asym-
metric. For example, left- and right-wing parties respond differently to rising economic
globalisation (Haupt, 2010). In the same vein, unemployment and inflation evoke dif-
ferent position shifts for centre-left or centre-right parties (Hellwig, 2012). A typical
pattern is that while issues are relevant to the entire electorate, they trigger different
responses among different voters. For instance, voters of the political right seek protec-
tion from redistributive pressure and potentially higher taxes which can be caused by
rising unemployment. In contrast, the constituencies of the left are disproportionately
affected by unemployment so that they demand protection as well as investment in
employment opportunities (Cusack, Iversen and Rehm, 2006; Rehm, 2009; Iversen and
Soskice, 2001). Rising unemployment should, therefore, polarise by driving the right
further to the right and the left further to the left because it activates core threats of
left and right core voters and makes them demand signals from their representatives. In
contrast, economic growth releases the ideological left and right from economic pressure
and reduces the urgency of political parties to renew or radicalise their signals. In times
of low pressure on the core issues of mainstream parties, those parties can spend their
emphasis on more diversified and moderate signals in order to expand their electoral
base.
There are other developments which do not affect the constituencies of all par-
ties. Pontusson and Rueda (2010) argue that inequality drives left parties to leftist
moves when low-income voters are strongly mobilised. Left parties should be partic-
ularly responsive to wage inequality because low-income voter groups as their core
constituencies consist of voters who derive their income overwhelmingly from depen-
dent employment (Pontusson and Rueda, 2008, p.313). In contrast, right-wing voters
1Despite the different effects on niche and mainstream parties, both party types seem to influence
each other’s agenda significantly (Adams et al., 2006; Abou-Chadi, 2016; van de Wardt, 2015).
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perceive the value of assets more pressing than wage income distributions (Ansell,
2014). Furthermore, the partisanship literature has argued that right-wing parties are
more likely to shift the burden of macroeconomic adjustments to lower income groups
to keep inflation in check in an effort to protect asset values (Hibbs, 1977). In the same
vein, recent studies show that e.g. house price changes strongly affect the wealth of
predominantly right-wing voters who then adjust their policy preferences and voting
behaviour (Ansell, 2014; Andre´ et al., 2016). Right-wing governments use these pref-
erence changes and cut social expenditure during house price booms. Similarly, the
economic voting literature suggests that asset ownership increases electoral support for
right-wing parties (Persson and Martinsson, 2016).
These examples illustrate that the theorised uniform responses of political parties
to external conditions are not very likely. Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that
party type is a stable determinant of whether parties rather respond to their core or the
median voter. On a more abstract level, we can summarise the literature concerning the
expectations on party position shifts in two strands. One strand of literature derives
predictions on party positions shifts via the type of party (niche versus mainstream) and
its effect on the strategic balance between core and median voter orientation whereas
the other strand of literature prioritises the specific meaning of external changes to
specific core voter groups. We propose following the latter and show that it subsumes
the supposedly different strategic behaviour of niche and mainstream parties. The
missing link between both is a more generalisable argument about when parties follow
the core voters and when they turn to the median voter.
We start to develop our theory by assuming that all parties have close ties to core
voter groups (Pontusson and Rueda, 2010). At the same time, parties are caught in the
decision to strike a balance between interests and preferences of these core voters and
non-core voters, e.g. the median voter, in order to maximise electoral success (Aldrich,
1995). Although closely linked, the two objectives of targeting core voters and the
median voter often pull parties in different directions ((Pontusson and Rueda, 2010).
Theoretically, if we want to move past the assumption that party orientation on voter
groups is stable for party types, we are left with the task to characterise conditions
under which parties choose either to send signals to their core voters or to the median
voter. Our take on this task is to formulate an argument about the relative importance
of core voters which changes with developments in the external environment. In essence,
we suggest that party support by core voters is more likely when these core voters are
comparably well off. In such a situation, parties have leeway for moderation and can
reach out to the median voter as core voters do not demand specific policy signals. The
strategic landscape for parties changes in the opposite situation, when core voters are
under pressure by an external development of importance. Consequently, we expect
parties to send signals to their core voters when these are under pressure which results
in a polarising move.
This rationale subsumes the supposedly outlying behaviour of niche parties. For
example, a regionalist party striving for authority at the sub-national level is under
constant pressure to deliver authority to their core voters of regionalists or separatists
(Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972). In periods where authority is delivered, for example via
a decentralisation reform, these parties usually shift more emphasis to mainstream and
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moderate issues in order to retain a dominant position in a newly decentralised system
(Massetti, 2009). Our argument also explains why parties seem to respond to party
shifts of their competitors, in particular when these parties are perceived to be in the
same ideological camp (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009; Williams, 2015). Due to our
reasoning, this might be the case because the same ideological camp faces the same
pressure on core voters by the same socio-economic developments. Accordingly, our
framework allows both niche and mainstream parties to focus on core or mean voters
in their programmatic position.
In a nutshell, we argue, parties radicalise their ideological stance if their core vot-
ers are under pressure. Vice versa, they moderate their positional signals when core
issues are well satisfied. This has different implications for the development of party
systems in general. Party systems can either converge or diverge as a result of parties’
positional responses. An interesting corollary is that not all socio-economic devel-
opments represent salient issues to the entire electorate. In such a case, we would
expect convergence or polarisation on the party level being driven by one ideological
camp, the left or the right. For example, Ura and Ellis (2012) show that spending
preferences of Republican partisans in the US are a major driver of what they call an
asymmetric polarisation, caused by a radicalisation of voters supporting the political
right when spending increases. Equally asymmetric is the reaction of Republicans and
Democrats to rising economic inequality with Republicans moving faster to the right
than Democrats (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2014).
4.3 The empirical verification. Identification, data,
and results
4.3.1 Selection of socio-economic developments
To empirically test our theoretical claims on the party level, we select four indicators of
socio-economic change which should trigger different responses by different parties. An
important criterion for the selection is that the literature clearly points to asymmetric
reactions to these developments by voters with different ideologies which we can then
translate into expectations for the analysis at the party level. The first indicator we
select for our analyses is economic growth. We consider that economic growth is an
overarching goal that all parties attempt to achieve. Left-wing parties link economic
growth to distributional equality while right-wing parties have a more general interest in
economic expansion as it benefits business (Boix, 1998). Although parties have different
opinions on how to achieve economic growth, we argue that economic expansion matters
to all constituencies and should lead to more moderate party positions. The move
towards the centre is better visible by the inverse interpretation that under an economic
recession, parties have incentives to polarise to reassure the interests of their core voters.
For instance, Bremer (2018) shows that left-wing parties moved leftwards with respect
to the welfare state and economic liberalism. At the same time, the literature also
argues that right-wing or centre-right governments and parties move to the right when
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the economy is contracting, in particular through cuts to the welfare state (Korpi and
Palme, 2003; Amable, Gatti and Schumacher, 2006).
We select house price developments as the second indicator and argue that it taps
more directly into the policy preferences of right-wing voters. Ansell (2014) has shown
that right-wing voters develop more conservative redistribution and tax preferences
under increasing house prices. As right-wing parties represent disproportionately many
homeowners, there is a clear electoral connection to consider house prices. Left-wing
voters, on the other hand, have not been shown to systematically respond to housing
markets2. By our argument of economic pressure on core constituencies, we expect
rising house prices to lead to convergence as they relax commitment constraints for
right-wing parties and allow them to moderate their positional signals to broaden
electoral support from moderate voters. Again, the argument is best visible when
considering housing market crises where core voters of the political right come under
pressure and right-wing parties have an incentive to send out reassuring signals.
The third indicator is gross government debt. Right-wing governments are typi-
cally considered to run more balanced budgets whereas left-wing governments display
less fiscal discipline (see Cusack (1999) for an overview). This implies that right-wing
governments prefer balanced budgets which they can achieve by promoting fewer in-
terventionist policies and spending cuts when public debt increases. Partisanship is
usually thought to moderate fiscal policy preferences such that right-wing voters ob-
ject to higher spending and higher debt (Stevenson, 2001). For the US case, Ura and
Ellis (2012) show that spending preferences of Republican partisans are a major driver
of what they call an asymmetric polarisation which is driven by a radicalisation of vot-
ers supporting the political right when spending increases. Other studies similarly find
that ideology drives voter preferences for fiscal consolidation and public debt more gen-
erally (Heinemann and Hennighausen, 2012; Stix, 2013). A typical finding is that while
deficit reduction is seen as an important issue, partisanship moderates the preferred
method of reduction with rightist voters preferring spending cuts over tax increases to
a higher degree than leftist voters (Blinder and Krueger, 2004). Similarly, while leftist
voters and parties may agree with the general need for a limit on public borrowing,
they are at the same time more likely to protect public schemes such as unemployment
or social insurance from fiscal consolidation efforts (Bojar, 2018; Bremer, 2018). As a
result, we consider increasing government indebtedness as an issue that is relevant to
the entire electorate polarises the voters.
Finally, we select income inequality as the fourth indicator. Equality is the norma-
tive core claim of the political left (Bobbio, 1996). Changing patterns of inequality are
seen to influence the strategic positioning of parties. Following the canonical model
of Meltzer and Richard (1981), democracy is self-correcting in terms of inequality.
Inequality increases the redistributive demands of the median voter and drives polit-
ical parties to follow these demands. Bolton and Roland (1997), as well as Romer
2Left-wing voters can theoretically also be affected by house price changes, e.g. if homeownership
expands to the middle class and thus represents less of a socio-economic cleavage. In addition,
through their effect on the market for rental housing and rent prices, leftist voters can be adversely
affected by rising house prices and polarise. The literature in this regard is, however, less clear so
that we decide to argue in favour of an asymmetric argument with respect to house prices.
63
(1975) have put forward similar arguments. However, low turnout of the low economic
strata can lead to situations where the pivotal voter has an income above the median
(McCarthy, 2006). Benabou (2000) further qualifies this relationship by highlighting
potential efficiency gains from redistribution. The implication is that societies with low
levels of inequality have higher preferences for redistribution than societies with higher
levels (Benabou, 2000). The economic power of the higher income earners might block
the self-correcting tendencies of inequality (McCarthy, 2006; Bonica et al., 2013). Data
from the US suggests a relationship between inequality (top income shares) and po-
larisation which is driven by two tendencies. The Republicans moving stronger to the
right than the Democrats (a right-skewed polarisation, see McCarty, Poole and Rosen-
thal (2014)). On the US-state level, polarisation follows higher levels of inequality as
well (Garand, 2010). However, this evidence is based on a majoritarian system and
more proportional systems have been shown to yield more equal income distributions
(Austen-Smith, 2000; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2007).
Left parties should be particularly responsive to wage inequality because low-income
voter groups as their core constituencies consist of voters who derive their income over-
whelmingly from dependent employment (Pontusson and Rueda, 2008, p. 313). Right
parties have for a long time now engaged in the negligence of inequality as a problem
for societies at all (Hickson, 2009). Both findings combined support expectations of a
left-skewed polarisation (Pontusson and Rueda, 2008, p. 313); in particular in constel-
lations of highly mobilised low-income voters (Pontusson and Rueda, 2010). Overall,
the literature on partisan responses to inequality starts from the assumption of a sym-
metric left shift but increasingly qualifies the expectations into the hypothesis of an
asymmetric left-skewed response. In Table 4.1, we summarise the selected indicators
of socio-economic change and the expected partisan response.
Expected party level effect Party system
Left Right implication
∆ GDP Move right Move left Moderation
∆ Public debt Move left Move right polarisation
∆ House prices No effect Move left Moderation
∆ Inequality Move left No effect polarisation
Table 4.1: Expected party system response to the selected indicators
We would like to recall that we expect parties to base their strategic balance between
core and median voter orientation on a simple formula. When core constituencies move
towards the median, parties should follow because moderating shifts reduce the distance
to both voter groups. However, we have argued that core voters move away from the
median in cases when they are negatively affected by socio-economic developments
which are important to them. In contrast, if core voters are indifferent or positively
affected by socio-economic developments, parties ideally move to the median in order
to broaden their electoral support. In the following part, we present the data we use
for the empirical evaluation of our claims.
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4.4 Case selection, data, and identification at the
party level
4.4.1 Case selection
Partisan programmatic responsiveness is a phenomenon we can at best expect in democ-
racies. A case within the universe of such democracies constitutes a positional shift
of a party between two elections. We admittedly limit the scope of the argument
and consequently the sample to parties with visible socio-economic preferences and
exclude ethnic and special issue parties as defined by the CMP/Marpor coding scheme
(Volkens et al., 2017). Moreover, we limit the period under investigation to the years
1980 to 2017 for two reasons. First, political scientists have identified a watershed
in ideational and structural conditions before and after the golden age of embedded
liberalism (Ruggie, 1982) and second, as niche parties are an important aspect of our
argument we acknowledge their rising importance from the 1980s onwards. The scope
conditions in terms of time and partisan types are relaxed in the robustness section in
the appendix. The remaining restrictions of the cases included in our analysis do not
follow a purposeful selection but constraints of data availability.
4.4.2 Data
We take advantage of the CMP/Marpor database providing party manifesto signals dif-
ferentiated in 54 issue categories (Volkens et al., 2017). Conventionally, party positions
are aggregate measures of theoretically selected issue categories which are measured
as a percentage of category counts (see for example Budge and Laver (1992) for the
default index of left and right (RILE)). We depart, from the conventional measure-
ment of the RILE for two reasons. First, we are theoretically interested in the impact
of socio-economic development on the socio-economic positioning of political parties.
The RILE, however, entails issue categories referring to cultural and foreign policy
issue for which we see no theoretical justification to be influenced by the main inde-
pendent variables under scrutiny. Second, the measurement decisions involved in the
aggregation procedure of the RILE index has been shown to not produce the most valid
estimates of party positions (Ro¨th, 2017; Ro¨th, Afonso and Spies, 2018). Accordingly,
we select a measurement procedure based on CMP/Marpor data developed to provide
comparable party positions on the economic dimension over countries and time (see
Ro¨th (2017) for the procedure3). Henceforth the terminology of interventionist versus
left or market liberal versus right is exchangeable. Party positions shifts are measured
as first differences of party positions between two elections. Theoretically, we assume
the level of a party position in t -1 to moderate the effect of socio-economic develop-
ments on party position shifts because asymmetric responses of left and right parties
are at the core of our argument. Overall, this leaves us with around 2000 party position
shifts in 37 countries from 1980 until 2017.
3As a matter of verification for this argument we test every model with the Rile index instead of the
party position on a purely socio-economic dimension in the robustness section.
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We test our theoretical expectations using four socio-economic developments. Eco-
nomic growth is measured in percentage change (World Bank, 2018). Note that change
rates appear higher as usual as we calculated the change rates for electoral periods in-
stead of years. Debt data have been taken from the Comparative Political Dataset
(Armingeon et al., 2015) and were updated with more recent figures via OECD sources
(OECD, 2018). Changes in house prices are measured using data from the Bank of
International Settlements’ property price database which covers 18 countries from 1970
onwards (BIS, 2018). In addition, house price indexes for three countries have been
added from the national statistical offices. Although house prices vary strongly within
countries, we argue that this data is still the best proxy that captures most of the vari-
ation we are interested in, namely the visible changes in overall residential property
values over time in countries. We measure inequality by the top one percent income
share (WIID, 2018) as top income shares are better comparable than Gini-coefficients.
4.4.3 Identification
We are interested in the effect of socio-economic change for political parties’ posi-
tional shifts, moderated by the ideological position of that party. Although we look at
changes in the dependent variable, party system and time trends might not be fully
captured by our controls. There is clear evidence for auto-correlation following the
standard test of serial correlation (Wooldridge, 2010; Drukker, 2003). Accordingly, we
estimate random effects models with panel specific auto-correlation (Beck and Katz,
1995) including country fixed effects4. Furthermore, party position shifts might de-
mand clustered standard errors on the country level in order to take party system
specific dynamics seriously5. However, it has been shown that clustered standard er-
rors in samples with cluster-size being lower 50 are potentially subject to severe bias
(Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2006; Ke´zdi, 2004). We opt for an empirical strategy
to identify potential cluster-effects by calculating intracluster correlation coefficients
(ICC) (see Killip, Mahfoud and Pearce (2004)). We demonstrate empirically that intr-
acluster variance is substantially higher than cross-cluster variance (very low ICC) and
thus justify our abstention from country clustered standard errors (compare appendix
for the individual ICC p-values).
Our main effect of interest is modelled as an interaction between the four different
treatments and the lagged party position respectively. As interaction effects are ideally
presented graphically (Berry, Golder and Milton, 2012; Brambor, Clark and Golder,
2006; Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu, 2018), we only report three types of results be-
low (underlying regression tables can be consulted in the appendix). We first visualise
party responses across a range of observed socio-economic dynamics to illustrate the
4We provide results from various different specifications in the supplementary material. Most impor-
tantly, we also report findings from models using party fixed effects which represent a very tough
empirical test as only within-variation of parties over time is used for the estimation. For these
models, we provide detailed tables and graphs in the appendix.
5In previous work on party position shifts others have clustered the observation at the election level
(Adams et al., 2006; Adams, Haupt and Stoll, 2008; Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009). We do not
follow this approach. The interaction effect reduces relevant observations within elections to very
few observations.
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substantive magnitude of our results for interventionist (parties scoring 0.2 on a 0-1
standardised index of the economic dimension), moderates (selected by the median in
the distribution of 0.5) and market liberal parties (0.8) over the four different socio-
economic treatments. Secondly, we show the average marginal effects computed with
a kernel density estimator (Xu et al., 2017). The kernel density estimator is a very
conservative test because it relaxes the linearity assumptions and thereby avoids the
otherwise typical interpolation across areas in the distribution with few or no observa-
tions (Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu, 2018)6. In the case of the economic dimension,
we have a normal Gaussian distribution with fewer observations at the margins, a
highly vulnerable set-up for spurious findings at the margins with linear interaction
effects. Thirdly, we depict interactions for niche and mainstream parties separately.
As we have four different treatments we avoid bothering readers with a long discussion
of controls and continue with a generalised procedure of selecting necessary control
variables (confounders) based on the back-door criteria of causal identification (see
Pearl (2000) and Morgan and Winship (2007, pp. 105-139)) which we briefly discuss
in the following section.
4.4.4 A general identification procedure for necessary control
variables
We expect party supporters and parties to move their positions in response to changes
in the socio-economic environment. To identify the average treatment effect between
changes in the socio-economic conditions and the change in party positions we apply
a generalised procedure of causal identification.
Estimating causal effects requires closing all back-door paths (Morgan and Winship,
2007, pp. 105-139; Pearl, 2000). Back-door paths are closed when no causal variance
flows systematically from a confounder to the treatment variable and the outcome
variable7. These are basically the two conditions to identify useful confounders or also
often called control variables. To check for possible back-door paths, we have to identify
the confounding variables for every relationship between a socio-economic change and
the party position. We automatised the procedure with a program checking both
conditions for a long list of theoretically justified confounders and selected different
sets of control variables for the six different relationships. The two conditions are met
if a variable has a systematic effect on the treatment as well as a systematic effect on
the outcome8.
Our case is more complicated because the treatment is modelled as an interaction
with a continuous variable. The treatment is an interaction between the level of a party
6Interflex models are estimated with OLS regressions including country dummies and robust standard
errors. Bandwidths are optimised for models with robust standard errors only. Results from models
with party fixed effects and party clusters can be found in the appendix.
7Additionally, mediators and colliders should be not included in the model because the first picks up
much of the variance of interest and the inclusion of colliders leads to spurious findings or non-findings.
However, we do not consider any of the included controls as potential mediator or collider.
8We estimate random effects models to capture between as well as within variance (Bell and Jones,
2015). We used 95 per cent confidence levels to consider an effect as systematic.
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position in t -1 and the change in the different socio-economic variables. Interactions
in a consistently applied framework of blocked back-door paths can be perceived as
identification over multiple groups (see Morgan and Winship (2007, pp.278-290)). We
can think of a closed back-door path for a relationship between socio-economic changes
and a party position shift for, let us say, a group of very market liberal parties and a
group of very interventionist parties. The whole approach of asymmetric effects should
not only let us assume that the treatment has different effects across a dimension of
party positions but that the back-door paths might be different as well. That means
we might need to select different controls in the case of market liberal and interven-
tionist parties. Accordingly, we used the same automatised procedure with the two
conditions for two different groups of parties. The first being parties ≥ 0.5 on a market
liberalism scale representing market liberal parties (1 being the conceptual extreme
point of market liberalism) and parties ≤ 0.5 representing interventionist parties (0
being the extreme point of very interventionist parties). In case the treatment, as well
as the outcome, is systematically affected, we include the potential confounder in the
respective regression model. We report the full selection of control variables and the
underlying procedure at length in the supplementary material (see Table SM3.1) and
continue with a parsimonious presentation of the results in the following parts. It is
important to name two additional aspects of the selection of controls. First, we proved
that the inclusion of controls which are not selected by the procedure described above
has no impact on our average treatment effect of concern. Second, a variable being a
treatment in one model can be a control variable in another. This applies regularly in
our case because, for example, GDP growth affects the change in government debt as
well as the change in party positions and is accordingly, included in a model estimating
the impact of a change in debt on party position change9.
4.5 Results
To test the theorised implications for partisan shifts, we estimate interaction effects of
the party position in t-1 and the specific socio-economic treatment. Figure 4.1 depicts
linear predictions for three selected partisan groups across all four indicators.
The figure maps party shifts across a range of observed changes in the socio-economic
treatment. The level of the effect of the market liberal parties below the moderate and
left parties might be irritating at first sight. On average, parties moderate their stance
and this regression to the mean tendency explains the level of the effects. The levels
are, however, meaningless to us because the real effect of interest to us is the difference
between the slopes induced by the selected treatments. Discounting for the differences
in the intercept, the substantive leftward shift of a market liberal party under the mean
expansion (9.4 per cent in GDP) as predicted by the model amounts to -0.024. In the
mean recession (-3.3 per cent GDP), these parties shift to the right by roughly 0.01
points on the index. Given the median leftward and rightward shifts of market liberal
9For reasons of data availability, we exclude income inequality as control variable from some models
as it disproportionately reduces the sample size.
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Figure 4.1: Linear predictions of socio-economic developments on party position shifts
Shaded areas represent 95 per cent confidence intervals around the respective point estimates.
parties of -0.07 and 0.08, the predicted effects account for roughly one third to one
eighth of the entire positional movement between elections.
Focusing on the slopes of the predicted movements, it follows from the first three
of the four graphs that there are considerable asymmetries between party responses
to economic growth, changes in house prices and public debt. Economic growth as
quickly described above has the expected moderating effect on interventionist and mar-
ket liberal parties. Interestingly, and somewhat counter-intuitive to our expectations,
booming housing markets lead to a moderation of the party system driven by market
liberal as well as interventionist parties. The effect is more nuanced for the former type
of parties but nevertheless, it appears that also interventionist parties contributed to
the overall moderation in response to house prices.
An expansion of government debt, in contrast, induces polarising responses by par-
ties of the left and the right. Ultimately, different parties do not respond differently to
changes in inequality but all rather move to the left. The parallel slopes indicate that
the effect of changes in inequality on party position shift is not moderated by ideology.
These graphs are primarily helpful to illustrate the substantive magnitude of our
results. Due to the discussed regression to the mean tendency, the direction of position
shifts as well as for which parties our results hold cannot easily be discerned from the
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graphs. Equally important, we seek to dispel potential reservations against the im-
portance of the categorical distinction of very market liberal and very interventionist
parties for our findings. We apply kernel density estimations to obtain marginal effects
across the entire continuous dimension of market liberalism to further illustrate our
findings10. In order to make marginal effects based on few observations transparent,
we show the underlying distribution across the economic dimension (see Figure 4.2).
Overall, the estimates based on the kernel estimator confirm the patterns depicted in
Figure 4.1. However, there are also noteworthy differences where the linearity assump-
tion from the linear predictions is falsified. For example, GDP growth (top left panel)
only systematically shifts interventionist parties to the centre. The point estimate
of the average marginal effect for market liberal parties has the expected signs but
the confidence intervals are too large to constitute a systematic effect. Overall, GDP
growth appears to have a moderating effect on party systems which is, however, driven
disproportionately by interventionist parties shifting rightwards.
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Figure 4.2: Marginal effect of socioeconomic treatments across the entire market liberalism
scale
Note: Estimations computed with the interflex package to evaluate interaction models (Hainmueller et al. 2017). Robust
standard errors and country dummies included.
One of the most robust findings across the four indicators are the effects of house
prices on party position shifts (top right panel). House prices are of predominant
10Linear marginal effects plots can be found in the appendix for purpose of comparison.
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concern to economic right-wing parties (Ansell, 2014). According to our argument,
higher house prices should disproportionately benefit voters of the right and therefore
open strategic room for market liberal parties to move to the centre. In the opposite
situation, however, reassuring core voters who are under pressure should move market
liberal parties to the right. For left-wing voters, the literature does not predict a
systematic response. Our results support these arguments in part. The point estimate
for more market liberal parties is negative indicating they move systematically to the
left when house prices increase, but the confidence intervals are rather large. At the
same time, we find a moderating response by interventionist parties to house prices. As
we control for economic growth, there is a systematic response to house price dynamics
by parties of the right and the left exceeding a pure growth effect. House price booms
lead to an overall moderation of the party system while negative market developments
have a polarising effect.
Theoretically, we assumed public debt to be a core issue for right- and left-wing
parties, albeit for different reasons, with a polarising effect on the party system. While
our expectation is met for interventionist parties, market liberal parties do not system-
atically shift to the right (bottom left panel). Interestingly, the average marginal effect
is slightly non-linear with a decreasing slope for market liberal parties. The substantive
response by interventionist parties by the point estimate is therefore slightly stronger
than for market liberals, an interpretation which is apparently concealed by the linear
predictions in Figure 4.1. It is worth mentioning, however, that this is a consistent
finding against the tendencies of the regression to mean. We interpret this result as
driven by different motivations for left- and right-wing parties. While market liberal
parties should favour a smaller state in general, it follows by implication that a rising
stock of public debt leads to some sort of ideological signal to their supporters to limit
public borrowing. We see a tendency of these shifts in the results. Leftist parties, in
turn, are not by definition opposed to public borrowing in general. Still, we deem their
core voters to be particularly exposed to fiscal consolidation which is why they send
out signals which can be interpreted as protecting these interests (Bojar, 2018; Bremer,
2018). Accordingly, they move leftwards in response to increasing debt. Rising debt
has a polarising effect on the party system.
The expectations on the impact of rising inequality on party position shifts are in-
consistent (bottom right panel). The results, however, portray a consistent picture in
line with the canonical Meltzer and Richard (1981) model and furthermore support ar-
guments of Romer (1975) or Bolton and Roland (1997). Higher top income shares are
associated with a consistent left-shift across the entire ideological spectrum although
the ideological extremes depict broad confidence intervals leading to insignificant ef-
fects. This might be connected to the smaller sample size in the case of inequality and
few observations on the poles of the ideology distribution. Our own expectations as
well as the findings of (Pontusson and Rueda, 2010) towards an asymmetric response
of the left are not confirmed.
So far, we have only considered asymmetric responses by political parties based on
their previous party positions. Our results match the expectations on ideology as a
moderating factor to respond to socio-economic developments. The second assump-
tion we question is whether niche or mainstream parties are stable predictors of core
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voters or median voter orientation. Figure 4.3 presents the average marginal effects
plots for split samples of niche and mainstream parties. We follow conventional ap-
proaches in the literature (Adams et al., 2006) and classify niche parties by party family
indicator from the CMP data. Niche parties are communist, green and nationalist par-
ties while social democratic, liberal, Christian democratic and conservative parties are
mainstream parties. Crucially, both split samples contain parties of the left and the
right on the economic policy dimension such that we can, at least theoretically, expect
similar patterns.
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Figure 4.3: Marginal effect of socioeconomic treatments across the entire market liberalism
scale by party type
Note: Estimations computed with the interflex package to evaluate interaction models (Hainmueller et al. 2017). Robust
standard errors and country dummies included. estimates.
The top row of Figure 4.3 depicts the average marginal effect on the party position
change estimated for niche parties while the bottom row reports the results for main-
stream parties. Overall, the general patterns remain similar to the results shown in
Figure 4.2 for niche and mainstream parties. GDP growth and house price changes
induce the same moderating effects while public debt triggers polarisation. However,
when we interpret the confidence intervals strictly, some differences to the overall re-
sults emerge. Firstly, with respect to GDP growth, it appears that the moderation of
the left and the right is driven by different party types. Moderation by the left seems to
be driven by mainstream interventionist parties while there is more variation for niche
interventionist parties. In contrast, however, moderation by market liberal parties is
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mainly driven by niche market liberal parties while mainstream market liberals are not
systematically responding to growth.
The results on house price changes support our theoretical expectation. Systematic
moderation on the left seems to be driven by positional moves from interventionist
niche parties. Responses from market liberal parties are only systematic for main-
stream parties. From the point of view of our theoretical argument, this pattern makes
sense: Niche parties with more right-wing economic policy positions are mostly nation-
alist parties for whom we think there is less of a rationale to respond to volatile asset
markets. Similarly, it fits the picture that mainstream interventionist parties show no
systematic response. We are more puzzled by the moderating responses by niche inter-
ventionist parties to house price changes. The positions associated with a significant
response, contain about a fourth of all observations. Potential explanations from a
theoretical point of view entail that homeownership extends towards the middle class
and wider shares of the population which makes interventionist niche parties respond.
Additionally, house price changes might be associated with other dynamics for which
we do not control and that drive the effects. At the same time, reading our argument
for parties whose core issues are not affected might also yield an explanation. As nei-
ther leftist voters nor leftist parties care particularly about house prices, a dynamic on
this indicator might drive them further to the centre of the policy space as they seek
to attract more voters when house prices are booming.
Surprisingly, disentangling party responses to changes in public debt by party type
reveals that systematic polarising responses to rising public debt are mostly driven
from interventionist parties, and even more so by niche interventionist parties. Market
liberal parties, in contrast, show a tendency to moderate but our results fail to reveal a
systematic pattern. This points to the fact that from a party perspective, shielding core
voters from adverse effects of more pressure towards fiscal consolidation is a stronger
driver for interventionist parties than pushing for fiscal consolidation as such by market
liberal parties.
Moving to inequality, it turns out that the full sample effect is almost identically
replicated for mainstream parties. Mainstream parties of the centre moderate in re-
sponse to rising inequality. Interestingly, when studying the graph in the top right
corner on niche parties, interventionist niche parties are not responsive but market
liberal niche parties polarise when inequality rises. This effect is quite interesting and
raises questions on who is represented by mostly nationalist parties which populate the
right half of the ideological spectrum for niche parties.
Overall, when zooming out of the individual indicators again and relating the re-
sults back to our second research interest, we find no strong evidence that niche and
mainstream parties are fundamentally different in their responses to the chosen socio-
economic developments. As such, we think this represents initial evidence that party
type does not clearly determine to whom parties are responsive.
It is important to note, however, that we decided to display rather conservative
estimation results. We provide several additional specifications for every indicator in
the supplementary material, most of which replicate and often improve the results pre-
sented here as to how they match our expectations. What seems important to reiterate
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is the fact that almost every model confirms our core claim. Partisan shifts in response
to socio-economic change are overwhelmingly asymmetric and thereby challenge the
conventional theorising and modelling of uniform partisan shifts.
The entire results are derived from models which have departed from the conven-
tional usage of a general left and right dimension for party position shifts (see for
example Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009); (Adams, 2012); (Adams, Haupt and Stoll,
2008)). Purposefully we selected party positions and party position shifts on a purely
socio-economic dimension because we wanted to narrow the causal chain between ide-
ological positioning and socio-economic developments and avoid confounding signals
from policy areas beyond our theoretical scope (see Hellwig (2012) for a similar proce-
dure). This decision turns out to be of importance because a replication of our results
with the RILE index (Budge and Laver, 1992), does show considerably fewer systematic
partisan shift patterns (compare Figure SM3.12, Figure SM3.13 and Table SM3.6 in
the supplementary material). In our view, this strengthens the value of our approach
as using a dimension based on issues that are better comparable and closely linked to
our theoretical argument (Ro¨th, Afonso and Spies, 2018).
4.6 Conclusion
polarisation and convergence are at the core of any dynamic perspective on democracy
because democracy is perceived as working best on a knife’s edge between too much
convergence and too much polarisation. Explaining the gravitation of party systems
around that edge is to explain why parties shift their position. The existing literature
on that matter has advanced a lot in recent years and has brought many plausible
explanations to the forefront. However, we would like to encourage and empirically
underline a rethinking of two aspects which still dominate the research on party posi-
tion shifts. (1) From a theoretical point of view, it is highly likely that parties with
different ideologies respond asymmetrically and not uniformly to the very same change
in external conditions. (2) We do not think that mainstream parties consistently re-
spond to the median voter and niche parties to core voters but that addressing voter
groups depends on how changing external conditions affect core and median voters the
right, left, and niche parties respectively. We expect parties to radicalise when their
core voters are under pressure while moderating when they fare comparatively well. As
parties of the economic left and right have different core voters and accordingly core
voters are different, if at all, affected by the socio-economic change, we assume parties
to respond asymmetrically. Additionally, these asymmetric dynamics can be driven by
shifts of economic right or left parties or both at the same time. Overall, this leads to
skewed dynamics of moderation and polarisation on the party system level.
We select four socio-economic indicators which we consider to theoretically tap into
the described categories (GDP growth, house prices, public debt, and income inequal-
ity) and test the relationship empirically using data from the Comparative Manifestos
Project. We model party positions shifts in response to a socio-economic change in
order to compare the consistency of partisan responses. The analysis builds on 18 to
36 countries from 1980 to 2017. Theoretically, we expect to see moderation when GDP
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grows and house prices rise while increasing public debt and rising inequality should
induce polarisation in the party system. Our empirical analysis overall confirms this
pattern. Firstly, leftist and rightist parties respond very differently to three of the four
indicators. We interpret this finding to question the assumption that parties respond
uniformly to the same change in external conditions. Secondly, we disentangle the re-
sponse by niche and mainstream parties. The overall pattern remains similar thereby
showing that a core or median voter focus can be found with mainstream and with
niche parties. We interpret this as support for our claim that external conditions make
parties prioritise either core or median voters depending on the effect these develop-
ments have on their core voters than just their party type. The results give evidence
to rethink some of the partisan shifts associated to a socio-economic change in the
literature (for example house prices and income inequality) and support a view which
stresses the consistency between micro and partisan responses for the future.
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SM1 Patrimonial Economic Voting in the UK: Home-
ownership and House Price Appreciation
SM1.1 Transition to homeownership
SM1.1.1 Summary statistics
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Remains tenant 256 294 286 292 273 289 443 399 368 375 208 159 155
Transitions to HO 68 64 91 79 99 92 132 106 100 96 87 47 78
Total 324 358 377 371 372 381 575 505 468 471 295 206 233
2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Remains tenant 176 166 159 156 1171 2488 2134 2019 1955 1900 1172 96 17389
Transitions to HO 60 50 69 38 92 195 200 219 187 224 113 15 2601
Total 236 216 228 194 1263 2683 2334 2238 2142 2124 1285 111 19990
Table SM1.1: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tenants Homeowners Remaining tenants Recent homeowners
count mean sd count mean sd count mean sd count mean sd
Dummy: supports Conservatives 34140 0.236 0.425 122307 0.377 0.485 17389 0.203 0.402 2601 0.315 0.465
Age 34140 37.064 12.738 122307 42.739 12.653 17389 39.728 13.019 2601 33.269 10.400
Female 34140 0.508 0.500 122307 0.498 0.500 17389 0.517 0.500 2601 0.498 0.500
Education 34140 5.476 2.999 122307 5.091 2.866 17389 5.847 3.036 2601 4.406 2.776
Occupation 34140 4.729 2.530 122307 3.917 2.412 17389 5.100 2.532 2601 3.774 2.312
Log total income (last month) 34140 7.148 0.809 122307 7.355 0.896 17389 7.158 0.772 2601 7.323 0.841
Living in Urban/rural area 34140 0.825 0.380 122307 0.765 0.424 17389 0.829 0.377 2601 0.796 0.403
Has children 34140 0.332 0.474 122307 0.361 0.480 17389 0.360 0.480 2601 0.300 0.458
Single/never married 34140 0.324 0.468 122307 0.161 0.367 17389 0.308 0.462 2601 0.265 0.441
Married/living together/civil union 34140 0.559 0.497 122307 0.765 0.424 17389 0.559 0.497 2601 0.674 0.469
Widowed 34140 0.013 0.114 122307 0.012 0.109 17389 0.019 0.136 2601 0.007 0.081
Divorced/separated 34140 0.104 0.305 122307 0.063 0.243 17389 0.115 0.318 2601 0.055 0.227
Parl. Const: Safe Tory 31298 0.246 0.430 110795 0.316 0.465 15728 0.228 0.420 2432 0.292 0.455
Parl. Const: Safe Labour 31298 0.394 0.489 110795 0.299 0.458 15728 0.409 0.492 2432 0.333 0.472
Parl. Const: Safe/marginal LibDem 31298 0.060 0.237 110795 0.058 0.234 15728 0.056 0.230 2432 0.064 0.244
Parl. Const: Marginal Tory 31298 0.016 0.124 110795 0.016 0.127 15728 0.014 0.119 2432 0.015 0.121
Parl. Const: Marginal Labour 31298 0.210 0.407 110795 0.234 0.424 15728 0.213 0.409 2432 0.224 0.417
Parl. Const: Mixed 31298 0.075 0.263 110795 0.077 0.266 15728 0.079 0.270 2432 0.072 0.258
Ideology index 5917 3.243 1.161 25426 3.536 1.135 2139 3.128 1.146 620 3.466 1.150
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SM1.1.2 Incumbency effects
In addition to the results across the entire period under investigation, elections and
their outcomes may affect the presented effect. Given that the Tories won elections
in 1992, 2010 and 2015 while losing in between introduces a dynamic political context
into the data. The expectation from these dynamics would be that in the period where
the Conservative party won, the effect should be larger as a majority of the electorate
swung to the right, as well. The effect for the years of Labour winning the General
election should represent the lower bound of the estimate on the causal mechanism for
two reasons. Firstly, of course, Labour secured a majority and therefore fewer people
on average supported the Tories. At the same time, Labour moved programmatically
strong to the right on a pro-market platform, therefore reducing the incentive for recent
property owners to support the Conservatives. Figure SM1.1 shows results from split
sample estimations on all observations before 1997 and past 2010 (marked as Tory
incumbency) and in between (Labour incumbency).
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Figure SM1.1: Homeownership and transition to homeownership and probability to vote
Conservative by government incumbency
Note: Tory government on the left, Labour government on the right.
The results support these expectations. Overall, there is still a systematic differ-
ence between remaining tenants and recent homeowners. With an incumbent Labour
government though, the difference between both groups slightly shrinks both in mag-
nitude and significance. The results have two main implications. Firstly, it appears
that there is sill some incumbency effect present in the results. Purchasing a house
might reflect economic well-being for which voters can potentially reward incumbent
governments. At the same time, political parties can influence the electoral effect of
asset ownership by making explicit programmatic offers to owners. With the data at
79
hand, it is not possible to further disentangle these dynamics which should be subject
to further research. With respect to the main effect under investigation, however, these
additional models further support the results.
Table SM1.2: Transition to homeownership: Labour and Tory governments
Labour government Tory government
(1) (2)
Transition to homeownership 0.414 (0.005) 0.479 (0.000)
Age 0.008 (0.191) 0.010 (0.012)
Female -0.055 (0.695) -0.324 (0.000)
Education 0.019 (0.512) 0.066 (0.000)
Occupation -0.035 (0.202) -0.122 (0.000)
Log total income (last month) 0.202 (0.098) 0.192 (0.004)
Living in Urban/rural area -0.488 (0.003) -0.658 (0.000)
Has children -0.183 (0.232) -0.082 (0.346)
Marital status (ref: single)
Married/living together/civil union 0.007 (0.969) 0.057 (0.560)
Widowed 1.129 (0.094) -0.068 (0.882)
Divorced/separated 0.108 (0.677) -0.097 (0.585)
Observations 4008 15982
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.073
p-values in parentheses
Respondent clustered standard errors & region dummies included.
80
SM1.1.3 Alternative dependent variables
Table SM1.3: Homeownership: Tory identification as DV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Homeownership status 0.563 (0.000) 0.563 (0.000) 0.563 (0.000) 0.618 (0.000)
Age -0.001 (0.661) -0.001 (0.759) -0.001 (0.751) 0.002 (0.616)
Female -0.272 (0.000) -0.268 (0.000) -0.279 (0.000) -0.216 (0.006)
Education 0.076 (0.000) 0.084 (0.000) 0.087 (0.000) 0.116 (0.000)
Occupation -0.108 (0.000) -0.090 (0.000) -0.107 (0.000) -0.129 (0.000)
Log total income (last month) 0.067 (0.006) 0.101 (0.001) 0.074 (0.002) -0.048 (0.188)
Living in Urban/rural area -0.609 (0.000) -0.583 (0.000) -0.427 (0.000) -0.412 (0.000)
Has children -0.152 (0.000) -0.148 (0.002) -0.171 (0.000) -0.060 (0.396)
Marital status (ref: single)
Married/living together/civil union 0.250 (0.000) 0.221 (0.001) 0.227 (0.000) 0.016 (0.862)
Widowed 0.282 (0.145) 0.040 (0.850) 0.249 (0.228) 0.350 (0.318)
Divorced/separated 0.241 (0.002) 0.322 (0.002) 0.226 (0.007) 0.070 (0.603)
Average council tax rate 0.000 (0.000)
Parl. constituency (ref: Safe Tory)
Parl. Const: Safe Labour -0.839 (0.000)
Parl. Const: Safe/marginal LibDem -0.227 (0.010)
Parl. Const: Marginal Tory -0.123 (0.367)
Parl. Const: Marginal Labour -0.375 (0.000)
Parl. Const: Mixed -0.217 (0.009)
Ideology (ref: very leftist)
Ideology: Leftist 0.202 (0.124)
Ideology: Center 0.588 (0.000)
Ideology: Rightist 1.042 (0.000)
Ideology: Very rightist 1.794 (0.000)
Observations 115963 49969 106276 25900
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.069 0.078 0.123
p-values in parentheses
Respondent clustered standard errors, year & region dummies included.
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Table SM1.4: Homeownership: Tory vote intention as DV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Homeownership status 0.346 (0.000) 0.353 (0.000) 0.359 (0.000) 0.188 (0.073)
Age 0.000 (0.832) -0.005 (0.088) -0.002 (0.243) -0.012 (0.020)
Female -0.211 (0.000) -0.181 (0.001) -0.202 (0.000) -0.201 (0.087)
Education 0.019 (0.026) 0.034 (0.001) 0.028 (0.001) 0.077 (0.001)
Occupation -0.049 (0.000) -0.047 (0.000) -0.056 (0.000) -0.014 (0.564)
Log total income (last month) 0.198 (0.000) 0.111 (0.003) 0.185 (0.000) 0.050 (0.468)
Living in Urban/rural area -0.367 (0.000) -0.294 (0.000) -0.274 (0.000) -0.471 (0.000)
Has children -0.076 (0.092) -0.004 (0.942) -0.042 (0.340) 0.097 (0.393)
Marital status (ref: single)
Married/living together/civil union 0.199 (0.000) 0.254 (0.001) 0.212 (0.000) 0.315 (0.020)
Widowed 0.087 (0.641) 0.165 (0.510) 0.231 (0.217) 0.645 (0.106)
Divorced/separated 0.066 (0.449) 0.114 (0.330) 0.077 (0.379) 0.449 (0.034)
Average council tax rate 0.001 (0.000)
Parl. constituency (ref: Safe Tory)
Parl. Const: Safe Labour -0.362 (0.000)
Parl. Const: Safe/marginal LibDem -0.095 (0.339)
Parl. Const: Marginal Tory 0.146 (0.310)
Parl. Const: Marginal Labour -0.201 (0.001)
Parl. Const: Mixed -0.120 (0.139)
Ideology (ref: very leftist)
Ideology: Leftist 0.049 (0.833)
Ideology: Center -0.094 (0.666)
Ideology: Rightist 0.140 (0.543)
Ideology: Very rightist 0.270 (0.234)
Observations 40667 18426 37802 5443
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.039 0.034 0.035
p-values in parentheses
Respondent clustered standard errors, year & region dummies included.
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Table SM1.5: Transition to homeownership: Tory identification as DV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transition to homeownership 0.503 (0.000) 0.578 (0.000) 0.444 (0.000) 0.468 (0.015)
Age 0.008 (0.038) 0.007 (0.211) 0.009 (0.044) 0.001 (0.922)
Female -0.220 (0.009) -0.150 (0.227) -0.234 (0.008) -0.135 (0.457)
Education 0.077 (0.000) 0.074 (0.002) 0.087 (0.000) 0.130 (0.000)
Occupation -0.097 (0.000) -0.097 (0.000) -0.107 (0.000) -0.079 (0.068)
Log total income (last month) 0.169 (0.011) 0.147 (0.197) 0.180 (0.011) 0.036 (0.776)
Living in Urban/rural area -0.642 (0.000) -0.644 (0.000) -0.470 (0.000) -0.757 (0.000)
Has children -0.161 (0.070) -0.215 (0.083) -0.208 (0.028) -0.232 (0.280)
Marital status (ref: single)
Married/living together/civil union 0.089 (0.374) 0.197 (0.206) 0.077 (0.459) -0.145 (0.510)
Widowed 0.402 (0.356) 0.310 (0.627) 0.289 (0.549) 0.778 (0.363)
Divorced/separated 0.105 (0.534) 0.241 (0.332) 0.083 (0.638) -0.338 (0.386)
Average council tax rate 0.001 (0.004)
Parl. constituency (ref: Safe Tory)
Parl. Const: Safe Labour -0.694 (0.000)
Parl. Const: Safe/marginal LibDem -0.289 (0.077)
Parl. Const: Marginal Tory -0.637 (0.056)
Parl. Const: Marginal Labour -0.652 (0.000)
Parl. Const: Mixed -0.383 (0.018)
Ideology (ref: very leftist)
Ideology: Leftist 0.751 (0.166)
Ideology: Center 0.920 (0.078)
Ideology: Rightist 1.357 (0.009)
Ideology: Very rightist 1.840 (0.000)
Observations 13459 5878 12373 2147
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.075 0.080 0.136
p-values in parentheses
Respondent clustered standard errors, year & region dummies.
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Table SM1.6: Transition to homeownership: Tory vote intention as DV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transition to homeownership 0.331 (0.002) 0.216 (0.174) 0.314 (0.005) 0.589 (0.098)
Age 0.009 (0.105) 0.003 (0.705) 0.009 (0.158) 0.020 (0.309)
Female -0.272 (0.017) -0.204 (0.226) -0.318 (0.007) -0.510 (0.136)
Education -0.015 (0.505) 0.001 (0.975) -0.005 (0.848) 0.067 (0.374)
Occupation -0.085 (0.001) -0.052 (0.152) -0.069 (0.011) 0.072 (0.362)
Log total income (last month) 0.204 (0.038) 0.034 (0.826) 0.210 (0.040) -0.120 (0.452)
Living in Urban/rural area -0.545 (0.000) -0.304 (0.124) -0.466 (0.002) -0.700 (0.071)
Has children 0.137 (0.263) 0.190 (0.302) 0.118 (0.358) 0.790 (0.062)
Marital status (ref: single)
Married/living together/civil union -0.106 (0.441) -0.284 (0.157) -0.099 (0.501) -0.194 (0.697)
Widowed -1.299 (0.012) -2.140 (0.013) -1.235 (0.015) -2.119 (0.121)
Divorced/separated -0.176 (0.498) 0.279 (0.461) -0.121 (0.657) 0.708 (0.380)
Average council tax rate 0.001 (0.004)
Parl. constituency (ref: Safe Tory)
Parl. Const: Safe Labour -0.575 (0.002)
Parl. Const: Safe/marginal LibDem -0.021 (0.933)
Parl. Const: Marginal Tory -0.225 (0.639)
Parl. Const: Marginal Labour -0.267 (0.096)
Parl. Const: Mixed 0.321 (0.121)
Ideology (ref: very leftist)
Ideology: Leftist 3.152 (0.005)
Ideology: Center 2.190 (0.039)
Ideology: Rightist 2.745 (0.012)
Ideology: Very rightist 2.880 (0.008)
Observations 7133 3015 6234 598
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.041 0.068 0.184
p-values in parentheses
Respondent clustered standard errors, year & region dummies.
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SM1.2 House price developments
SM1.2.1 Summary statistics
Table SM1.7: Summary statistics: self-reported house values and median house price index
by constituency
count mean sd 1st pctile 99th pctile
House value 87994 227552 397999 32000 1000000
Log of house value 87994 12.026 0.751 10.373 13.816
Change in house value 87994 8125 530682 -130000 200000
Log change of house value 87994 0.051 0.337 -0.588 0.780
Constituency median house value 69823 1647.332 595.932 657.000 3247.000
Log constituency median house value 69823 7.340 0.372 6.488 8.085
Change in constituency median house value 67093 52.978 313.831 -1203.000 667.000
Change in log constituency median house value 67093 0.038 0.180 -0.715 0.358
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SM1.2.2 Incumbency effects
Similar to the transition models, the house price change models can also be affected
by government incumbency. Rising asset values might lead voters to reward the sitting
government while decreasing values might lead to punishment at the voting booth. To
disentangle potential incumbency effects, I re-estimate the house price models for split
samples of Labour and Tory governments of the sample and present the results in Figure
SM1.2 and Table SM1.8. The results from the main text mostly prevail. Under both
governments, rising house prices reduce the likelihood to support the Tories, although
the effect is stronger under a Labour government. Tory incumbency does, however,
mitigate the negative effect of house price increases.
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Figure SM1.2: House price changes and probability to vote Conservative by incumbent
government
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Table SM1.8: House price changes: Labour and Tory governments
Tory government Labour government
(1) (2)
Log of house value 0.468 (0.000) 0.556 (0.000)
Log change of house value -0.155 (0.000) -0.405 (0.000)
Age -0.002 (0.271) 0.003 (0.367)
Female -0.193 (0.000) -0.262 (0.000)
Education 0.082 (0.000) 0.091 (0.000)
Occupation -0.058 (0.000) -0.060 (0.000)
Log total income (last month) 0.076 (0.000) 0.001 (0.976)
Living in Urban/rural area -0.381 (0.000) -0.295 (0.000)
Has children -0.162 (0.000) -0.246 (0.000)
Marital status (ref: single)
Married/living together/civil union 0.237 (0.000) 0.267 (0.007)
Widowed 0.494 (0.001) 0.359 (0.209)
Divorced/separated 0.224 (0.006) 0.323 (0.031)
Constant -7.105 (0.000) -8.105 (0.000)
Observations 58476 29518
Pseudo R2 0.073 0.069
p-values in parentheses
Individual clustered standard errors and region dummies included
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SM1.2.3 Official house price index
Table SM1.9: Constituency median house values: Logit Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log constituency median house value 0.652 (0.000) 0.513 (0.000) 0.257 (0.000) 0.118 (0.405) 0.686 (0.000) 0.525 (0.000) 0.272 (0.000) 0.112 (0.436)
Change in log constituency median house value -0.340 (0.000) -0.113 (0.251) -0.125 (0.065) 0.060 (0.720)
Age 0.007 (0.000) 0.006 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) 0.009 (0.001) 0.007 (0.000) 0.006 (0.000) 0.007 (0.000) 0.009 (0.001)
Female -0.189 (0.000) -0.175 (0.000) -0.204 (0.000) -0.198 (0.001) -0.189 (0.000) -0.175 (0.000) -0.204 (0.000) -0.198 (0.001)
Education 0.057 (0.000) 0.064 (0.000) 0.062 (0.000) 0.069 (0.000) 0.057 (0.000) 0.064 (0.000) 0.062 (0.000) 0.069 (0.000)
Occupation -0.077 (0.000) -0.067 (0.000) -0.075 (0.000) -0.053 (0.000) -0.077 (0.000) -0.067 (0.000) -0.075 (0.000) -0.053 (0.000)
Log total income (last month) 0.116 (0.000) 0.122 (0.000) 0.108 (0.000) 0.048 (0.110) 0.115 (0.000) 0.122 (0.000) 0.108 (0.000) 0.048 (0.109)
Living in Urban/rural area -0.525 (0.000) -0.453 (0.000) -0.371 (0.000) -0.418 (0.000) -0.524 (0.000) -0.453 (0.000) -0.372 (0.000) -0.419 (0.000)
Has children -0.152 (0.000) -0.122 (0.001) -0.156 (0.000) -0.165 (0.006) -0.152 (0.000) -0.122 (0.001) -0.156 (0.000) -0.165 (0.006)
Marital status (ref: single)
Married/living together/civil union 0.262 (0.000) 0.230 (0.000) 0.268 (0.000) 0.194 (0.026) 0.262 (0.000) 0.229 (0.000) 0.267 (0.000) 0.194 (0.026)
Widowed 0.210 (0.131) 0.018 (0.916) 0.200 (0.165) 0.189 (0.486) 0.210 (0.130) 0.018 (0.917) 0.200 (0.164) 0.190 (0.484)
Divorced/separated 0.075 (0.268) 0.121 (0.135) 0.063 (0.364) 0.119 (0.379) 0.073 (0.274) 0.121 (0.137) 0.062 (0.366) 0.119 (0.378)
Average council tax rate 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000)
Parl. constituency (ref: Safe Tory)
Parl. Const: Safe Labour -0.684 (0.000) -0.680 (0.000)
Parl. Const: Safe/marginal LibDem -0.223 (0.001) -0.223 (0.001)
Parl. Const: Marginal Tory 0.038 (0.736) 0.039 (0.730)
Parl. Const: Marginal Labour -0.330 (0.000) -0.328 (0.000)
Parl. Const: Mixed -0.210 (0.001) -0.208 (0.001)
Ideology (ref: very leftist)
Ideology: Leftist 0.232 (0.065) 0.232 (0.065)
Ideology: Center 0.549 (0.000) 0.549 (0.000)
Ideology: Rightist 0.907 (0.000) 0.907 (0.000)
Ideology: Very rightist 1.351 (0.000) 1.351 (0.000)
Observations 90230 44386 87222 16153 90230 44386 87222 16153
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.054 0.062 0.082 0.054 0.054 0.062 0.082
p-values in parentheses
Respondent clustered standard errors, wave & region dummies included.
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SM2 An Asymmetric Partisanship Effect: House
Price Fluctuations and Party Positions
Table SM2.1: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Deviation
∆ Real House Prices (from prev. Election) 903 13.693 30.415
Franzmann/Kaiser 903 4.753 2.320
∆ Franzmann/Kaiser 903 0.029 0.581
RILE 903 -1.296 22.619
∆ RILE 903 0.717 15.667
Benoit/Laver 903 -0.370 0.490
∆ Benoit/Laver 903 -0.000 0.352
Competition from the right: FK 903 3.028 2.468
Competition from the right: RILE 903 3.008 2.481
Competition from the right: BL 903 2.993 2.461
∆ Gross gov. debt in % GDP (ppt. from prev. election) 903 2.621 12.787
Real GDP growth (% ∆ from previous year) 903 2.511 2.204
∆ Unemployment (% pt. ∆ from previous election) 903 0.202 2.118
Long-term interest rate on government bonds 903 7.777 3.910
Inflation (CPI % ∆ from previous year) 903 4.382 4.003
Openness of the economy: (imports + exports)/GDP 903 74.660 34.576
Homeownership rate 903 58.798 11.883
Log Population 903 9.530 1.131
∆ Population over 65 (% pt. ∆ from previous election) 903 0.427 0.476
Urban Population 903 78.801 9.779
Duration legislative term 903 3.426 0.993
Government (yes/no) 903 0.375 0.484
Effective number of parties 903 5.108 1.815
Voter turnout in election 903 77.624 13.857
Inequality (Gini coefficient) 903 44.323 3.850
Vote share (t-1) 903 16.294 13.620
Electoral system (PR=1) 903 1.708 0.589
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Countries included in the sample (n=18):
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain, Ger-
many, Switzerland, Great Britain, Ireland, United States, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, Japan
SM2.1 Measuring party positions: Description and additional
results
I measure party positions using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)
(Volkens et al., 2015). For the CMP dataset, human coders analyse the content of
party manifestos by assigning quasi-sentences to policy categories such as welfare or
defence. The number of quasi-sentences allocated to one issue is aggregated and its
relative share of the entire document is reported. The CMP approach is saliency-based
which assumes that parties have different preferences for different policies and will
signal those preferences in their manifesto through the amount of space they concede
to the respective issue.
The CMP is the only data source that allows for an analysis of party position change
over time and across countries. However, the data do not come without problems. For
instance, the relative importance reported for each category only consists of point
estimates without any indication of measurement error. Hence, within party variation
in one issue can be due to measurement error or an actual positional shift (Benoit
and Laver, 2007). Unfortunately, the CMP issues are also not sufficiently fine-grained
to explicitly measure changes in parties’ stances concerning e.g. redistribution. The
conventional approach to work with the CMP data is to locate parties on a left-right
dimension and evaluate positional shifts along this dimension. As a robustness check,
I present results from two additional left/right measurements here in the appendix.
These represent just a selection of numerous options proposed in the literature which
are highly correlated but differ in the number and selection of items as well as the
method of aggregation. Selecting (in total) three different indicators should account
for some of the shortcomings inherent in every positional measurement and increase
the robustness of the empirical results.
The measurement I use in the main text is the index by Franzmann and Kaiser
(2006). The authors argue that not all CMP issues are informative about the positions
that parties take and therefore distinguish between valence and positional issues for
each country. As party competition differs by political context, a country-specific
selection of the most relevant issues is suggested as a better measurement than using a
set of issues across all countries to derive positions. In addition, the authors distinguish
between a general left-right, a socio-economic and an economic affairs dimension. I use
the latter dimension ranking parties on a scale from 1 to 10 with one representing the
most leftist and 10 the most rightist position. Using this scale represents a particularly
tough empirical test as its country-specificity reduces the overall variation between
countries that can be statistically exploited.
As a robustness check, I include below models using two additional indexes. The
first one is the CMP provided, issue-based left-right scale (called RILE) which assigns
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parties a value between -100 (left) and 100 (right). The value of the scale is computed
by aggregating the percentages of certain issues that signal rightist positions and sub-
tracting the combined percentages of leftist issues (Budge and Laver, 1992). Of the
three scales employed in this paper, the RILE scale is the broadest measurement as it
includes the most left-right dimensions. For instance, it includes non-economic issues
such as the position on international relations (military involvement or peace). It is
unlikely that using this index biases estimates in favour of my argument. Including
more categories for which no reasonable theoretical prediction can be established should
rather introduce more noise into the data and thus weaken any systematic relationship.
The third alternative scale is a left-right scale derived from Benoit and Laver (2007).
The authors split the items of the RILE scale into two different subgroups on economic
and social policy. I use the economic policy dimension as it measures issues relevant
to questions of redistribution and includes some aspects of social policy. The indicator
consists of fewer categories than RILE and is dimension-based. This implies that the
salience of different items is measured as the proportion of all items on this policy
dimension. While other scales compute saliency in relation to the entire manifesto,
dimension-based measurements calculate saliency as a share of the sum of all statements
on a single dimension. Technically, this leads to a scale ranging from -1 (left) to 1
(right). This scale differentiates more directly between party positions on the economic
policy dimension.
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Figure SM2.1: Marginal effects of house price change over previous party position, by
measurement
Dotted lines represent 95 per cent confidence intervals around point estimates. Models from column 3 in Table SM3
and SM4 are the basis of the graphs.
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Figure SM2.2: Average party position by party family (across all elections); based on CMP
party family coding, by measurement
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Figure SM2.3: Simulated responsiveness to different house price changes
By previous party position (from left to right: left-wing, centrist, right-wing) and measurement.
Shaded areas represent 95 per cent confidence intervals around the respective point estimates. Models from column 3
in Table SM3 and SM4 are the basis of the graphs.
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SM2.2 Empirical results - full tables and robustness checks
Table SM2.2: Determinants of shifts in party positions – Full models: Franzmann/Kaiser
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Real house prices -0.002 (0.157) 0.001 (0.750) 0.000 (0.873) 0.001 (0.660)
Party Position (t-1) -0.041 (0.000) -0.034 (0.000) -0.036 (0.000) -0.161 (0.000)
∆ House prices × Party Position (t-1) -0.001 (0.077) -0.001 (0.089) -0.000 (0.075)
Center of gravity 0.072 (0.043) 0.126 (0.000)
Competition from the right -0.155 (0.000)
∆ Gross government debt 0.001 (0.849) 0.000 (0.920) -0.000 (0.939) 0.001 (0.778)
Real GDP growth -0.010 (0.603) -0.008 (0.691) -0.009 (0.627) -0.003 (0.890)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.013 (0.413) -0.011 (0.492) -0.013 (0.405) -0.006 (0.664)
Government bond interest rate -0.021 (0.336) -0.020 (0.339) -0.022 (0.294) -0.004 (0.836)
Inflation rate -0.004 (0.796) -0.004 (0.790) -0.000 (0.994) -0.005 (0.716)
Openness of the economy -0.005 (0.194) -0.005 (0.194) -0.005 (0.188) -0.002 (0.509)
Homeownership rate -0.012 (0.251) -0.011 (0.310) -0.005 (0.615) -0.007 (0.484)
Population (logs) 1.741 (0.011) 1.850 (0.007) 1.984 (0.004) 1.887 (0.007)
∆ over 65-year olds -0.106 (0.056) -0.109 (0.050) -0.123 (0.028) -0.167 (0.002)
Urban Population 0.005 (0.637) 0.004 (0.723) 0.001 (0.944) 0.013 (0.195)
Duration legislative term -0.005 (0.883) -0.001 (0.979) 0.002 (0.943) -0.004 (0.899)
Government (yes/no) -0.025 (0.557) -0.021 (0.627) -0.022 (0.605) -0.048 (0.239)
Effective number of parties 0.039 (0.398) 0.040 (0.386) 0.036 (0.435) 0.082 (0.057)
Voter turnout in election 0.004 (0.626) 0.004 (0.649) 0.006 (0.491) 0.000 (0.958)
Inequality (Gini coefficient) -0.019 (0.137) -0.019 (0.127) -0.012 (0.332) -0.013 (0.270)
Vote share (t-1) 0.002 (0.319) 0.002 (0.266) 0.002 (0.271) 0.001 (0.402)
Electoral system (PR=1) 0.019 (0.935) 0.021 (0.927) 0.092 (0.694) 0.123 (0.556)
Constant -14.811 (0.017) -15.789 (0.012) -17.899 (0.004) -17.039 (0.008)
Observations 903 903 903 903
R2 0.141 0.145 0.149 0.263
p-values in parentheses
Robust standard errors, country & year dummies included.
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Table SM2.3: Determinants of shifts in party positions – Full models: RILE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Real house prices -0.046 (0.111) -0.055 (0.058) -0.052 (0.066) -0.041 (0.077)
Party Position (t-1) -0.265 (0.000) -0.248 (0.000) -0.257 (0.000) -0.628 (0.000)
∆ House prices × Party Position (t-1) -0.001 (0.036) -0.001 (0.073) -0.001 (0.103)
Center of gravity 0.476 (0.000) 0.591 (0.000)
Competition from the right -5.326 (0.000)
∆ Gross government debt 0.148 (0.038) 0.141 (0.047) 0.042 (0.569) 0.082 (0.128)
Real GDP growth -0.517 (0.280) -0.533 (0.257) -0.048 (0.916) 0.671 (0.055)
∆ Unemployment rate 0.033 (0.929) -0.043 (0.910) -0.201 (0.582) -0.171 (0.548)
Government bond interest rate 0.307 (0.594) 0.332 (0.566) -0.077 (0.887) 0.230 (0.562)
Inflation rate -0.361 (0.404) -0.401 (0.355) 0.194 (0.642) 0.385 (0.213)
Openness of the economy 0.092 (0.269) 0.086 (0.297) -0.072 (0.378) 0.009 (0.898)
Homeownership rate 0.828 (0.007) 0.818 (0.007) 0.594 (0.046) 0.620 (0.007)
Population (logs) 25.588 (0.185) 24.499 (0.203) 40.772 (0.026) 49.958 (0.001)
∆ over 65-year olds -2.108 (0.157) -2.077 (0.162) -2.885 (0.039) -3.196 (0.005)
Urban Population -0.830 (0.001) -0.853 (0.001) -0.918 (0.000) -0.229 (0.242)
Duration legislative term -2.070 (0.012) -2.086 (0.011) -1.063 (0.180) -1.198 (0.062)
Government (yes/no) 0.436 (0.686) 0.578 (0.589) 0.746 (0.471) 0.043 (0.956)
Effective number of parties -2.077 (0.054) -2.141 (0.047) -0.128 (0.907) 1.547 (0.077)
Voter turnout in election 0.197 (0.379) 0.213 (0.345) 0.148 (0.477) 0.012 (0.940)
Inequality (Gini coefficient) -0.164 (0.588) -0.145 (0.631) -0.043 (0.884) -0.205 (0.364)
Vote share (t-1) 0.004 (0.926) 0.004 (0.922) -0.002 (0.968) -0.014 (0.634)
Electoral system (PR=1) 9.515 (0.192) 10.055 (0.169) 7.372 (0.279) 3.510 (0.486)
Constant -229.788 (0.189) -220.228 (0.206) -345.036 (0.038) -462.475 (0.000)
Observations 903 903 902 902
R2 0.282 0.285 0.324 0.627
p-values in parentheses
Robust standard errors, country & year dummies included.
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Table SM2.4: Determinants of shifts in party positions – Full models: Benoit/Laver
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Real house prices -0.001 (0.021) -0.002 (0.004) -0.002 (0.012) -0.002 (0.004)
Party Position (t-1) -0.280 (0.000) -0.264 (0.000) -0.262 (0.000) -0.620 (0.000)
∆ House prices × Party Position (t-1) -0.002 (0.031) -0.002 (0.016) -0.002 (0.000)
Center of gravity 0.310 (0.000) 0.439 (0.000)
Competition from the right -0.119 (0.000)
∆ Gross government debt 0.001 (0.434) 0.001 (0.498) -0.001 (0.438) -0.000 (0.786)
Real GDP growth -0.028 (0.005) -0.028 (0.006) -0.017 (0.090) 0.003 (0.704)
∆ Unemployment rate 0.014 (0.099) 0.013 (0.153) 0.012 (0.194) 0.013 (0.040)
Government bond interest rate 0.019 (0.103) 0.020 (0.085) 0.014 (0.251) 0.026 (0.005)
Inflation rate -0.013 (0.188) -0.014 (0.173) -0.007 (0.495) -0.001 (0.856)
Openness of the economy 0.003 (0.130) 0.003 (0.137) 0.001 (0.748) 0.002 (0.057)
Homeownership rate 0.014 (0.010) 0.014 (0.011) 0.018 (0.002) 0.016 (0.001)
Population (logs) 0.322 (0.378) 0.289 (0.430) 0.400 (0.293) 0.325 (0.270)
∆ over 65-year olds -0.088 (0.007) -0.085 (0.009) -0.049 (0.135) -0.046 (0.070)
Urban Population -0.010 (0.069) -0.011 (0.052) -0.009 (0.096) 0.002 (0.677)
Duration legislative term -0.012 (0.501) -0.012 (0.487) 0.002 (0.913) 0.002 (0.880)
Government (yes/no) 0.008 (0.726) 0.011 (0.636) 0.020 (0.389) -0.023 (0.187)
Effective number of parties -0.035 (0.126) -0.036 (0.123) -0.049 (0.030) -0.004 (0.803)
Voter turnout in election -0.003 (0.476) -0.003 (0.545) -0.002 (0.711) -0.005 (0.152)
Inequality (Gini coefficient) -0.005 (0.447) -0.005 (0.441) 0.001 (0.833) 0.002 (0.649)
Vote share (t-1) 0.001 (0.516) 0.001 (0.500) 0.001 (0.257) -0.000 (0.583)
Electoral system (PR=1) 0.091 (0.484) 0.101 (0.443) 0.096 (0.498) -0.065 (0.486)
Constant -2.378 (0.473) -2.066 (0.534) -3.511 (0.314) -3.290 (0.219)
Observations 903 903 865 865
R2 0.319 0.323 0.346 0.657
p-values in parentheses
Robust standard errors & year dummies included.
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Table SM2.5: Robustness – Models with lagged dependent variable
(1) (2) (3)
Franzmann/Kaiser RILE Benoit/Laver
∆ Real house prices 0.002 (0.376) -0.065 (0.023) -0.002 (0.005)
Party Position (t-1) -0.040 (0.000) -0.199 (0.000) -0.233 (0.000)
∆ House prices × Party Position (t-1) -0.001 (0.036) -0.001 (0.048) -0.002 (0.004)
∆ Party Position (t-1) 0.341 (0.000) -0.332 (0.000) -0.214 (0.000)
Center of gravity 0.064 (0.077) 0.506 (0.000) 0.367 (0.000)
∆ Gross government debt 0.000 (0.984) 0.036 (0.644) -0.002 (0.277)
Real GDP growth -0.014 (0.420) 0.246 (0.615) -0.012 (0.238)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.013 (0.438) -0.504 (0.204) 0.008 (0.344)
Government bond interest rate -0.020 (0.380) -0.344 (0.531) 0.011 (0.383)
Inflation rate 0.008 (0.630) -0.038 (0.936) -0.005 (0.681)
Openness of the economy -0.004 (0.403) -0.120 (0.168) -0.002 (0.341)
Homeownership rate -0.002 (0.885) 0.848 (0.011) 0.015 (0.025)
Population (logs) 1.298 (0.070) 54.347 (0.003) 0.188 (0.655)
∆ over 65-year olds -0.088 (0.132) -1.959 (0.165) -0.028 (0.403)
Urban Population 0.002 (0.845) -0.686 (0.004) -0.005 (0.294)
Duration legislative term 0.024 (0.498) -0.926 (0.273) 0.005 (0.798)
Government (yes/no) 0.019 (0.681) 1.260 (0.235) 0.041 (0.090)
Effective number of parties 0.014 (0.782) -0.672 (0.535) -0.032 (0.175)
Voter turnout in election 0.008 (0.456) 0.276 (0.205) 0.001 (0.841)
Inequality (Gini coefficient) 0.000 (0.973) -0.195 (0.538) -0.002 (0.799)
Vote share (t-1) -0.000 (0.790) -0.012 (0.770) 0.000 (0.656)
Electoral system (PR=1) 0.045 (0.864) 9.643 (0.166) 0.152 (0.321)
Constant -12.500 (0.054) -495.924 (0.003) -2.614 (0.501)
Observations 762 761 728
R2 0.260 0.432 0.431
p-values in parentheses
Robust standard errors, country & year dummies included.
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Figure SM2.4: Non-linear marginal effects of house prices on change in party position, by measurement.
Graphs created with the help of Stata’s “interflex” package (Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu, 2018; Xu et al., 2017). Shaded areas represent linear marginal effects with 95 per cent
confidence intervals around the point estimates. The spikes represent the point estimates with 95 per cent Cis for the so-called “binning estimators”. For these estimations, the
moderating variable has been broken down into three categories (low, middle, high) for which the effect has been evaluated separately. This allows for non-linearities and guarantees
common support. All models use the same control variables as in column (3) of Table SM2.1, SM2.2 and SM2.3. The models also include country & year fixed effects and robust
standard errors.
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Table SM2.6: Robustness – Models with party fixed effects
(1) (2) (3)
Franzmann/Kaiser RILE Benoit/Laver
∆ Real house prices 0.002 (0.241) -0.039 (0.138) -0.002 (0.004)
Party Position (t-1) -0.249 (0.000) -0.885 (0.000) -0.812 (0.000)
∆ House prices × Party Position (t-1) -0.001 (0.012) -0.002 (0.017) -0.003 (0.000)
Center of gravity 0.143 (0.000) 0.529 (0.000) 0.459 (0.000)
∆ Gross government debt -0.001 (0.732) 0.079 (0.222) -0.001 (0.749)
Real GDP growth -0.012 (0.549) 0.526 (0.183) -0.000 (0.964)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.007 (0.659) -0.553 (0.148) 0.009 (0.319)
Government bond interest rate -0.013 (0.619) -0.269 (0.555) 0.025 (0.022)
Inflation rate -0.010 (0.542) 0.374 (0.282) -0.008 (0.361)
Openness of the economy -0.004 (0.416) -0.022 (0.762) 0.002 (0.286)
Homeownership rate -0.010 (0.425) 0.907 (0.000) 0.011 (0.073)
Population (logs) 2.459 (0.001) 67.226 (0.000) 0.477 (0.147)
∆ over 65-year olds -0.114 (0.079) -1.057 (0.331) -0.005 (0.872)
Urban Population 0.008 (0.430) -0.463 (0.093) -0.006 (0.246)
Duration legislative term 0.013 (0.666) -0.848 (0.172) -0.006 (0.644)
Government (yes/no) -0.054 (0.390) 0.472 (0.651) 0.013 (0.640)
Effective number of parties 0.033 (0.532) 0.233 (0.779) -0.017 (0.397)
Voter turnout in election -0.005 (0.586) -0.022 (0.908) -0.005 (0.250)
Inequality (Gini coefficient) 0.001 (0.952) 0.273 (0.319) 0.003 (0.633)
Vote share (t-1) -0.008 (0.157) -0.062 (0.624) -0.001 (0.833)
Electoral system (PR=1) -0.068 (0.773) -4.276 (0.599) -0.142 (0.199)
Constant -22.130 (0.002) -656.445 (0.000) -4.117 (0.196)
Observations 903 902 865
R2 0.213 0.568 0.585
Number of parties 155 155 155
p-values in parentheses
Year dummies included
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Table SM2.7: Robustness – Models with party random effects
(1) (2) (3)
Franzmann/Kaiser RILE Benoit/Laver
∆ Real house prices 0.000 (0.875) -0.052 (0.075) -0.002 (0.003)
Party Position (t-1) -0.036 (0.000) -0.257 (0.000) -0.262 (0.000)
∆ House prices × Party Position (t-1) -0.001 (0.106) -0.001 (0.052) -0.002 (0.004)
Center of gravity 0.072 (0.033) 0.476 (0.000) 0.310 (0.000)
∆ Gross government debt -0.000 (0.943) 0.042 (0.591) -0.001 (0.464)
Real GDP growth -0.009 (0.648) -0.048 (0.918) -0.017 (0.088)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.013 (0.430) -0.201 (0.644) 0.012 (0.248)
Government bond interest rate -0.022 (0.328) -0.077 (0.873) 0.014 (0.209)
Inflation rate -0.000 (0.994) 0.194 (0.634) -0.007 (0.480)
Openness of the economy -0.005 (0.242) -0.072 (0.332) 0.001 (0.724)
Homeownership rate -0.005 (0.600) 0.594 (0.009) 0.018 (0.002)
Population (logs) 1.984 (0.006) 40.772 (0.025) 0.400 (0.229)
∆ over 65-year olds -0.123 (0.036) -2.885 (0.013) -0.049 (0.098)
Urban Population 0.001 (0.946) -0.918 (0.000) -0.009 (0.065)
Duration legislative term 0.002 (0.937) -1.063 (0.166) 0.002 (0.911)
Government (yes/no) -0.022 (0.646) 0.746 (0.474) 0.020 (0.398)
Effective number of parties 0.036 (0.488) -0.128 (0.892) -0.049 (0.020)
Voter turnout in election 0.006 (0.537) 0.148 (0.474) -0.002 (0.684)
Inequality (Gini coefficient) -0.012 (0.405) -0.043 (0.883) 0.001 (0.824)
Vote share (t-1) 0.002 (0.284) -0.002 (0.966) 0.001 (0.216)
Electoral system (PR=1) 0.092 (0.701) 7.372 (0.182) 0.096 (0.454)
Constant -17.899 (0.007) -345.036 (0.032) -3.511 (0.250)
Observations 903 902 865
Number of parties 155 155 155
p-values in parentheses
Robust standard errors & year dummies included.
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Table SM2.8: Robustness – Models with generalized least squares
(1) (2) (3)
Franzmann/Kaiser RILE Benoit/Laver
∆ Real house prices -0.000 (0.821) -0.076 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000)
Party Position (t-1) -0.035 (0.000) -0.235 (0.000) -0.246 (0.000)
∆ House prices × Party Position (t-1) -0.000 (0.023) -0.001 (0.169) -0.003 (0.000)
Center of gravity 0.077 (0.000) 0.415 (0.000) 0.270 (0.000)
∆ Gross government debt 0.002 (0.298) 0.009 (0.816) -0.002 (0.105)
Real GDP growth -0.002 (0.884) 0.307 (0.303) -0.015 (0.012)
∆ Unemployment rate 0.004 (0.617) 0.078 (0.713) 0.006 (0.228)
Government bond interest rate -0.020 (0.106) -0.527 (0.079) 0.008 (0.302)
Inflation rate 0.011 (0.247) 0.277 (0.242) -0.012 (0.037)
Openness of the economy -0.003 (0.071) -0.094 (0.047) -0.001 (0.628)
Homeownership rate -0.013 (0.062) 0.834 (0.000) 0.016 (0.000)
Population (logs) 1.736 (0.000) 54.839 (0.000) 0.369 (0.116)
∆ over 65-year olds -0.070 (0.086) -2.156 (0.005) -0.043 (0.022)
Urban Population 0.006 (0.458) -0.692 (0.000) -0.005 (0.112)
Duration legislative term -0.022 (0.221) -0.314 (0.530) -0.003 (0.759)
Government (yes/no) -0.028 (0.318) 1.200 (0.053) 0.056 (0.000)
Effective number of parties -0.009 (0.712) -0.025 (0.969) -0.037 (0.006)
Voter turnout in election 0.001 (0.786) -0.067 (0.585) -0.003 (0.179)
Inequality (Gini coefficient) -0.010 (0.237) 0.031 (0.866) 0.003 (0.436)
Vote share (t-1) 0.001 (0.252) -0.009 (0.737) 0.000 (0.927)
Electoral system (PR=1) -0.007 (0.957) 4.748 (0.149) 0.134 (0.035)
Constant -15.038 (0.000) -471.896 (0.000) -3.227 (0.120)
Observations 882 881 843
Number of parties 134 134 133
p-values in parentheses
Country & year dummies included. Standard errors are panel-specific (AR1) and corrected for panel heteroskedasticity.
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Table SM2.9: Robustness – Models with panel corrected standard errors
(1) (2) (3)
Franzmann/Kaiser RILE Benoit/Laver
∆ Real house prices 0.001 (0.722) -0.053 (0.045) -0.002 (0.017)
Party Position (t-1) -0.051 (0.000) -0.224 (0.000) -0.242 (0.000)
∆ House prices × Party Position (t-1) -0.000 (0.085) -0.001 (0.069) -0.002 (0.021)
Center of gravity 0.086 (0.012) 0.448 (0.000) 0.299 (0.000)
∆ Gross government debt 0.002 (0.541) 0.037 (0.568) -0.001 (0.368)
Real GDP growth -0.009 (0.585) -0.033 (0.945) -0.017 (0.084)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.020 (0.142) -0.143 (0.692) 0.012 (0.145)
Government bond interest rate -0.021 (0.292) -0.088 (0.860) 0.013 (0.262)
Inflation rate 0.002 (0.895) 0.167 (0.662) -0.007 (0.424)
Openness of the economy -0.004 (0.277) -0.080 (0.303) 0.000 (0.835)
Homeownership rate -0.001 (0.898) 0.599 (0.020) 0.018 (0.001)
Population (logs) 1.772 (0.009) 39.135 (0.012) 0.413 (0.256)
∆ over 65-year olds -0.094 (0.101) -2.644 (0.032) -0.044 (0.125)
Urban Population 0.002 (0.870) -0.909 (0.000) -0.009 (0.109)
Duration legislative term 0.002 (0.938) -1.016 (0.190) 0.002 (0.929)
Government (yes/no) -0.002 (0.957) 0.688 (0.469) 0.020 (0.375)
Effective number of parties -0.008 (0.836) -0.145 (0.889) -0.049 (0.025)
Voter turnout in election 0.006 (0.448) 0.131 (0.496) -0.002 (0.661)
Inequality (Gini coefficient) -0.010 (0.419) -0.089 (0.752) 0.001 (0.886)
Vote share (t-1) 0.001 (0.493) -0.001 (0.975) 0.001 (0.219)
Electoral system (PR=1) 0.034 (0.879) 7.817 (0.186) 0.103 (0.436)
Constant -16.084 (0.010) -327.755 (0.019) -3.584 (0.274)
Observations 903 902 865
R2 0.136 0.311 0.340
Number of parties 155 155 155
p-values in parentheses
Country & year dummies included. Standard errors are AR1 and corrected for panel heteroskedasticity.
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Table SM2.10: Robustness – Models with Level Party Position as DV
(1) (2) (3)
Franzmann/Kaiser RILE Benoit/Laver
∆ Real house prices -0.001 (0.532) -0.063 (0.038) -0.002 (0.007)
Party Position (t-1) 0.966 (0.000) 0.748 (0.000) 0.743 (0.000)
∆ House prices × Party Position (t-1) -0.001 (0.074) -0.001 (0.071) -0.002 (0.008)
Center of gravity 0.081 (0.022) 0.458 (0.000) 0.305 (0.000)
Gross government debt -0.006 (0.005) -0.061 (0.141) -0.002 (0.085)
Real GDP growth -0.004 (0.811) -0.192 (0.627) -0.022 (0.014)
Unemployment rate -0.009 (0.597) 0.053 (0.882) 0.008 (0.344)
Government bond interest rate -0.034 (0.126) -0.112 (0.834) 0.011 (0.380)
Inflation rate 0.006 (0.693) 0.184 (0.630) -0.006 (0.531)
Openness of the economy -0.008 (0.024) -0.091 (0.242) 0.000 (0.864)
Homeownership rate -0.009 (0.384) 0.559 (0.059) 0.018 (0.002)
Population (logs) 0.888 (0.185) 27.357 (0.115) 0.052 (0.896)
over 65-year olds 0.017 (0.523) 0.158 (0.794) 0.010 (0.469)
Urban Population 0.000 (0.972) -0.864 (0.000) -0.012 (0.033)
Duration legislative term -0.014 (0.645) -1.215 (0.120) -0.003 (0.865)
Government (yes/no) -0.043 (0.320) 0.695 (0.508) 0.020 (0.404)
Effective number of parties 0.052 (0.219) -0.619 (0.535) -0.053 (0.013)
Voter turnout in election 0.005 (0.537) 0.148 (0.450) 0.002 (0.565)
Inequality (Gini coefficient) -0.013 (0.317) -0.058 (0.847) -0.004 (0.620)
Vote share (t-1) 0.003 (0.063) -0.008 (0.849) 0.001 (0.438)
Electoral system (PR=1) 0.300 (0.032) 6.007 (0.112) 0.113 (0.103)
Constant -8.140 (0.191) -219.590 (0.171) -0.361 (0.922)
Observations 916 915 877
R2 0.947 0.672 0.670
p-values in parentheses
Robust standard errors, country & year dummies included.
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Table SM2.11: Robustness – Models with party-family based left-right dummies
(1) (2) (3)
Franzmann/Kaiser RILE Benoit/Laver
∆ Real house prices -0.002 (0.146) -0.025 (0.492) -0.000 (0.745)
Right -0.005 (0.920) -0.496 (0.692) -0.003 (0.911)
Right × ∆ House prices -0.001 (0.719) -0.055 (0.087) -0.002 (0.020)
Center of gravity 0.030 (0.452) 0.478 (0.000) 0.261 (0.000)
∆ Gross government debt -0.001 (0.612) 0.056 (0.528) -0.002 (0.256)
Real GDP growth -0.010 (0.664) -0.563 (0.355) -0.028 (0.015)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.015 (0.410) -0.477 (0.256) 0.015 (0.103)
Government bond interest rate -0.040 (0.103) -0.780 (0.246) -0.008 (0.557)
Inflation rate 0.006 (0.748) 0.299 (0.579) -0.012 (0.308)
Openness of the economy -0.006 (0.121) -0.085 (0.371) -0.000 (0.917)
Homeownership rate -0.004 (0.715) 0.467 (0.206) 0.018 (0.006)
Population (logs) 2.282 (0.001) 38.395 (0.079) 0.528 (0.234)
∆ over 65-year olds -0.125 (0.042) -2.879 (0.080) -0.054 (0.144)
Urban Population 0.002 (0.885) -0.999 (0.001) -0.007 (0.209)
Duration legislative term 0.018 (0.617) -1.424 (0.141) -0.005 (0.820)
Government (yes/no) -0.040 (0.413) 1.119 (0.377) -0.007 (0.796)
Effective number of parties 0.068 (0.196) 0.189 (0.885) -0.045 (0.085)
Voter turnout in election 0.005 (0.623) 0.282 (0.251) 0.001 (0.827)
Inequality (Gini coefficient) -0.019 (0.167) -0.102 (0.780) -0.001 (0.871)
Vote share (t-1) 0.001 (0.554) -0.015 (0.762) 0.001 (0.440)
Electoral system (PR=1) 0.079 (0.764) 10.633 (0.178) 0.316 (0.028)
Constant -20.352 (0.002) -313.519 (0.114) -4.917 (0.226)
Observations 754 753 726
R2 0.135 0.214 0.229
p-values in parentheses
Robust standard errors, country & year dummies included.
Left-right dummies coded according to party family membership in CMP. Right=1 indicates Liberal, Christian
Democrats and Conservative parties, right=0 Ecologist, Communist, and Social Democratic parties.
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Table SM2.12: Robustness – Models with interaction by party family
(1) (2) (3)
Franzmann/Kaiser RILE Benoit/Laver
∆ Real house prices -0.000 (0.880) -0.049 (0.242) -0.001 (0.535)
party family membership 0.000 (0.716) -0.014 (0.593) -0.000 (0.537)
∆ House prices × party family membership -0.000 (0.103) -0.000 (0.791) -0.000 (0.286)
Center of gravity 0.060 (0.095) 0.452 (0.000) 0.247 (0.000)
∆ Gross government debt -0.000 (0.893) 0.003 (0.975) -0.002 (0.226)
Real GDP growth -0.015 (0.467) -0.342 (0.534) -0.024 (0.029)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.016 (0.307) 0.037 (0.926) 0.018 (0.071)
Government bond interest rate -0.026 (0.224) -0.276 (0.640) 0.001 (0.908)
Inflation rate 0.002 (0.906) 0.174 (0.714) -0.003 (0.790)
Openness of the economy -0.005 (0.169) -0.114 (0.200) -0.000 (0.857)
Homeownership rate -0.008 (0.464) 0.446 (0.169) 0.020 (0.001)
Population (logs) 1.897 (0.004) 36.089 (0.069) 0.508 (0.222)
∆ over 65-year olds -0.111 (0.050) -3.014 (0.045) -0.054 (0.126)
Urban Population 0.002 (0.891) -1.030 (0.000) -0.009 (0.115)
Duration legislative term -0.004 (0.901) -1.025 (0.254) 0.005 (0.801)
Government (yes/no) -0.042 (0.344) 0.380 (0.741) -0.012 (0.631)
Effective number of parties 0.037 (0.439) -0.044 (0.970) -0.055 (0.024)
Voter turnout in election 0.009 (0.315) 0.232 (0.298) 0.001 (0.838)
Inequality (Gini coefficient) -0.013 (0.314) -0.128 (0.687) 0.000 (0.955)
Vote share (t-1) 0.002 (0.288) -0.004 (0.933) 0.001 (0.211)
Electoral system (PR=1) 0.090 (0.709) 10.786 (0.143) 0.159 (0.275)
Constant -17.404 (0.004) -289.679 (0.110) -4.645 (0.221)
Observations 903 902 865
R2 0.124 0.194 0.217
p-values in parentheses
country & year dummies included.
Model estimated with party family as continuous variable.
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Table SM2.13: Robustness – Models with interaction by party family dummies
(1) (2) (3)
Franzmann/Kaiser RILE Benoit/Laver
∆ Real house prices 0.000 (0.921) -0.006 (0.929) -0.001 (0.559)
Ecologist 0.001 (0.988) -1.187 (0.679) -0.024 (0.625)
Social democratic 0.080 (0.236) 0.684 (0.756) 0.008 (0.868)
Liberal 0.095 (0.245) 0.816 (0.738) 0.022 (0.683)
Christian democrat -0.055 (0.498) -0.722 (0.769) -0.050 (0.310)
Conservative 0.110 (0.186) -0.508 (0.847) 0.024 (0.633)
Nationalist 0.099 (0.375) -0.688 (0.859) -0.062 (0.466)
Agrarian 0.104 (0.269) 1.134 (0.702) 0.040 (0.605)
Ethnic-regional -0.084 (0.526) -0.127 (0.970) -0.112 (0.223)
Special issue 0.095 (0.442) -2.422 (0.512) -0.017 (0.817)
Ecologist × ∆ Real house prices 0.002 (0.533) 0.020 (0.818) 0.002 (0.062)
Social democratic × ∆ Real house prices -0.004 (0.095) -0.056 (0.437) -0.001 (0.661)
Liberal × ∆ Real house prices -0.002 (0.415) -0.082 (0.303) -0.001 (0.328)
Christian democrat × ∆ Real house prices 0.000 (0.865) -0.047 (0.542) -0.000 (0.939)
Conservative × ∆ Real house prices -0.004 (0.113) -0.100 (0.203) -0.002 (0.138)
Nationalist × ∆ Real house prices -0.007 (0.340) -0.139 (0.301) 0.000 (0.877)
Agrarian × ∆ Real house prices -0.003 (0.281) -0.057 (0.569) -0.002 (0.501)
Ethnic-regional × ∆ Real house prices 0.006 (0.142) 0.081 (0.544) 0.006 (0.074)
Special issue × ∆ Real house prices -0.006 (0.034) 0.032 (0.695) -0.001 (0.732)
Observations 903 902 865
R2 0.143 0.204 0.234
p-values in parentheses
Robust standard errors, country & year dummies included.
Reference category: Party family: Communist (20)
Models estimated with full control variables as in previous specifications. For reasons of presentation, coefficients
of control variables are not reported. Results are available on request.
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Table SM2.14: Robustness – House price increase/decreases
(1) (2)
HP increase HP decrease
Party Position (t-1) -0.039 (0.012) -0.013 (0.556)
∆ Real house prices 0.001 (0.677) 0.027 (0.833)
∆ House prices × Party Position (t-1) -0.000 (0.408) 0.001 (0.673)
Center of gravity 0.021 (0.690) 0.019 (0.957)
∆ Gross government debt 0.001 (0.767) 0.002 (0.969)
Real GDP growth 0.008 (0.782) -0.034 (0.945)
∆ Unemployment rate -0.012 (0.679) 0.083 (0.579)
Government bond interest rate -0.044 (0.160) 0.038 (0.929)
Inflation rate 0.023 (0.399) -0.043 (0.871)
Openness of the economy -0.011 (0.064) 0.051 (0.503)
Homeownership rate -0.013 (0.391) 0.089 (0.344)
Population (logs) 0.857 (0.537) -1.333 (0.790)
∆ over 65-year olds -0.138 (0.191) 0.127 (0.924)
Urban Population 0.033 (0.059) -0.096 (0.071)
Duration legislative term -0.071 (0.241) 0.203 (0.779)
Government (yes/no) -0.035 (0.495) 0.017 (0.818)
Effective number of parties 0.240 (0.002) -0.549 (0.793)
Voter turnout in election 0.005 (0.743) 0.008 (0.913)
Inequality (Gini coefficient) -0.025 (0.285) -0.088 (0.583)
Vote share (t-1) -0.000 (0.898) 0.005 (0.083)
Electoral system (PR=1) -0.448 (0.225) 0.590 (0.784)
Constant -8.392 (0.505) 14.972 (0.796)
Observations 613 290
R2 0.204 0.303
p-values in parentheses
Robust standard errors, country & year dummies included.
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Table SM2.15: Robustness – Models with categorised house price changes
(1) (2) (3)
Franzmann/Kaiser RILE Benoit/Laver
∆ HP: strong decreases 0.118 (0.426) 4.013 (0.138) 0.148 (0.031)
∆ HP: moderate decreases -0.268 (0.013) -0.044 (0.980) -0.054 (0.263)
∆ HP: strong increases -0.043 (0.719) -0.520 (0.805) -0.050 (0.348)
∆ HP: very strong increases 0.161 (0.422) -0.563 (0.825) -0.121 (0.088)
Party Position (t-1) -0.047 (0.000) -0.211 (0.000) -0.263 (0.000)
∆ HP: strong decreases × Party Position (t-1) 0.035 (0.151) -0.039 (0.577) 0.062 (0.454)
∆ HP: moderate decreases × Party Position (t-1) 0.019 (0.324) -0.065 (0.286) -0.015 (0.806)
∆ HP: strong increases × Party Position (t-1) -0.005 (0.818) -0.147 (0.047) -0.036 (0.566)
∆ HP: very strong increases × Party Position (t-1) -0.030 (0.383) -0.166 (0.024) -0.153 (0.071)
Observations 899 898 861
R2 0.170 0.335 0.358
p-values in parentheses
Robust standard errors, country & year dummies included.
Models estimated with full control variables as before. Coefficients not shown for reasons of presentation. Full
results available on request.
To analyse in how far house price changes have an asymmetric effect, I categorised
house price changes into five categories: strong decreases, moderate decreases, mod-
erate increases, strong increases, and very strong increases. The table above presents
results from models using these house price change categories as categorical variables
with moderate increases as reference categories. Although not at conventional levels of
statistical significance (most likely due to a low number of observations in the respec-
tive categories), in two of three measurements, the signs of the coefficients support the
hypothesised move to the right when house prices decrease and move to the left when
they increase. Most interestingly, the results seem to be driven by sharp decreases in
house prices which drive parties of the right to polarise.
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SM3 Asymmetric Responsiveness. The Effects of
Socio-economic Developments on Party Posi-
tion Shifts
SM3.1 Covariate selection
As stated in the identification section of the paper, we selected the covariates for our
models by a systematic approach using the backdoor-path criterion. On basis of the
existing literature and theories, we created a list of potential confounding variables
and systematically tested whether those variables were systematically associated with
the treatment and the outcome variable. If a variable met both criteria, we decided to
include it into our analyses as it had potentially biasing effect on our estimation results.
In the following, we provide the full record of all models which we estimated to test
for association between a possible confounder and treatment or outcome. As we have
several socio-economic indicators of interest on both levels of analysis, we grouped the
results by the indicator as we assume different causal structures to exist behind every
investigated dependent variable.
The tables are structured as follows. In column one, the variable names are described
while columns 2-7 list the descriptive statistics (mean, variance, skewness) of all possible
covariates for treatment and control group. Columns 8 and 9 lists the coefficient and
standard error for the effect of the covariate on the treatment variable. Column 10
and 11 are similar with respect to the association of the covariate and the outcome
variable. In column 12, our decision to include a variable on basis of the statistical
association between covariate and treatment/outcome is listed.
We tested for confounding variables among a list of macro variables. We interpreted
the socio-economic indicator of choice as treatment and dichotomies those variables
into a binary treatment to test for possible confounders. The regressions guiding our
decisions to include covariates thus include tests for statistical association between a co-
variate and a category of the binary socio-economic indicator as an auxiliary treatment
variable as well as the outcome, i.e. the change in party positions. As the moderator
in this regression is a continuous variable, we binned the lagged ideological positions
in t-1 into two groups (position >0.5 and <0.5 on a 0-1 economic dimension) and ran
multilevel regressions of the potential confounders on the treatments in both subgroups
and the outcome accordingly. All variables fulfilling the conditions of systematically
affecting the treatments in one of the sub-groups as well as the outcome are selected
as a confounder in the final model 1.
1For reasons of data availability, we dropped income the change in income inequality as control variable
from the GDP and debt models as it decreased sample size by almost one half.
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Table SM3.1: Covariate selection
Leftist parties Treatment group Treatment group Effect on treatment Effect on outcome
∆ GDP low ∆ GDP low Selection
mean variance skewness mean variance skewness coefficient std error coefficient std error as confounder
Union density 40.989 436.895 0.390 37.468 516.685 0.661 -0.009 0.032 0.000 0.000 NO
EMU membership 0.118 0.105 2.363 0.215 0.169 1.390 -3.797 0.803 -0.006 0.008 NO
Capital openness 0.757 0.083 -0.678 0.890 0.034 -1.544 -2.743 1.123 -0.040 0.013 YES
Openness of the economy 63.917 733.132 0.567 63.106 691.948 1.041 -0.045 0.014 0.000 0.000 NO
Turnout 77.001 65.207 0.027 77.725 85.082 -0.267 0.095 0.046 0.001 0.000 YES
Fractionalisation index 0.747 0.003 0.151 0.752 0.004 -0.140 -28.006 6.806 -0.119 0.050 YES
Disproportionality index 5.707 27.797 1.727 5.542 26.108 1.116 -0.460 0.109 -0.001 0.001 NO
Public debt 58.960 551.488 0.393 64.766 1169.561 1.336 -0.104 0.010 0.000 0.000 NO
Gross domestic product 36833 207278652 1.301 40860 222607256 1.436 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ GDP
∆ House price 26.713 656.065 1.219 23.001 1204.487 0.916 0.071 0.007 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ Public debt 0.442 156.313 0.509 4.981 146.303 0.700 -0.322 0.020 0.001 0.000 NO
∆ Top 1% income 0.298 2.437 -1.108 0.120 4.869 0.201 0.457 0.168 -0.006 0.003 YES
∆ Top 10% Income 0.204 5.220 -0.746 0.204 7.033 0.266 0.064 0.126 -0.003 0.002 NO
∆ Unemployment -0.809 4.968 -1.020 1.097 5.298 1.958 -1.984 0.088 0.002 0.001 NO
Rightist parties Treatment group Treatment group Effect on treatment Effect on outcome
∆ GDP high ∆ GDP high Selection
mean variance skewness mean variance skewness coefficient std error coefficient std error as confounder
Union density 40.989 436.895 0.390 37.468 516.685 0.661 -0.004 0.025 0.000 0.000 NO
EMU membership 0.118 0.105 2.363 0.215 0.169 1.390 -6.115 0.720 -0.003 0.009 NO
Capital openness 0.757 0.083 -0.678 0.890 0.034 -1.544 -3.602 0.988 -0.003 0.014 NO
Openness of the economy 63.917 733.132 0.567 63.106 691.948 1.041 -0.084 0.012 0.000 0.000 NO
Turnout 77.001 65.207 0.027 77.725 85.082 -0.267 0.140 0.041 0.000 0.000 NO
Fractionalisation index 0.747 0.003 0.151 0.752 0.004 -0.140 -26.380 5.647 -0.004 0.046 NO
Disproportionality index 5.707 27.797 1.727 5.542 26.108 1.116 -0.484 0.092 0.000 0.001 NO
Public debt 58.960 551.488 0.393 64.766 1169.561 1.336 -0.094 0.010 0.000 0.000 NO
Gross domestic product 36833 207278652 1.301 40860 222607256 1.436 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ GDP
∆ House price 26.713 656.065 1.219 23.001 1204.487 0.916 0.069 0.008 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ Public debt 0.442 156.313 0.509 4.981 146.303 0.700 -0.301 0.018 0.001 0.000 YES
∆ Top 1% income 0.298 2.437 -1.108 0.120 4.869 0.201 0.439 0.170 -0.011 0.003 YES
∆ Top 10% Income 0.204 5.220 -0.746 0.204 7.033 0.266 0.109 0.119 -0.007 0.002 NO
∆ Unemployment -0.809 4.968 -1.020 1.097 5.298 1.958 -1.678 0.080 0.007 0.001 YES
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Leftist parties Treatment group Treatment group Effect on treatment Effect on outcome
∆ House price low ∆ House price low Selection
mean variance skewness mean variance skewness coefficient std error coefficient std error as confounder
Union density 40.662 546.715 0.340 37.128 391.912 0.805 -0.222 0.112 0.000 0.000 NO
EMU membership 0.207 0.165 1.447 0.121 0.107 2.324 25.109 3.586 -0.006 0.008 NO
Capital openness 0.844 0.054 -1.035 0.806 0.070 -1.212 38.367 5.668 -0.040 0.013 YES
Openness of the economy 64.868 578.976 0.739 61.700 877.265 0.906 0.212 0.066 0.000 0.000 NO
Turnout 77.363 77.189 -0.315 77.413 74.198 0.097 -0.395 0.187 0.001 0.000 YES
Fractionalisation index 0.753 0.003 -0.309 0.744 0.004 0.322 -40.672 27.514 -0.119 0.050 NO
Disproportionality index 5.702 28.133 1.591 5.512 25.300 1.148 -0.581 0.388 -0.001 0.001 NO
Public debt 54.568 521.194 0.553 71.702 1196.271 1.166 -0.283 0.050 0.000 0.000 NO
Gross domestic product 42874 281847133 1.103 33921 93227482 0.572 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ GDP 8.782 38.183 1.528 5.447 30.938 0.053 2.032 0.202 -0.001 0.000 NO
∆ House price
∆ Public debt -1.861 122.075 1.014 8.942 134.073 0.270 -1.460 0.081 0.001 0.000 NO
∆ Top 1% income 0.233 5.373 -0.116 0.166 1.613 -0.588 0.354 0.774 -0.006 0.003 NO
∆ Top 10% Income 0.094 8.713 0.037 0.347 2.868 -0.467 0.296 0.566 -0.003 0.002 NO
∆ Unemployment -0.406 4.876 -0.887 0.989 6.474 1.590 -6.344 0.459 0.002 0.001 NO
Rightist parties Treatment group Treatment group Effect on treatment Effect on outcome
∆ House price high ∆ House price high Selection
mean variance skewness mean variance skewness coefficient std error coefficient std error as confounder
Union density 43.029 569.265 0.330 36.413 432.196 1.088 -0.196 0.097 0.000 0.000 NO
EMU membership 0.182 0.150 1.650 0.162 0.137 1.832 14.460 3.226 -0.003 0.009 NO
Capital openness 0.827 0.060 -0.869 0.853 0.057 -1.800 22.609 4.807 -0.003 0.014 NO
Openness of the economy 65.640 669.103 0.974 61.334 1124.348 1.164 0.083 0.052 0.000 0.000 NO
Turnout 78.685 73.586 -0.560 78.717 84.528 -0.160 -0.229 0.151 0.000 0.000 NO
Fractionalisation index 0.769 0.003 -0.489 0.757 0.004 0.300 -0.159 22.808 -0.004 0.046 NO
Disproportionality index 5.462 34.022 1.501 5.085 23.218 1.022 -0.570 0.321 0.000 0.001 NO
Public debt 61.170 668.775 0.389 70.179 992.692 0.886 -0.228 0.044 0.000 0.000 NO
Gross domestic product 40965 215020476 1.357 35586 87191975 0.664 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ GDP 8.805 36.775 1.386 5.264 20.923 0.265 1.720 0.182 -0.002 0.000 YES
∆ House price
∆ Public debt -1.212 153.255 1.237 8.401 98.529 0.164 -1.221 0.079 0.001 0.000 YES
∆ Top 1% income 0.202 3.081 -1.137 0.178 1.574 -0.973 -0.356 0.768 -0.011 0.003 NO
∆ Top 10% Income 0.304 5.606 -0.658 0.368 2.615 -0.656 -0.202 0.529 -0.007 0.002 NO
∆ Unemployment -0.396 4.489 -0.326 0.684 4.364 1.116 -4.813 0.437 0.007 0.001 YES
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Leftist parties Treatment group Treatment group Effect on treatment Effect on outcome
∆ Public debt low ∆ Public debt low Selection
mean variance skewness mean variance skewness coefficient std error coefficient std error as confounder
Union density 35.652 406.018 0.747 42.707 535.829 0.292 -0.057 0.035 0.000 0.000 NO
EMU membership 0.137 0.119 2.116 0.203 0.163 1.474 -4.130 1.228 -0.006 0.008 NO
Capital openness 0.808 0.069 -1.113 0.847 0.053 -1.151 -3.189 1.906 -0.040 0.013 NO
Openness of the economy 59.037 783.189 0.987 68.087 595.381 0.790 -0.010 0.016 0.000 0.000 NO
Turnout 76.197 70.135 0.019 78.613 78.851 -0.335 -0.077 0.054 0.001 0.000 NO
Fractionalisation index 0.750 0.003 0.110 0.749 0.003 -0.170 9.460 9.629 -0.119 0.050 NO
Disproportionality index 6.013 29.004 1.284 5.212 24.412 1.573 0.592 0.149 -0.001 0.001 NO
Public debt 69.922 1116.170 1.234 53.892 520.594 0.493 0.163 0.016 0.000 0.000 NO
Gross domestic product 37942 278024866 1.705 40032 156697976 0.593 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ GDP 5.532 27.725 -0.041 9.184 41.353 1.451 -0.777 0.049 -0.001 0.000 NO
∆ House price 13.174 757.798 1.327 36.706 866.829 0.985 -0.258 0.014 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ Public debt
∆ Top 1% income 0.029 5.557 -0.010 0.384 1.788 -0.070 -0.019 0.309 -0.006 0.003 NO
∆ Top 10% Income 0.049 8.088 0.061 0.364 4.161 -0.318 0.148 0.221 -0.003 0.002 NO
∆ Unemployment 1.172 5.934 1.441 -0.800 4.189 -1.280 2.853 0.136 0.002 0.001 NO
Rightist parties Treatment group Treatment group Effect on treatment Effect on outcome
∆ Public debt high ∆ Public debt high Selection
mean variance skewness mean variance skewness coefficient std error coefficient std error as confounder
Union density 34.945 420.820 1.078 45.613 560.247 0.261 -0.067 0.044 0.000 0.000 NO
EMU membership 0.171 0.143 1.744 0.173 0.144 1.733 1.230 1.260 -0.003 0.009 NO
Capital openness 0.847 0.061 -1.575 0.832 0.055 -0.957 2.834 1.959 -0.003 0.014 NO
Openness of the economy 59.165 1056.416 1.294 68.838 660.520 0.952 0.041 0.018 0.000 0.000 NO
Turnout 77.713 83.673 -0.182 79.936 70.649 -0.526 -0.033 0.061 0.000 0.000 NO
Fractionalisation index 0.762 0.004 0.140 0.764 0.003 -0.365 12.392 10.099 -0.004 0.046 NO
Disproportionality index 5.501 28.709 1.280 4.984 28.310 1.474 0.820 0.168 0.000 0.001 NO
Public debt 72.637 939.315 0.814 57.079 609.366 0.418 0.192 0.017 0.000 0.000 NO
Gross domestic product 37669 179488314 1.904 38969 129482322 0.626 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ GDP 5.419 23.116 0.105 9.012 35.714 1.760 -0.901 0.054 -0.002 0.000 YES
∆ House price 10.181 477.462 1.653 30.684 593.695 1.098 -0.249 0.016 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ Public debt
∆ Top 1% income 0.071 3.121 -1.095 0.338 1.277 -0.405 2.561 0.144 0.007 0.001 YES
∆ Top 10% Income 0.246 4.844 -0.782 0.450 3.136 -0.395 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ Unemployment 0.863 4.243 0.988 -0.743 3.873 -0.482 0.289 0.181 -0.003 0.009 NO
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Leftist parties Treatment group Treatment group Effect on treatment Effect on outcome
∆ Top 1 % income low ∆ Top 1 % income low Selection
mean variance skewness mean variance skewness coefficient std error coefficient std error as confounder
Union density 36.891 462.119 0.704 41.786 493.424 0.332 -0.005 0.004 0.000 0.000 NO
EMU membership 0.168 0.141 1.773 0.171 0.142 1.750 0.119 0.219 -0.006 0.008 NO
Capital openness 0.873 0.045 -1.388 0.773 0.076 -0.853 0.848 0.295 -0.040 0.013 YES
Openness of the economy 61.029 712.766 0.801 66.424 693.908 0.857 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 NO
Turnout 76.498 89.063 0.071 78.445 58.046 -0.403 -0.020 0.007 0.001 0.000 YES
Fractionalisation index 0.747 0.003 0.069 0.752 0.003 -0.130 0.484 1.169 -0.119 0.050 NO
Disproportionality index 6.205 28.560 1.134 4.919 24.026 1.853 0.026 0.015 -0.001 0.001 NO
Public debt 62.840 874.391 0.864 61.086 902.505 1.726 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 NO
Gross domestic product 38757 220221367 1.341 39223 218465369 1.368 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ GDP 8.562 39.696 1.525 5.853 31.463 0.002 0.032 0.010 -0.001 0.000 NO
∆ House price 27.976 940.734 0.842 20.881 934.784 1.164 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ Public debt 0.666 151.177 0.538 5.461 149.527 0.658 -0.001 0.008 0.001 0.000 NO
∆ Top 1% income
∆ Top 10% Income 1.578 3.635 2.563 -1.438 4.246 -2.320 0.642 0.013 -0.003 0.002 NO
∆ Unemployment -0.507 5.236 -0.676 1.050 5.703 1.862 -0.061 0.033 0.002 0.001 NO
Rightist parties Treatment group Treatment group Effect on treatment Effect on outcome
∆ Top 1 % income high ∆ Top 1 % income high Selection
mean variance skewness mean variance skewness coefficient std error coefficient std error as confounder
Union density 37.833 500.140 0.875 42.027 514.858 0.451 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 NO
EMU membership 0.152 0.129 1.942 0.198 0.160 1.519 0.289 0.181 -0.003 0.009 NO
Capital openness 0.874 0.042 -1.353 0.798 0.076 -1.106 0.608 0.235 -0.003 0.014 NO
Openness of the economy 57.838 699.887 1.139 70.572 1070.714 0.887 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.000 NO
Turnout 77.774 89.020 -0.171 79.872 64.113 -0.524 -0.015 0.006 0.000 0.000 NO
Fractionalisation index 0.756 0.004 0.136 0.771 0.003 -0.302 -0.541 0.860 -0.004 0.046 NO
Disproportionality index 6.423 29.530 0.917 3.816 23.602 2.272 0.032 0.011 0.000 0.001 NO
Public debt 68.663 1107.911 0.630 62.006 505.306 0.713 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000 NO
Gross domestic product 37630 142436216 1.465 39026 175909291 1.438 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ GDP 8.279 34.519 1.546 5.419 24.029 0.217 0.026 0.010 -0.002 0.000 YES
∆ House price 21.577 755.200 1.016 16.408 464.377 1.301 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ Public debt 2.599 148.511 0.335 4.967 146.068 0.654 -0.004 0.006 0.001 0.000 NO
∆ Top 1% income
∆ Top 10% Income 1.455 1.961 2.722 -1.076 3.199 -2.872 0.598 0.013 -0.007 0.002 YES
∆ Unemployment -0.223 5.093 0.101 0.620 3.847 1.087 -0.049 0.027 0.007 0.001 NO
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Leftist parties Treatment group Treatment group Effect on treatment Effect on outcome
∆ Unemployment low ∆ Unemployment low Selection
mean variance skewness mean variance skewness coefficient std error coefficient std error as confounder
Union density 40.235 516.820 0.400 37.596 431.042 0.714 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.000 NO
EMU membership 0.154 0.131 1.919 0.191 0.155 1.574 -0.691 0.229 -0.006 0.008 NO
Capital openness 0.783 0.070 -0.855 0.889 0.043 -1.697 -0.897 0.339 -0.040 0.013 YES
Openness of the economy 62.494 770.625 0.813 64.845 627.089 0.840 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 NO
Turnout 77.520 69.813 -0.271 77.201 84.152 0.003 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.000 NO
Fractionalisation index 0.752 0.004 -0.158 0.746 0.003 0.192 1.582 1.527 -0.119 0.050 NO
Disproportionality index 5.287 25.268 1.641 6.073 28.796 1.158 0.036 0.025 -0.001 0.001 NO
Public debt 65.012 991.846 1.412 57.974 716.737 0.805 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.000 NO
Gross domestic product 37205 193977354 1.298 41384 244277728 1.376 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ GDP 5.339 25.974 -0.046 10.050 41.049 1.550 -0.172 0.008 -0.001 0.000 NO
∆ House price 18.129 1003.407 1.344 33.796 735.407 0.791 -0.038 0.003 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ Public debt 8.294 147.718 0.343 -4.599 71.058 0.348 0.125 0.006 0.001 0.000 NO
∆ Top 1% income 0.187 3.485 2.393 0.227 4.078 -2.931 -0.105 0.057 -0.006 0.003 NO
∆ Top 10% Income 0.152 6.689 1.145 0.276 5.478 -2.385 -0.004 0.040 -0.003 0.002 NO
∆ Unemployment
Rightist parties Treatment group Treatment group Effect on treatment Effect on outcome
∆ Unemployment high ∆ Unemployment high Selection
mean variance skewness mean variance skewness coefficient std error coefficient std error as confounder
Union density 39.325 511.231 0.642 40.173 510.270 0.730 0.028 0.008 0.000 0.000 NO
EMU membership 0.175 0.145 1.710 0.168 0.140 1.779 -0.071 0.236 -0.003 0.009 NO
Capital openness 0.819 0.069 -1.218 0.869 0.043 -1.345 -0.559 0.348 -0.003 0.014 NO
Openness of the economy 64.276 1135.462 0.981 62.369 588.973 1.104 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 NO
Turnout 78.875 78.131 -0.469 78.467 80.348 -0.165 0.022 0.010 0.000 0.000 NO
Fractionalisation index 0.770 0.003 -0.223 0.752 0.003 0.138 0.995 1.547 -0.004 0.046 NO
Disproportionality index 4.870 27.454 1.636 5.812 29.630 1.041 0.070 0.027 0.000 0.001 NO
Public debt 67.850 811.980 0.945 62.855 893.625 0.640 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 NO
Gross domestic product 37547 138949783 1.031 39191 181445879 1.813 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ GDP 4.956 21.643 0.228 9.791 32.280 1.963 -0.188 0.009 -0.002 0.000 YES
∆ House price 12.927 547.326 1.537 27.875 620.597 0.975 -0.031 0.003 0.000 0.000 NO
∆ Public debt 8.691 141.438 0.360 -3.155 77.732 0.000 0.113 0.006 0.001 0.000 YES
∆ Top 1% income 0.128 2.003 2.220 0.273 2.735 -3.990 -0.114 0.063 -0.011 0.003 NO
∆ Top 10% Income 0.252 4.244 0.894 0.451 3.873 -3.179 -0.002 0.041 -0.007 0.002 NO
∆ Unemployment
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SM3.2 Verification of clustered standard errors
Clustered standard errors in samples with cluster-size being lower 50 are potentially
subject to severe bias (Ke´zdi, 2004; Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2006). We opt for
an empirical strategy to identify the potential of cluster-effects by calculating intra-
cluster correlation coefficients (ICC) (see Killip, Mahfoud and Pearce, 2004). The ICC
basically compares within country versus cross-country variance. ICC values close to 1
indicate strong cluster effects whereas values around 0 assign no cluster effects. In our
case, we need to assess the ICC for the four treatments as well as for ideological sub-
groups of position shifts of left as well as right parties because we have an interactive
argument. We demonstrate empirically, that intracluster correlation is substantially
higher than cross-cluster correlation (very low ICC) and thus, motivate our absten-
tion from country clustered standard errors (compare below for the individual ICC
p-values). ICC’s are calculated using clttest in Stata (Donner and Klar, 2000). Cluster
effects are slightly higher within the groups of left and right parties in comparison
to the combined sample. However, ICCs are still very close to zero and accordingly
clustered standard errors are not justified.
Table SM3.2: Intracluster correlation of party position shifts within countries
Sample Treatment Cluster ICC N clusters N
Left-right combined GDP growth Country 0.000 35 1941
Left-right combined ∆ House prices Country 0.000 19 1241
Left-right combined ∆ Public debt Country 0.001 34 1549
Left-right combined ∆ Top 1 % income share Country 0.000 17 1104
Only left parties GDP growth Country 0.010 35 986
Only left parties ∆ House prices Country 0.005 18 600
Only left parties ∆ Public debt Country 0.004 34 782
Only left parties ∆ Top 1 % income share Country 0.010 17 527
Only right parties GDP growth Country 0.021 35 955
Only right parties ∆ House prices Country 0.003 19 641
Only right parties ∆ Public debt Country 0.000 32 767
Only right parties ∆ Top 1 % income share Country 0.027 17 577
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SM3.3 Additional results: Tables and graphs
Table SM3.3: Prais-Winsten regression results (models behind Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 12)
Full sample Niche parties Mainstream parties
VARIABLES GDP growth ∆ Public debt ∆ House prices ∆ Top 1 % income GDP growth ∆ Public debt ∆ House prices ∆ Top 1 % income GDP growth ∆ Public debt ∆ House prices ∆ Top 1 % income
Party position t -1 -0.130*** -0.222 -0.151*** -0.189*** -0.285*** -0.376*** -0.279*** -0.420*** -0.232*** -0.307*** -0.217*** -0.263
∆ GDP 0.004** - - - 0.003 - - - 0.003** - - -
∆ GDP × Party position t -1 -0.008*** - - - -0.007** - - - -0.006** - - -
Gross domestic product t -1 -0.000 - - - -0.000 - - - -0.000 - - -
∆ Public debt - -0.003 - - - -0.004*** - - - -0.003** - -
∆ Debt × Party position t -1 - 0.006 - - - 0.007** - - - 0.005** - -
Public debt t -1 - -0.001 - - - -0.000 - - - -0.001*** - -
∆ House price - - 0.001** - - - 0.001* - - - 0.001* -
∆ House price × Party position t -1 - - -0.002** - - - -0.002 - - - -0.003** -
House price t -1 - - 0.000 - - - -0.000* - - - 0.000 -
∆ Top 1% income - - - -0.013* - - - -0.019 - - - -0.010
∆ Top 1% income × Party position t - - - - 0.004 - - - 0.028 - - - 0.001
Top 1% income t -1 - - - -0.006* - - - -0.010 - - - -0.007
Constant -0.287** 0.120 -0.029 0.081 -0.113 0.112*** 0.011 0.094 -0.230 0.182*** 0.031 0.357
Observations 1045 1045 762 598 294 306 198 155 751 774 564 472
Number of parties 247 247 159 127 79 83 48 38 168 172 111 89
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Note: All models for linear predictions estimated with Prais-Winsten regressions with country dummies and panel corrected standard errors. Non-
linear marginal effects plots are computed using OLS estimations with country fixed effects and robust standard errors. For the GDP and public debt models, our covariate selection
approach identified income inequality as a control variable. Due to data availability, the inclusion reduced our sample by almost one half, so we decided to drop the variable to
maximise sample size.
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Table SM3.4: Panel regression models with party fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 12)
Full sample Niche parties Mainstream parties
VARIABLES GDP growth ∆ Public debt ∆ House prices ∆ Top 1 % income GDP growth ∆ Public debt ∆ House prices ∆ Top 1 % income GDP growth ∆ Public debt ∆ House prices ∆ Top 1 % income
Party position t -1 -0.743*** -0.834*** -0.742*** -0.804*** -0.818*** -0.863*** -0.847*** -0.955*** -0.734*** -0.833*** -0.730*** -0.777***
∆ GDP 0.005*** - - - 0.001 - - - 0.006** - - -
∆ GDP × Party position t -1 -0.008*** - - - -0.002 - - - -0.009** - - -
Gross domestic product t -1 -0.000 - - - -0.000 - - - -0.000 - - -
∆ Public debt - -0.003*** - - - -0.003** - - - -0.004*** - -
∆ Debt × Party position t -1 - 0.007*** - - - 0.005* - - - 0.008*** - -
Public debt t -1 - -0.000** - - - -0.001** - - - -0.000 - -
∆ House price - - 0.001*** - - - 0.001 - - - 0.002*** -
∆ House price × Party position t -1 - - -0.003*** - - - -0.002* - - - -0.003*** -
House price t -1 - - 0.000 - - - -0.000** - - - 0.000 -
∆ Top 1% income - - - -0.009* - - - -0.022* - - - -0.008
∆ Top 1% income × Party position t - - - - 0.003 - - - 0.032 - - - 0.001
Top 1% income t -1 - - - -0.010** - - - -0.026** - - - -0.008*
Constant 0.117 0.461*** 0.467*** 0.651*** -0.049 0.403*** 0.157 0.360* 0.215 0.493*** 0.540*** 0.728***
Observations 1045 1045 762 598 294 294 198 152 751 751 564 446
Number of parties 247 247 159 127 79 79 48 38 168 168 111 89
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Note: All models for linear predictions estimated with Prais-Winsten regressions with country dummies and panel corrected standard errors. Non-
linear marginal effects plots are computed using OLS estimations with country fixed effects and robust standard errors. For the GDP and public debt models, our covariate selection
approach identified income inequality as a control variable. Due to data availability, the inclusion reduced our sample by almost one half, so we decided to drop the variable to
maximise sample size.
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SM3.3.1 Robustness: Alternative specifications and control variables configurations
In the robustness section, we put the interaction effects of the main models reported above to a critical assessment. For purpose of
comparison, we provide the results from the main specifications presented above in the first two columns. For both specifications,
Prais-Winston regressions with panel-corrected standard errors and party fixed effects with robust standard errors, we then include
year dummies to control for time trends, exclude and include all potential controls from our dataset and lift the sample restriction
of time and partisan types. Finally, we present results from specifications with party random effects (including time dummies due
to the time structure of the dataset) and OLS estimations with country-clustered jackknife standard errors. In addition, we test
the impact of unemployment as an additional and salient indicator of socio-economic change. We only depict the interaction effect
but constitutive terms of the interaction are part of every model. Controls are also not shown in order to improve the clarity of the
tables.
Table SM3.5: Robustness of main effect for each indicator
Treatment ∆ GDP growth
Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Panel (robust) OLS jackknife
∆ GDP × Party position t -1 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007** -0.009** -0.006** -0.004* -0.008*** -0.008**
Observations 1045 1045 1045 1045 989 989 1438 1438 1045 1045
Number of parties 247 247 247 247 230 230 305 305 247 -
Party FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES YES NO
Party RE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country dummies YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Year dummies NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO YES NO
Full controls NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
Unrestricted sample NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO
Replications - - - - - - - - - 31
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Treatment ∆ House prices
Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Panel (robust) OLS jackknife
∆ HP × Party position t -1 -0.002** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002**
Observations 762 762 762 762 752 752 1062 1062 762 762
Number of parties 159 159 159 159 158 158 202 202 159 -
Party FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES YES NO
Party RE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country dummies YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Year dummies NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO YES NO
Full controls NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
Unrestricted sample NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO
Replications - - - - - - - - - 18
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Treatment ∆ Public debt
Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Panel (robust) OLS jackknife
∆ Debt × Party position t -1 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.005** 0.008*** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006**
Observations 1045 1045 1045 1045 989 989 1438 1438 1045 1045
Number of parties 247 247 247 247 230 230 305 305 247 -
Party FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES YES NO
Party RE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country dummies YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Year dummies NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO YES NO
Full controls NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
Unrestricted sample NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO
Replications - - - - - - - - - 16
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Treatment ∆ Top 1 % income share
Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Panel (robust) OLS jackknife
∆ Top1 × Party position t -1 0.004 0.003 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.003 -0.0003 0.004 0.01 0.004
Observations 598 598 598 598 591 591 812 812 598 598
Number of parties 127 127 127 127 126 126 162 162 127 -
Party FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES YES NO
Party RE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country dummies YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Year dummies NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO YES NO
Full controls NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
Unrestricted sample NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO
Replications - - - - - - - - - 16
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Treatment ∆ Unemployment
Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Prais-Winston Panel (robust) Panel (robust) OLS jackknife
∆ Unemp × Party position t -1 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02**
Observations 1045 1045 1045 1045 989 989 1438 1438 1045 1045
Number of parties 247 247 247 247 230 230 305 305 247 -
Party FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES YES NO
Party RE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Country dummies YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Year dummies NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO YES NO
Full controls NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
Unrestricted sample NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO
Replications - - - - - - - - - 31
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure SM3.1: Non-linear marginal effects with party fixed effects: full sample
Note: Results derived from OLS regression with country dummies and robust standard errors. Bandwidth optimized
for models with only robust standard errors.
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Figure SM3.2: Non-linear marginal effects with party fixed effects: split sample
Note: Results derived from OLS regression with country dummies and robust standard errors. Bandwidth optimised
for models with only robust standard errors.
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Figure SM3.3: Linear predictions: split sample
Note: Results derived from Prais-Winsten regression with panel-corrected standard errors.
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Figure SM3.4: Linear predictions with party fixed effects: full sample
Note: Results derived from panel regression with party fixed effects and robust standard errors.
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Figure SM3.5: Linear predictions with party fixed effects: split sample
Note: Results derived from panel regression with party fixed effects and robust standard errors.
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Figure SM3.6: Linear marginal effects: full sample
Note: Results derived from Prais-Winsten regression with panel-corrected standard errors.
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Figure SM3.7: Linear marginal effects: split sample
Note: Results derived from Prais-Winsten regression with panel-corrected standard errors.
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Figure SM3.8: Linear marginal effects with party fixed effects: full sample
Note: Results derived from panel regression with party fixed effects and robust standard errors.
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Figure SM3.9: Linear marginal effects with party fixed effects: split sample
Note: Results derived from panel regression with party fixed effects and robust standard errors.
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Figure SM3.10: Non-linear marginal effects for unemployment
Note: Top row represents OLS models with country fixed effects and robust standard errors, bottom row with party
fixed effects and party clustered standard errors.
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Figure SM3.11: Linear predictions for unemployment variable
Note: Top row represents Prais-Winsten regressions with country fixed effects and panel-corrected standard errors,
bottom row with party fixed effects and robust standard errors.
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Figure SM3.12: Linear predictions: CMP RILE score
Note: Results derived from Prais-Winsten regression with panel-corrected standard errors.
127
-.0
4
-.0
2
0
.0
2
.0
4
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
GDP growth
-.0
06
-.0
04
-.0
02
0
.0
02
.0
04
.0
06
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Δ House prices
-.0
03
-.0
02
-.0
01
0
.0
01
.0
02
.0
03
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Party position/RILE (t-1)
Δ Public debt
-.1
5
-.1
-.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Party position/RILE (t-1)
Δ Top 1% income
Figure SM3.13: Non-linear marginal effects: CMP RILE score
Note: Results derived from OLS regressions with country fixed effects and robust standard errors. Bandwidths optimised
for OLS models with robust standard errors only.
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Table SM3.6: Models with CMP RILE score as a left-right measurement of party positions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Prais-Winsten Panel Prais-Winsten Panel Prais-Winsten Panel Prais-Winsten Panel Prais-Winsten
GDP growth GDP growth ∆ Public debt ∆ Public debt ∆ House prices ∆ House prices ∆ Top 1 % income ∆ Top 1 % income ∆ Unemployment
Party position t -1 -0.301*** -0.897*** -0.325*** -0.925*** -0.246*** -0.907*** -0.270*** -0.944*** -0.325***
∆ GDP 0.000 0.001 - - - - - - -
∆ GDP × Party position t -1 -0.002 -0.003 - - - - - - -
Gross domestic product t -1 -0.000** -0.000* - - - - - - -
∆ Public debt - - 0.001 -0.001 - - - - -
∆ Debt × Party position t -1 - - -0.000 0.004** - - - - -
Public debt t-1 - - -0.000** -0.000** - - - - -
∆ House price - - - - 0.000 0.001* - - -
∆ House price × Party position t -1 - - - - -0.001 -0.002** - - -
House price t -1 - - - - -0.000 -0.000 - - -
∆ Top 1% income - - - - - - -0.010 -0.004 -
∆ Top 1% income × Party position t -1 - - - - - - 0.029 0.018 -
Top 1% income t -1 - - - - - - -0.003 -0.001 -
∆ Unemployment - - - - - - - - 0.003
∆ Unemployment × Party position t -1 - - - - - - - - -0.002
Unemployment t -1 - - - - - - - - -0.000
Constant -0.140 0.143 0.172*** 0.418*** -0.098 0.370*** -0.069 0.413*** 0.158***
Observations 1045 1045 1045 1045 762 762 598 598 1045
Number of parties 247 247 247 247 159 159 127 127 247
Country dummies YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Party FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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